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Statement	  of	  Problem	  	   Within	  the	  larger	  frame	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  the	  generally	  unknown	  public	  performance	  right	  and	  its	  varied	  interpretations	  have	  grown	  exponentially	  in	  the	  last	  thirty	  years.	  	  Performance	  rights	  organizations	  have	  been	  responsible	  for	  the	  massive	  growth	  of	  copyright	  collectives	  worldwide,	  but	  nowhere	  more	  than	  in	  Canada.	  Prior	  to	  the	  1988	  Phase	  I	  revisions	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Act,1	  there	  was	  a	  single	  copyright	  collective	  authorized	  under	  Canadian	  law,	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  music	  performance	  rights.	  Since	  the	  Phase	  I	  revisions	  were	  enacted,	  more	  than	  thirty-­‐‑eight	  copyright	  collectives2	  have	  been	  registered	  with	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada.	  With	  thirty-­‐‑eight	  registered	  collectives,	  Canada	  has	  more	  than	  double	  the	  copyright	  collectives	  of	  any	  other	  nation.	  3	  	   The	  continued	  growth	  of	  copyright	  collectives	  reflects	  their	  unique	  ability	  to	  extract	  value	  from	  previously	  existing	  works.	  New	  collectives	  mean	  new	  revenue	  streams	  on	  works	  already	  in	  circulation	  as	  well	  as	  those	  yet	  to	  be	  created.	  The	  current	  Canadian	  copyright	  collectives	  owe	  their	  existence	  to	  the	  establishment	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  Canada.	  While	  initially	  limited	  to	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  musical	  works,	  copyright	  collectives	  have	  now	  expanded	  their	  scope	  to	  encompass	  other	  areas.4	  Several	  Royal	  Commissions	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-30 s. 1 [Act]. 
2 A copyright collective is an agency created under the terms of the Copyright Act which collects royalties 
or licensing fees on behalf of registered copyright owners. Note however that of the 38 collectives listed 
there are only 35 separate collectives; 3 collectives (Societe du Droit de Reproduction des Auteurs 
Compositeurs et Editeurs au Canada [SODRAC], Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency 
[CMRRA] and Society of Composers Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [SOCAN]) collect in 
multiple areas.  3	  Daniel J. Gervais, “Collective Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada: An 
International Perspective” (2002) 1 CJLT 2 at 18 table 3.	   
4 For example, Access Copyright collects for the reproduction rights of works published in books, 
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been	  created	  in	  response	  to	  the	  concerns5	  from	  users6	  brought	  forward	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  original	  Canadian	  collective.	  Canada	  established	  a	  copyright	  tribunal	  in	  1936,	  well	  in	  advance	  of	  other	  common-­‐‑law	  countries.7	  While	  some	  form	  of	  this	  tribunal	  has	  been	  in	  operation	  for	  almost	  eighty	  years	  there	  has	  been	  very	  little	  scholarship	  in	  regard	  to	  its	  operation	  and	  almost	  none	  that	  attempts	  to	  critically	  engage	  the	  issue	  beyond	  simple	  economic	  or	  legal	  function.	  	  	  	  	   The	  intent	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  history	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  its	  regulatory	  oversight	  role	  on	  behalf	  of	  users.	  Contextualizing	  the	  issue	  within	  the	  frames	  of	  information	  policy,	  legal	  theory	  and	  critical	  historical	  analysis	  will	  provide	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  understanding	  the	  establishment	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  board	  and	  its	  powers.	  Using	  a	  critical	  historical	  holistic	  approach	  will	  enrich	  the	  policy	  analysis	  with	  factors	  beyond	  simply	  the	  purely	  economic	  or	  legal.	  This	  approach	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  derogate	  the	  importance	  of	  such	  factors,	  but	  rather	  to	  recognize	  that	  legal	  and	  economic	  institutions	  operate	  in	  a	  larger	  public	  realm	  and	  not	  only	  impact	  that	  realm,	  but	  are	  also	  impacted	  by	  it.	  As	  an	  example,	  the	  massive	  expansion	  of	  copyright	  collectives	  following	  the	  1988	  revisions	  to	  the	  Act	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
magazines, journals and newspapers. The Producers Audiovisual Collective of Canada collects fees from 
the sale of blank audiovisual recording media and devices (often referred to as "private copy levies"), from 
the rental and lending of video recordings, from exhibition or public performance rights, and from 
educational copying and performance of audiovisual works.  
5 These commissions will be discussed in chapter three but primarily concerned the level of tariff being 
charged, and the legitimacy of works for which tariff was sought. 
6 User in this context would refer to anyone person or group requiring the use of a copyrighted work subject 
to collective license. 7	  Daniel Gervais, “A Uniquely Canadian Institution: The Copyright Board of Canada” in Ysolde Gendreau, 
ed, An Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm: Perspectives from Canada (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2008) at 207. Mario Bouchard, “Collective Management in Commonwealth Jurisdictions: Comparing 
Canada with Australia” in Daniel Gervais, ed, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights 
(The Netherlands: Kluwer, 2006) at 310.  
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strategic	  policy	  initiative	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  government.	  Generally,	  such	  far-­‐‑reaching	  initiatives	  are	  the	  result	  of	  factors	  beyond	  the	  simply	  legal,	  leading	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  function	  of	  the	  board	  has	  impacted	  the	  larger	  policy	  process,	  and	  was	  in	  turn	  impacted	  by	  it.	  	   Viewing	  the	  problem	  within	  a	  critical	  historical	  frame,	  the	  primary	  focus	  will	  be	  upon	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  the	  board	  over	  time,	  in	  particular	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Board	  given	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  (SCC)	  in	  2004	  &	  2012.	  	  
Justification	   	  	   Intellectual	  Property	  (IP)	  regimes	  have	  traditionally	  depended	  upon	  the	  container	  to	  provide	  the	  physical	  embodiment	  of	  artificial	  scarcity.	  	  Maintaining	  the	  myth	  of	  scarcity	  and	  the	  control	  of	  intellectual	  works	  is	  increasingly	  difficult	  in	  our	  expanding	  digital	  society.	  Increasingly	  one	  of	  the	  responses	  being	  used	  to	  address	  that	  concern	  is	  that	  of	  collectivization.	  While	  the	  expansion	  of	  collectives	  within	  the	  copyright	  regimes	  has	  largely	  gone	  unnoticed	  by	  the	  public,	  these	  agencies	  collect	  yearly	  rents	  in	  excess	  of	  $342	  million	  from	  Canadian	  users.	  Even	  using	  this	  undoubtedly	  low	  figure,8	  it	  still	  amounts	  to	  almost	  $10	  for	  every	  man,	  woman	  and	  child	  in	  Canada.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This figure is based on information available from only four of the registered collectives, and while it did 
include the largest, SOCAN, it is not a true reflection of the actual per capita cost which will be 
undoubtedly higher. The data was gathered in 2015 and reflects revenues in the 2014 fiscal period (with 
respect to Societe Quebecise de Gestion Collective, des Droits de Reproduction (COPIBEC) the 2013-2014 
fiscal year)   See Society of Composers Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) “SOCAN 
Annual Report” online: <http://www.socanannualreport.ca>, Societe Quebecise de Gestion Collective, des 
Droits de Reproduction (COPIBEC). “Annual Report 2014-2015” online: 
<http://www.copibec.qc.ca/Portals/0/Fichiers_PDF_anglais/rapp_annuel_copibec_2014-15_ang_web.pdf>; 
Canadian Private Copying Collective, Financial Highlights” online: <http://www.cpcc.ca/en/the-
cpcc/financial-highlights> and Access Copyright at “Annual Report” online:  
<https://www.accesscopyright.ca/media/91810/2014_ar_final.pdf>. 
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   Unlike	  much	  of	  the	  policy	  analysis	  done	  in	  the	  copyright	  arena,	  this	  thesis	  takes	  a	  critical	  approach	  to	  the	  topic,	  viewing	  it	  not	  only	  from	  its	  economic	  outcomes,	  but	  also	  within	  the	  context	  of	  its	  social	  and	  cultural	  impacts.	  While	  the	  increasing	  recourse	  to	  collective	  licensing	  as	  a	  policy	  response	  is	  of	  great	  concern,	  the	  complete	  absence	  of	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  within	  this	  process	  illustrates	  a	  significant	  absence	  in	  the	  literature.	  It	  is	  the	  contention	  of	  the	  author	  that	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  critical	  analysis	  has	  been	  the	  extremely	  successful	  hegemonic	  process,	  which	  has	  surrounded	  the	  regimes	  of	  collective	  management	  from	  their	  earliest	  stages.	  
Theoretical	  Framework	  
	   Gramsci’s	  theoretical	  interpretation	  provides	  a	  strong	  analytic	  framework	  for	  this	  study,	  as	  the	  standard	  economic	  and	  philosophic	  rationales	  surrounding	  the	  policy	  process	  raise	  significant	  questions.9	  The	  economic	  literature	  in	  particular	  seems	  to	  indicate	  a	  reality	  contrary	  to	  the	  justifications	  historically	  offered.	  Gramsci’s	  hegemonic	  theory	  will	  be	  used	  to	  construct	  an	  organizing	  rationale	  behind	  the	  successful	  imposition,	  and	  expansion	  of	  collective	  management.	  The	  copyright	  board,	  collective	  societies	  and	  the	  copyright	  and	  policy	  experts	  within	  the	  larger	  community	  can	  in	  analysis	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  indicative	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  process.	  	  
	   In	  a	  previous	  work10	  the	  author	  utilized	  this	  frame	  to	  form	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  establishment	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  within	  the	  Canadian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For a more complete discussion see D’Alton 2014, “A Gramscian Analysis of the Public Performance 
Right”, in Intellectual Property for the 21st Century Interdisciplinary Approaches, B. Courtney Doagoo, 
Mistrale Goudreau, Teresa Scassa and Madelaine Saginur ed., (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2014).  
10 Louis J. D’Alton, A Critical Historical Analysis of the Public Performance Right (PhD Dissertation, 
University of Western Ontario, 2012) [unpublished]. 
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copyright	  environment.	  That	  work	  traced	  the	  creation	  and	  establishment	  of	  a	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  the	  common-­‐‑law	  tradition	  and	  its	  eventual	  widespread	  implementation.	  The	  primary	  issue	  underlying	  the	  creation	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  musical	  works,	  when	  viewed	  within	  a	  critical	  Marxist	  frame,	  was	  the	  essential	  struggle	  between	  authors/composers	  and	  the	  dominant	  publishing	  interests,	  which	  dictated	  their	  terms	  of	  employment	  and	  recompense.	  In	  particular,	  the	  previous	  work	  considered	  the	  initial	  establishment	  of	  what	  Gramsci	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘historic	  bloc’,	  a	  cross	  class	  alliance	  between	  traditionally	  opposing	  interests,	  publisher	  and	  composer.	  The	  initial	  study	  encompassed	  the	  history	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  from	  its	  beginnings	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  through	  its	  global	  expansion	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  with	  a	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Canadian	  experience.	  While	  much	  of	  the	  focus	  was	  on	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  the	  work	  ended	  with	  the	  1988	  phase	  one	  revision	  to	  copyright	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  massive	  expansion	  of	  collective	  management	  of	  copyright	  in	  Canada.	  	  	  In	  part	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  companion	  piece	  to	  that	  previous	  work.	  Some	  of	  the	  material	  presented	  in	  chapter	  two	  and	  the	  historical	  discussion	  surrounding	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  first	  tribunal	  in	  section	  3.1	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	  earlier	  work.	  	  This	  material	  provides	  the	  foundational	  context	  on	  which	  this	  current	  thesis	  is	  structured.	  Where	  the	  focus	  previously	  was	  on	  the	  creation	  and	  dominance	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  frame,	  this	  thesis	  concerns	  itself	  with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  tribunal	  within	  that	  larger	  process,	  and	  specifically	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  process	  has	  changed	  since	  the	  1988	  revisions	  to	  copyright.	  Additionally,	  while	  the	  initial	  work	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concerned	  itself	  with	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Canada,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  work	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  Canada	  while	  also	  considering	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Australia,	  which	  share	  the	  common	  law	  tradition	  and	  a	  common	  root	  of	  copyright	  legislation.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  contextualizing	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  theoretical	  ‘fit’	  to	  the	  current	  research	  the	  author	  notes	  that	  the	  performance	  rights	  organizations	  initially	  balked	  at	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  oversight	  agency,	  but	  over	  time	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  hegemonic	  process	  encapsulated	  and	  expanded	  the	  role	  of	  the	  board11	  to	  serve	  the	  dominant	  agenda	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  process.	  This	  process	  might	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  regulatory	  capture,	  however	  that	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  theoretical	  value	  of	  the	  Gramscian	  interpretation.	  
Thesis	  	  
	   The	  general	  thesis	  of	  this	  work	  is	  that	  the	  collective	  management	  of	  rights	  within	  copyright	  as	  established	  within	  the	  Anglo-­‐‑American	  legal	  tradition	  exists	  and	  has	  been	  successfully	  expanded	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  capital	  interests.	  Contemporary	  copyright	  policy	  relies	  upon	  the	  use	  of	  administrative	  tribunals	  within	  the	  copyright	  environment	  with	  little	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  their	  nature,	  justifications	  or	  impact	  upon	  the	  larger	  society	  of	  information	  users.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two	  the	  original	  purpose	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  was	  to	  provide	  regulatory	  oversight	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Earlier research revealed a number of attempts by collectives to evade their obligations to the board. 
Such behavior can be seen to peak with their attempt to discredit the Copyright Appeal Board’s right to 
oversee them during an appearance before the Ilsley Commission. More recently Knopf has commented on 
the collectives use of the Copyright Board hearing process to acquire private information that would 
otherwise be unavailable, Howard P. Knopf “Canadian Copyright Collectives and the Copyright Board: A 
Snap Shot in 2008” (paper delivered at Law Society of Upper Canada Continuing Legal Education 
Program, 28 February 2008) online: 
<http://www.macerajarzyna.com/pages/publications/Knopf_Canadian_Copyright_Collectives_Copyright_
Board_Feb2008.pdf>. 
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over	  the	  collective	  (singular	  at	  that	  point)	  on	  behalf	  of	  users.	  That	  initial	  role	  of	  oversight	  and	  protection	  has	  been	  lost	  over	  time	  and	  the	  tribunals	  now	  are	  generally	  promoted	  as	  agencies	  driving	  economic	  development.	  
	   Through	  a	  critical	  historical	  study	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  it’s	  predecessor,	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board,	  and	  copyright	  tribunals	  of	  other	  common	  law	  jurisdictions,	  the	  author	  will	  posit	  a	  model	  to	  explain	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  the	  tribunal	  from	  one	  of	  oversight	  to	  participant	  and	  its	  eventual	  absorption,	  along	  with	  the	  policy	  process,	  into	  the	  policy	  network	  surrounding	  the	  collective	  rights	  management	  regimes.	  This	  general	  thesis	  leads	  to	  a	  series	  of	  research	  questions,	  which	  seek	  to	  identify	  the	  key	  actors	  in	  the	  area	  and	  consider	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  various	  sectors.	  	   It	  is	  presumed	  that	  the	  readers	  of	  this	  work	  have	  at	  minimum	  a	  perfunctory	  understanding	  of	  copyright,12	  and	  while	  there	  will	  be	  no	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  regime	  as	  a	  whole,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  provide	  some	  definitions	  of	  recurring	  terms	  relevant	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  term	  intellectual	  property	  is	  the	  broad	  designation	  given	  the	  area	  of	  law	  which	  encompasses	  works	  of	  the	  intellect.	  Specifically,	  intellectual	  property	  includes	  Copyright,	  Patent	  and	  Trademark.	  Within	  the	  larger	  area	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  copyright	  is	  unique	  insofar	  as	  it	  deals	  with	  literary,	  dramatic,	  musical	  and	  artistic	  works	  as	  opposed	  to	  mechanical	  contrivances	  or	  inventions.	  	  A	  Copyright	  Board	  or	  Tribunal	  is	  a	  national	  regulatory	  agency	  established	  by	  legislation	  through	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  it’s	  country	  of	  origin.	  Their	  primary	  role	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For a detailed discussion of copyright and intellectual property as a whole see Vaver, David, Intellectual 
Property Law: Copyright, Patent, Trade-marks, (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2011). 
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the	  regulation	  of	  tariffs	  levied	  by	  copyright	  collectives	  for	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  works.	  Copyright	  collectives	  are	  also	  established	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  national	  legislations	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  collecting	  licence	  fees	  or	  royalties	  for	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  on	  behalf	  of	  copyright	  owners	  who	  have	  assigned	  their	  rights	  to	  the	  collective.	  	  	  
Objectives	  and	  Research	  Questions	  
	   The	  objective	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  attempt	  to	  discern	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board,	  and	  copyright	  tribunals	  generally,	  in	  the	  acceptance	  and	  expansion	  of	  collective	  management	  within	  the	  policy	  environment	  and	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  the	  impact	  on	  users	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  and	  other	  subject	  matter.	  Note	  that	  within	  this	  context	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘user’	  can	  be	  convoluted.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  tariff	  rulings	  of	  the	  Board,	  they	  are	  generally	  perceived	  to	  be	  directed	  at	  large	  scale	  users	  such	  as	  media	  broadcasters,	  as	  well	  as	  smaller	  users	  such	  as	  motels,	  hotels,	  churches	  and	  service	  clubs.	  However,	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  noted	  in	  Alberta	  
Education	  v	  Access	  Copyright,	  while	  tariffs	  are	  generally	  crafted	  based	  on	  an	  aggregate	  amount	  of	  users,	  they	  should	  in	  fact	  be	  considered	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  individual	  user	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  issues	  regarding	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Act.13	  
	   To	  accomplish	  this	  objective,	  the	  following	  research	  questions	  are	  posed:	  	  
	   1.	  In	  what	  ways	  has	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  changed	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  scope	  and	  oversight	  role	  since	  its	  creation	  as	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  in	  1936?	  
	   2.	  How	  well	  are	  user	  interests	  represented	  in	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  Board?	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37 [Alberta 
v AC].at 29. 
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   3.	  Has	  lobbying	  by	  the	  various	  industries	  represented	  by	  collective	  management	  shaped/impacted	  Board	  practice?	  
	   4.	  Is	  there	  evidence	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  policy	  or	  findings	  of	  the	  Board	  as	  a	  function	  over	  time?	  	  
	   5.	  Has	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  original	  public	  performance	  right	  collectives	  continued	  to	  significantly	  impact	  the	  Board	  since	  the	  1988	  copyright	  revisions,	  or	  has	  the	  network	  seen	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  key	  players?	  	  
Methodology	  
	   This	  study	  is	  situated	  within	  the	  critical-­‐‑historical	  paradigm	  and	  will	  utilize	  both	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  inputs.	  Such	  research	  “typically	  goes	  beyond	  mere	  description	  and	  attempts	  to	  interpret	  the	  facts	  as	  reconstructed.	  .	  ..	  	  the	  historian	  attempts	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  the	  facts	  in	  light	  of	  a	  relevant	  theory”.14	  This	  investigation	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  contextual	  framing	  of	  the	  justificatory	  theories	  underpinning	  copyright	  law,	  and	  thus	  the	  existence	  of	  copyright	  tribunals.	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  by	  several	  copyright	  scholars	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  administrative	  tribunals	  greatly	  impact	  the	  policy	  process	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  information	  which	  can	  be	  sought,	  the	  costs	  of	  appearance	  and	  the	  often	  ‘one	  sided’	  appearance	  of	  information	  flow	  in	  related	  hearings.15	  	  The	  study	  will	  outline	  the	  establishment	  and	  expansion	  of	  collective	  management	  regimes	  and	  their	  accompanying	  oversight	  tribunals,	  with	  a	  particular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ronald R. Powell, Basic Research Methods for Librarians, 2d ed (Greenwich CT: Ablex, 1991) at 137. 15	  For	  further	  discussion	  on	  these	  issues	  see	  Daniel Gervais, “A Uniquely Canadian Institution: The 
Copyright Board of Canada” in Ysolde Gendreau, ed, An Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm: 
Perspectives from Canada (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), and Howard Knopf, “Canadian Copyright 
Collectives and the Copyright Board: A Snap Shot in 2008” (28 February 2008), supra note 11. 
	   10	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  Canadian	  experience.	  The	  analysis	  will	  be	  framed	  using	  multiple	  data	  sources	  including	  legal	  decisions,	  government	  policy	  documents,	  stakeholder	  internal	  publications,	  and	  other	  sources	  of	  data	  reflecting	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  various	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  policy	  process.	  Particular	  emphasis	  will	  be	  given	  to	  those	  decisions	  of	  the	  Board	  that	  were	  later	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Federal	  Court.	  
	   The	  case	  being	  studied	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  actors	  and	  roles	  performed	  within	  the	  system	  surrounding	  collective	  rights	  management	  in	  Canada.	  The	  term	  
surrounding	  provides	  linkage	  to	  both	  the	  foundational	  networks,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  system,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  extended	  collective	  management	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  Copyright	  Board,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  derived	  from	  the	  collective	  rights	  management	  system.	  While	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  research	  is	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  copyright	  board,	  noting	  the	  linkage	  recognizes	  that	  the	  collective	  management	  network	  exists	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  foundational	  networks	  and	  their	  successful	  inculcation.	  
	   Discussions	  of	  copyright	  policy	  and	  process	  will	  often	  situate	  themselves	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  legal	  rulings.	  Cyril	  Ehrlich	  has	  commented	  “[s]uch	  interpretations	  of	  history	  give	  undue	  weight	  to	  intricacies	  of	  law,	  a	  common	  tendency	  in	  this	  field	  of	  study,	  and	  pay	  scant	  regard	  to	  economic	  realities”.16	  While	  legal	  systems	  may	  provide	  the	  coercion	  necessary	  to	  insure	  adherence	  to	  whatever	  regimes	  are	  established,	  they	  do	  not	  create	  law	  purely	  for	  their	  own	  interests.	  In	  issues	  of	  copyright	  the	  law	  is	  usually	  responding	  to	  economic	  concerns	  and	  as	  Paul	  Romer	  notes	  in	  the	  American	  Economic	  Review,	  it	  behooves	  economists	  to	  “explain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Cyril	  Ehrlich, Harmonious Alliance: A History of the Performing Right Society, (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) at 3. 
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that	  the	  policy	  goal	  should	  be	  to	  maximize	  consumer	  welfare,	  not	  such	  popular	  proxies	  as	  ‘exports’	  or	  ‘industry	  revenues’”.17	  Thus,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  upon	  the	  holistic	  nature	  of	  the	  network	  itself	  and	  the	  socio-­‐‑economic	  framework	  surrounding	  it	  as	  opposed	  to	  purely	  law	  or	  economic	  theory.	  
Organizational	  Plan	  	   The	  study	  will	  proceed	  along	  the	  following	  organizational	  plan.	  This	  chapter	  will	  introduce	  the	  problem	  under	  study	  and	  place	  it	  within	  the	  context	  of	  policy	  analysis.	  It	  will	  also	  outline	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  research	  and	  its	  proposed	  implication	  for	  the	  field.	  Chapter	  two	  will	  briefly	  consider	  the	  justificatory	  rationales	  for	  copyright	  and	  their	  dependence	  on	  the	  creator	  myth.	  The	  centrality	  of	  creator	  as	  justification	  for	  the	  existence	  and	  promulgation	  of	  copyright	  will	  be	  considered	  within	  historical	  context.	  It	  will	  also	  introduce	  the	  theoretical	  work	  of	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	  whose	  conception	  of	  hegemony	  provides	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  construct	  an	  organizing	  rationale	  behind	  the	  successful	  imposition,	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  collective	  management	  process.	  The	  hegemonic	  framework	  explains	  the	  success	  of	  the	  process	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ultimate	  acceptance	  and	  support	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board.	  	  	   Chapter	  three	  will	  consider	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  in	  comparison	  with	  similar	  tribunal	  based	  systems	  in	  other	  jurisdictions,	  specifically	  England	  and	  Australia.	  The	  chosen	  jurisdictions	  all	  share	  the	  same	  root	  for	  their	  initial	  copyright	  legislation	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1911.	  However,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Paul Romer, “When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?” (2002) American Economic  
Review 92 at 215. 
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the	  UK	  Act	  of	  1911	  did	  not	  provide	  provision	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  copyright	  tribunals.	  Each	  nation	  would	  eventually	  create	  an	  administrative	  tribunal	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  collective	  management	  of	  copyright	  but	  the	  timeline	  and	  approach	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  tribunal-­‐‑based	  administration	  was	  very	  different,	  thus	  indicating	  the	  impact	  of	  different	  policy	  goals.	  	   Chapter	  four	  will	  consider	  the	  status	  of	  the	  user	  under	  the	  three	  regimes.	  Particular	  attention	  will	  be	  given	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  status	  and	  role	  of	  the	  user	  within	  copyright	  following	  the	  2004	  decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  (SCC),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reconsideration	  of	  Fair	  Dealing	  by	  the	  court.	  This	  contemporary	  Canadian	  standard	  for	  Fair	  Dealing	  and	  the	  user	  will	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  parallel	  regimes.	  	  	   Chapter	  five	  will	  review	  Copyright	  Board	  decisions	  that	  reached	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  the	  period	  2004-­‐‑2014.	  This	  period	  was	  chosen	  as	  it	  coincides	  with	  the	  landmark	  ruling	  of	  CCH	  Canadian	  Ltd.	  V.	  Law	  Society	  of	  Upper	  Canada	  18	  in	  2004,	  which	  fundamentally	  changed	  the	  interpretation	  of	  copyright	  law	  with	  respect	  to	  users	  in	  Canada.	  The	  period	  also	  encompasses	  the	  Pentalogy	  rulings	  of	  July	  2012,	  which	  would	  further	  elaborate	  the	  understanding	  of	  copyright	  and	  the	  role	  of	  users	  in	  Canada.	  These	  will	  also	  be	  discussed.	  	   Chapter	  6	  will	  review	  inquiries	  into	  copyright	  and	  the	  tribunals.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Canadian	  Royal	  Commissions	  of	  the	  early	  and	  mid	  twentieth	  century	  there	  have	  also	  been	  numerous	  (and	  more	  recent)	  reviews	  in	  both	  England	  an	  Australia,	  though	  only	  one	  single	  review	  devoted	  solely	  to	  the	  tribunals	  themselves	  outside	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  CCH Canadian Ltd. V. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 [CCH].	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the	  early	  Canadian	  ones.	  While	  no	  new	  reviews	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  Canada	  since	  the	  1950s,	  the	  current	  internal	  review	  process	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada	  will	  also	  be	  considered.	  	  	   Chapter	  seven	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  section	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  salient	  points	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  and	  its	  parallel	  tribunals	  within	  a	  Gramscian	  hegemonic	  frame.	  The	  final	  part	  will	  consider	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  thesis	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  research	  questions	  posed,	  and	  consider	  possible	  alternatives	  to	  the	  current	  policy	  solutions	  that	  might	  more	  effectively	  achieve	  the	  intended	  policy	  objectives,	  but	  with	  a	  reduced	  social	  cost.	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Chapter	  2	  Contextualizing	  the	  Copyright	  &	  Tribunal	  Discussion	  
“The	  great	  enemy	  of	  truth	  is	  very	  often	  not	  the	  lie	  –	  deliberate,	  contrived	  and	  dishonest	  
–	  but	  the	  myth	  –	  persistent,	  persuasive,	  and	  unrealistic.”	  John	  F.	  Kennedy19	  There	  are	  two	  primary	  streams	  of	  justification	  most	  often	  cited	  in	  the	  defence	  of	  copyright,	  the	  natural	  right	  of	  the	  author	  or	  ‘right’	  based	  system	  and	  one	  based	  on	  economic	  efficiency	  or	  utilitarianism.20	  These	  two	  systems	  are	  often	  idealized	  in	  the	  French	  author	  centric	  system	  of	  “Droit	  d’Auteur”	  and	  the	  English	  common-­‐‑law	  system	  centred	  on	  economic	  efficiency.	  Some	  theorists,	  such	  as	  von	  Lewinski,	  posit	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  incompatible	  nature	  of	  the	  author	  versus	  economic	  driven	  philosophies	  has	  been	  the	  basis	  for	  much	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  have	  accompanied	  international	  agreements	  with	  respect	  to	  copyright.	  Conversely,	  Jane	  Ginsburg	  has	  noted	  that	  the	  gulf	  between	  the	  two	  variant	  systems	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  great	  as	  has	  been	  portrayed,	  and	  that	  in	  fact	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  in	  common	  than	  at	  odds.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  justification,	  the	  notion	  of	  author	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  both	  variants.	  While	  the	  author	  lies	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  rationale	  within	  right-­‐‑based	  systems,	  even	  within	  utilitarian/economic	  frameworks	  the	  author	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  justifying	  the	  system.	  However,	  one	  standpoint	  is	  rarely	  if	  ever	  considered,	  the	  irrelevance	  of	  the	  author.	  	  It	  is	  the	  contention	  of	  this	  author	  that	  the	  most	  significant	  purpose	  of	  copyright	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  industrial	  era	  (which	  coincides	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at Yale University, Old Campus, New Haven, Connecticut, 
June 11, 1962. 
20 Murray, Laura J., Trosow, Samuel E., Canadian Copyright A Citizen’s Guide, 2nd Edition (Between The 
Lines, Toronto, 2013) p 4. 
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copyright	  systems	  in	  the	  western	  world)	  has	  been	  to	  further	  the	  creation	  and	  circulation	  of	  capital	  and	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  author	  within	  copyright	  has	  simply	  been	  to	  provide	  the	  human	  connection	  needed	  to	  sell	  an	  unpopular	  product.	  When	  viewed	  within	  that	  context	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  author	  loses	  its	  import	  and	  rather	  can	  be	  seen	  simply	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  justify	  a	  tenuous	  scheme	  that	  intuitively	  holds	  little	  validity	  for	  the	  average	  user.	  	  
2.1	  Copyright	  Myths	  While	  one	  tends	  to	  think	  of	  copyright	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  creator,	  and	  certainly	  the	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  any	  copyright	  dispute	  will	  generally	  clothe	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  “creator”,	  with	  respect	  to	  economic	  rights,	  copyright	  does	  not	  in	  fact	  protect	  the	  creator,	  but	  rather	  the	  owner.	  While	  the	  creator	  is	  usually	  the	  first	  owner	  of	  the	  copyright,21	  under	  normal	  circumstances	  (at	  least	  historically	  in	  the	  case	  of	  music	  and	  the	  book	  trade)	  the	  copyright	  owner	  is	  usually	  the	  publisher,	  as	  the	  assignation	  of	  copyright	  to	  the	  publishing	  house	  is	  a	  normal	  condition	  of	  publication.22	  Assignment	  may	  be	  for	  a	  limited	  time	  or	  may	  be	  permanent,	  but	  rights	  guaranteed	  under	  the	  Act	  protect	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  copyright,	  not	  the	  creator.	  As	  copyright	  scholar	  David	  Vaver	  has	  pointed	  out,	  the	  first	  myth	  of	  copyright	  law	  is	  that	  it	  “is	  designed	  to	  protect	  authors.	  In	  locating	  itself	  around	  the	  central	  character	  of	  the	  author	  .	  .	  .	  copyright	  law	  is	  politically	  astute.”23	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  The Copyright Act at s. 13 (1) states the general rule in Canada; however, there are exceptions to this, for 
example work done in the employ of others may be owned by the corporate employer unless contractually 
stipulated otherwise. Similarly, photographs or works of fine art done in return for recompense are owned 
by the commissioner, unless an agreement to the contrary is made at s. 10 (2). 22	  Joanna	  Demers,	  Steal	  This	  Music:	  How	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  Affects	  Musical	  	  
Creativity, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2006) at 12. 
23 David Vaver, “Intellectual property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes” (1990) 69:1 Can Bar Rev at 102.    
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The	  other	  myth	  to	  be	  dispelled	  is	  that	  despite	  the	  nomenclature,	  Intellectual	  Property	  is	  not	  in	  fact	  property	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense.	  	  Property	  is	  by	  its	  nature	  rivalrous	  in	  consumption,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  ownership	  and	  use	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  physical	  property	  denies	  anyone	  else	  the	  use	  of	  it	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  The	  ownership	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  property	  by	  one	  individual	  can	  (at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  owner)	  limit	  the	  use	  of	  the	  property	  by	  others	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  in	  use	  by	  the	  owner.	  Likewise,	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  owner,	  uses	  may	  be	  made	  of	  the	  property,	  which	  make	  it	  unusable	  for	  any	  other	  purpose	  in	  the	  future.	  By	  contrast,	  many	  people	  may	  use	  works	  of	  the	  intellect	  without	  diminishing	  the	  ability	  of	  anyone	  else	  to	  use	  them.	  In	  many	  instances	  the	  more	  use	  that	  is	  made	  of	  the	  work	  the	  greater	  its	  value	  becomes	  (for	  example	  books,	  music,	  fine	  art).	  At	  first	  blush	  this	  distinction	  between	  intellectual	  property	  and	  real	  property	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  simply	  semantic,	  but	  it	  is	  vitally	  important	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  copyright.	  The	  fundamental	  reason	  we	  perceive	  and	  treat	  works	  of	  the	  intellect	  as	  extensions	  of	  property	  is	  because	  we	  have	  been	  taught	  to	  do	  so.	  As	  the	  economists	  Boldrin	  and	  Levine	  noted	  in	  their	  inquiry	  into	  intellectual	  property,	  "	  For	  at	  least	  three	  thousand	  years,	  musical	  and	  literary	  works	  have	  been	  created	  in	  pretty	  much	  every	  society,	  and	  in	  the	  complete	  absence	  -­‐‑	  in	  fact,	  often	  under	  the	  explicit	  prohibition	  -­‐‑	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  copyright	  protection	  .”24	  	  However	  as	  a	  society	  we	  have	  been	  increasingly	  inculcated	  into	  the	  notion	  and	  necessity	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  in	  large	  part	  by	  the	  legal	  system	  which	  administers	  it.	  Reviewing	  the	  growth	  of	  intellectual	  property	  systems	  over	  the	  last	  two	  hundred	  years,	  William	  Fisher	  stated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Boldrin, Michele. Levine, David, Against Intellectual Monopoly, (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) p30. 
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the	  “final	  force	  that	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  intellectual-­‐‑property	  rights	  consists	  of	  a	  gradual	  shift	  in	  the	  terminology	  used	  by	  lawyers	  to	  describe	  and	  discuss	  those	  rights	  -­‐‑-­‐‑	  in	  a	  word,	  the	  "propertization"	  of	  the	  field.”	  25	  Thus,	  authority	  figures	  throughout	  society	  regularly	  profess	  that	  works	  of	  the	  intellect	  are	  property,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  property	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense	  and	  that	  must	  always	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  whenever	  intellectual	  property	  is	  discussed.	  As	  Vaver	  points	  out,	  “Capitalists	  want	  to	  ‘own’	  whatever	  their	  enterprise	  produces	  .	  .	  .	  tangible	  or	  intangible.	  .	  ..	  Those	  who	  imitate	  or	  appropriate	  such	  assets	  can	  then	  be	  called	  thieves	  and	  pirates.	  .	  .	  ”	  26	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  this	  is	  hegemonic	  in	  its	  form	  and	  function,	  the	  inculcation	  of	  processes	  favourable	  to	  those	  dominating	  the	  social	  order.	  
2.2	  Common-­‐‑law	  Model	  
	   While	  there	  are	  historical	  predecessors,	  the	  first	  copyright	  legislation	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐‑American	  legal	  tradition,	  and	  one	  that	  would	  also	  have	  great	  impact	  on	  the	  French	  tradition,	  was	  An	  Act	  for	  the	  Encouragement	  of	  Learning,	  by	  Vesting	  the	  
Copies	  of	  Printed	  Books	  in	  the	  Authors	  or	  Purchasers	  of	  such	  Copies,	  During	  the	  Times	  
therein	  mentioned,27	  While	  much	  can	  be	  made	  of	  the	  history	  leading	  up	  to	  this	  Act,28	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Fisher, William W. III, “The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the 
United States” online: <https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property99/history.html>.  
26 David Vaver, “Agnostic Observations on Intellectual Property” (1991) 6 IPJ 125 at 3.  
27 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times therein mentioned, Copyright Act 1709, 8 Ann c 19. [Statute 
of Anne] 
28 Patterson in his treatise makes much of the connection between the state and the book trade in his 
understanding of the ultimate purpose of the Act, conversely Feather’s history seems to focus on the 
inequity of power relations exhibited in the author-publisher relationship. Deazley however views the Act 
as fundamentally one of balance, a bargain “It was the free market of ideas, not the marketplace of the 
bookseller, which provided the central focus for the Statute of Anne” Ronan Deazley, On	  the	  Origin	  of	  the	  
Right	  to	  Copy:	  Charting	  the	  Movement	  of	  Copyright	  Law	  in	  Eighteenth-­‐‑	  Century	  Britain	  (1695–1775), 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) at 46. 
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ultimately	  it	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  attempt	  at	  balance.	  As	  the	  full	  title	  of	  the	  Act	  makes	  clear,	  its	  intended	  purpose	  was	  to	  encourage	  learning.	  It	  did	  so	  in	  several	  ways.	  First	  by	  securing	  to	  authors	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  their	  works	  for	  a	  period	  of	  14	  years	  and	  also	  by	  requiring	  duties	  of	  the	  publishers.	  As	  part	  of	  their	  duties	  publishers	  were	  required	  to	  make	  free	  copies	  of	  the	  best	  quality	  available	  to	  the	  centres	  of	  learning.	  Penalties	  were	  prescribed	  for	  failure	  to	  do	  so.	  Publishers	  were	  also	  required	  to	  keep	  prices	  reasonable.	  Again	  failure	  to	  do	  so	  could	  lead	  to	  financial	  penalties	  as	  well	  as	  the	  price	  of	  the	  book	  being	  reduced.29	  	  	  We	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  the	  history	  of	  copyright	  in	  terms	  of	  rights,	  be	  they	  author’s	  rights	  or	  publisher’s	  rights.	  However,	  as	  the	  initial	  legislation	  indicates	  users’	  rights	  were	  also	  delineated,	  specifically	  the	  protection	  from	  usurious	  fees.	  More	  poignant	  however	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  duties,	  obligations	  upon	  the	  publishers.	  These	  concepts	  of	  users’	  rights	  and	  publishers’	  duties	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  largely	  forgotten	  in	  the	  history	  of	  copyright	  debate.	  Ultimately	  copyright	  in	  its	  present	  form	  is	  most	  commonly	  viewed	  as	  an	  efficient	  means	  to	  ensure	  economic	  investment	  in	  information	  industries.	  
2.3	  Justification	  on	  the	  Basis	  of	  Economic	  Efficiency	  	  The	  Economic	  Efficiency	  model	  (also	  sometimes	  treated	  as	  the	  Utilitarian	  model)	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  the	  justificatory	  basis	  for	  the	  common	  law	  tradition.30	  Within	  this	  model,	  intellectual	  property	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  necessary	  response	  given	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  intellectual	  works	  makes	  control	  difficult.	  Without	  such	  regimes,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
29 Statute of Anne, supra note 21 at s. 4. 
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downstream	  users	  could	  make	  use	  of	  works	  freely	  without	  any	  of	  the	  costs	  normally	  associated	  with	  creation	  and	  development,	  and	  thus	  bring	  goods	  to	  the	  market	  at	  a	  significantly	  reduced	  cost	  than	  could	  the	  originator.	  Ultimately,	  this	  free	  riding	  would	  result	  in	  market	  failure,	  as	  creators	  would	  have	  no	  incentive	  to	  invest	  in	  creation	  given	  that	  the	  costs	  of	  research	  and	  development	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  recovered.	  Within	  this	  framework,	  copyright	  operates	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  public	  policy,	  utilizing	  a	  statutorily	  created	  limited	  monopoly	  to	  ensure	  sufficient	  return	  to	  incent	  creation.	  This	  is	  often	  portrayed	  as	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  creator	  and	  the	  user,	  in	  which	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  user	  (access	  to	  works)	  are	  balanced	  against	  those	  of	  the	  creator	  (incentive	  to	  create).	  Thus	  the	  copyright	  monopoly,	  while	  limiting	  access,	  is	  justified	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  works	  are	  created	  and	  disseminated	  and	  should	  eventually	  become	  available	  within	  the	  public	  domain.	  
2.4	  Limitations	  on	  the	  Economic	  Efficiency	  Model	  	  	   While	  the	  economic	  efficiency	  model	  may	  seem	  a	  reasonable	  approach	  there	  are	  nonetheless	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  raised	  to	  contest	  it.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  not	  all	  works	  are	  created	  for	  monetary	  gain.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  particularly	  true	  of	  works	  of	  an	  artistic	  nature.	  Artists	  (of	  any	  medium)	  create	  because	  they	  feel	  a	  need	  to	  do	  so,	  not	  only	  for	  economic	  incentive,	  and	  often	  despite	  the	  lack	  of	  economic	  success.	  As	  Service	  Canada	  has	  noted	  on	  their	  website	  “Like	  many	  other	  occupations	  in	  the	  arts,	  multiple	  employment	  is	  common...their	  income	  from	  activities	  in	  this	  occupation	  alone	  is	  often	  not	  enough	  to	  make	  ends	  meet”.31	  	  Nigel	  Parker	  has	  noted	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The Service Canada website noted that in the 2011 National Household Survey, 46% of all self identified 
musicians and singers earned less than $10,000 in annual income, online: 
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/qc/job_futures/statistics/5133.shtml. 
	   20	  
“Creators	  do	  not	  create	  for	  the	  joy	  or	  prestige	  of	  owning	  a	  copyright	  -­‐‑	  or	  even	  for	  the	  money	  which	  that	  copyright	  may	  earn.	  Copyright	  does	  not	  itself	  generate	  creativity.”32	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  artists	  should	  not	  be	  rewarded	  for	  contributing	  to	  the	  culture	  of	  our	  societies,	  rather	  it	  is	  simply	  to	  note	  that	  they	  would	  likely	  do	  so	  regardless.	  	  Thus,	  incentive	  as	  a	  necessity	  for	  creation	  becomes	  suspect.	  	   There	  is	  also	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  economic	  research	  into	  copyright	  that	  indicates	  that	  the	  incentive	  rationale	  of	  copyright	  simply	  does	  not	  hold	  up.	  Birgitte	  Andersen,	  R.	  Kozul-­‐‑Wright,	  and	  Z.	  Kozul	  Wright’s	  “The	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Effects	  of	  Copyrights	  in	  the	  Music	  Industry”33	  examines	  many	  of	  the	  copyright	  stereotypes	  existing	  in	  the	  music	  industry.	  Within	  the	  study,	  Andersen	  et	  al.	  comment	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  incomes	  is	  due	  as	  much	  to	  “strategic	  interaction	  and	  bargaining	  power	  of	  individuals	  and	  firms,	  and	  the	  governance	  structures	  of	  copyrights,	  as	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  musical	  talent	  or	  market	  forces.”34	  Andersen	  et	  al.	  also	  note	  areas	  of	  conflict	  within	  the	  copyright	  regimes,	  which,	  while	  perhaps	  fruitful	  economically	  for	  those	  in	  superior	  bargaining	  positions,	  do	  not	  necessarily	  benefit	  either	  creators	  or	  cultural	  expression.	  Ultimately	  they	  state,	  “[w]hereas	  the	  copyright	  system	  in	  its	  current	  form	  is	  good	  in	  facilitating	  income	  and	  rent	  creation	  from	  musical	  ideas,	  we	  must	  recognize	  the	  problem	  that	  it	  is	  enormously	  bad	  in	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  Parker,	  Nigel,	  Music	  Business:	  Infrastructure,	  Practice	  and	  Law,	  (London:	  Sweet	  and	  	  
Maxwell, 2004) at 3. 33	  Birgitte	  Andersen,	  Richard	  Kozul-­‐‑Wright,	  and	  Zeljka	  Kozul-­‐‑Wright,	  “The	  Social	  and	  	  
Economic Effects of Copyrights in the Music Industry: A Contribution to the Convergence versus 
Divergence Debate” in F. MacMillan, ed, New Directions in Copyright Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2005). 
34	  Ibid	  at	  26.	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creating	  a	  ‘fair’	  income	  distribution,	  acknowledging	  creativity	  throughout	  the	  industry,	  and	  also	  somewhat	  unsuccessful	  in	  generating	  cultural	  expansion.”35	  	  Martin	  Kretschmer	  has	  also	  considered	  the	  author-­‐‑driven	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  copyright	  regimes,	  seeking	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  their	  effect.	  Kretschmer	  determines	  that	  copyright	  is	  in	  fact	  structured	  to	  benefit	  investors	  not	  creators,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  those	  artists	  who	  have	  become	  so	  large	  that	  they	  are	  in	  essence	  corporate	  entities	  (e.g.	  Springsteen,	  U2,	  Dylan).	  Kretschmer	  concludes:	  
[O]ur	  study	  reveals	  that	  orthodox	  assumptions	  about	  the	  function	  of	  copyright	  in	  creator’s	  lives	  are	  largely	  invalid.	  Copyright	  neither	  appears	  to	  support	  the	  creative	  basis	  of	  society	  nor	  does	  it	  make	  cultural	  materials	  available	  in	  a	  legal	  form	  that	  legitimizes	  creative	  digital	  re-­‐‑use.	  Future	  Copyright	  policy	  must	  be	  based	  on	  a	  much	  clearer	  empirical	  picture	  of	  the	  role	  of	  Copyright	  in	  creative	  production.36	  	  	   In	  2010	  Harvard	  economist	  Oberholzer-­‐‑Gee	  in	  conjunction	  with	  his	  colleague	  Strumpf	  constructed	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  downloading	  practices.	  They	  determined	  that	  practices	  were	  affecting	  music	  industry	  sales;	  however,	  not	  to	  the	  extent	  claimed	  by	  the	  industry.	  Of	  greater	  interest	  however	  was	  their	  contention	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  file	  sharing	  had	  “considerably	  weakened	  copyright	  protection”	  there	  was	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  greater	  access	  had	  resulted	  in	  increasing	  amounts	  of	  creative	  outputs.	  	  Overall	  production	  figures	  for	  the	  creative	  industries	  appear	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  this	  view	  that	  file	  sharing	  has	  not	  discouraged	  artists	  and	  publishers.	  	  While	  album	  sales	  have	  generally	  fallen	  since	  2000,	  the	  number	  of	  albums	  being	  created	  has	  exploded.	  	  In	  2000,	  35,516	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid at 27. 36	  Martin	  Kretschmer,	  “Artists’	  Earnings	  and	  Copyright:	  A	  Review	  of	  British	  and	  German	  	  Music	  Industry	  Data	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Digital	  Technologies”	  (2005)	  7.8	  First	  Monday	  at	  13.	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albums	  were	  released.	  	  Seven	  years	  later,	  79,695	  albums	  (including	  25,159	  digital	  albums)	  were	  published	  (Nielsen	  SoundScan,	  2008).37	  	  Nor	  was	  this	  increase	  limited	  to	  the	  music	  industry,	  Oberholzer-­‐‑Gee	  and	  Strumpf	  noted	  similar	  increases	  in	  the	  film	  and	  publishing	  industries.	  Such	  a	  conclusion	  is	  a	  direct	  contradiction	  of	  the	  fundamental	  copyright	  justification	  that	  incentive	  is	  required	  for	  creation.	  	   The	  impact	  of	  this	  economic	  research	  underscores	  the	  need	  for	  clarity	  in	  the	  roles	  of	  policy	  instruments	  such	  as	  copyright.	  If	  the	  purpose	  of	  copyright	  is	  to	  reward	  and	  benefit	  creators,	  then	  the	  policies	  are	  not	  working	  given	  the	  economic	  outcomes	  these	  researchers	  are	  seeing.	  While	  this	  discussion	  of	  policy	  outcomes	  was	  precipitated	  by	  the	  incentive	  justification	  within	  the	  Anglo-­‐‑American	  tradition,	  the	  outcomes	  are	  the	  same	  regardless	  of	  the	  author	  centric	  nature	  of	  the	  regimes.	  While	  Oberholzer-­‐‑Gee	  &	  Strumpf	  were	  focusing	  on	  America	  (common-­‐‑law)	  and	  Kretschmer	  on	  Germany	  (author-­‐‑centric)	  Andersen	  et	  al	  were	  looking	  internationally.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  geographic	  source	  of	  data	  the	  author	  did	  not	  benefit	  significantly	  relative	  to	  the	  industrial	  interests.	  
2.5	  Natural	  Right	  of	  the	  Creator	  	   While	  this	  thesis	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  copyright	  in	  a	  common	  law	  tradition,	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  author/creator	  to	  the	  justifications	  of	  copyright	  historically	  warrants	  a	  brief	  consideration	  of	  the	  natural	  right	  theory.	  The	  continental	  vision	  of	  copyright	  law	  is	  generally	  seen	  to	  have	  derived	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  natural	  right	  of	  an	  author	  to	  his	  work,	  in	  particular	  Georg	  Wilhelm	  Friedrich	  Hegel’s	  notion	  of	  personhood.	  Margaret	  Radin	  interprets	  Hegel	  as	  stating	  that	  “to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid at 24. 
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achieve	  proper	  self-­‐‑development—to	  be	  a	  person—an	  individual	  needs	  some	  control	  over	  resources	  in	  the	  external	  environment.”38	  	  Radin	  notes,	  “Because	  the	  person	  in	  Hegel’s	  conception	  is	  merely	  an	  abstract	  unit	  of	  free	  will	  or	  autonomy,	  it	  has	  no	  concrete	  existence	  until	  that	  will	  acts	  on	  the	  world.”39	  In	  acting	  upon	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  the	  abstract	  self	  unites	  with	  its	  physical	  self	  and	  infuses	  its	  will	  into	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	   Though	  this	  philosophy	  might	  form	  the	  romantic	  rationale	  for	  continental	  copyright,	  Jane	  Ginsburg	  has	  presented	  some	  very	  convincing	  scholarship	  that	  suggests	  that	  it	  was	  economic	  issues	  rather	  than	  philosophical	  that	  were	  the	  driving	  force	  in	  the	  French	  legislation.	  While	  reiterating	  points	  of	  the	  historic	  debates	  between	  Condorcet	  and	  Le	  Chapelier,	  Ginsburg	  also	  clarifies	  that	  much	  of	  the	  myth	  comes	  from	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  figures	  are	  quoted,	  and	  as	  with	  many	  such	  reports	  quotes	  taken	  out	  of	  context	  can	  have	  a	  very	  different	  meaning.	  Remarking	  on	  Le	  Chapelier’s	  famous	  quote	  “the	  most	  sacred,	  the	  most	  legitimate,	  the	  most	  unassailable,	  and	  …the	  most	  personal	  of	  all	  properties,	  is	  the	  work	  which	  is	  the	  fruit	  of	  a	  writer’s	  thoughts.”40	  Ginsburg	  points	  out	  that	  the	  quote	  was	  directed	  toward	  unpublished	  works.	  Once	  published	  however	  the	  work	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  private	  thing	  but	  rather	  the	  work	  was	  “give[n]	  over	  to	  the	  public…by	  the	  nature	  of	  things,	  everything	  is	  finished	  for	  the	  author	  and	  the	  publisher	  when	  the	  public	  has	  in	  this	  way	  acquired	  the	  work.”41	  Essentially	  Le	  Chapelier	  was	  advocating	  for	  a	  right	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Radin,	  Margaret,	  “Property	  and	  Personhood”	  (1982)	  34	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  [957]	  at	  957.	  
39 Ibid at 972. 
40 Le Chapelier cited in Jane C Ginsburg,	  “A Tale of two Copyrights” (1990) 64.5 Tulane Law Review 
[991] at 1006. 
41 Ibid. 
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public	  domain	  far	  more	  than	  an	  author’s	  right.	  It	  might	  also	  be	  said	  he	  was	  advocating	  for	  an	  inalienable	  moral	  right	  of	  the	  author	  to	  make	  the	  work	  known	  to	  the	  world,	  however	  once	  it	  was	  released	  he	  seemed	  to	  feel	  the	  work	  possessed	  a	  public	  life	  of	  its	  own.	  Such	  a	  viewpoint	  might	  seem	  well	  placed	  in	  the	  contemporary	  copyright	  discourse	  given	  the	  increasing	  awareness	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  mass	  mediated	  culture	  in	  the	  human	  experience.	  Within	  such	  contexts	  works	  of	  art	  take	  on	  a	  life	  of	  their	  own	  in	  their	  absorption	  and	  transformation	  as	  cultural	  objects	  arguably	  clearly	  evidenced	  in	  the	  massive	  amounts	  of	  user	  generated	  content	  on	  websites	  such	  as	  YouTube.	  	  	   Not	  simply	  content	  with	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  framers	  of	  the	  1793	  legislation	  may	  have	  had	  different	  viewpoints	  about	  authorial	  rights	  than	  generally	  accepted	  in	  the	  modern	  discourse,	  Ginsburg	  looked	  further	  into	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  courts	  following	  enactment	  of	  the	  legislation	  to	  draw	  out	  proof	  that	  authors	  were	  not	  necessarily	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  Act.	  In	  the	  judgement	  of	  Veuve	  Buffon	  -­‐‑	  C.	  Behmer42	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  decrees	  of	  1789	  did	  not	  impact	  on	  an	  author’s	  right	  to	  compensation	  for	  his	  work	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  noted	  the	  policy	  that	  the	  copyright	  regime	  should	  reward	  authors	  in	  return	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  advancement	  of	  public	  learning.43	  Note	  that	  the	  court	  stated	  not	  that	  the	  author	  had	  an	  inalienable	  right	  to	  the	  fruits	  of	  his	  intellect,	  but	  rather	  that	  he	  should	  be	  rewarded	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  advancement	  of	  public	  learning.	  Such	  a	  position	  was	  clearly	  far	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Anglo-­‐‑American	  tradition	  as	  it	  is	  generally	  understood.	  Similarly,	  the	  ruling	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  Dictionary	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Veuve Buffon - C. Behmer, Cour de cassation, Therm. 29, S. Jur. I, an 11 at 851. 
43 Jane C Ginsburg, “A Tale of two Copyrights” (1990) 64.5 Tulane Law Review [991] at 1018. 
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Academie	  francaise	  supported	  the	  right	  of	  a	  producer	  over	  an	  author.44	  Again	  such	  a	  position	  seems	  in	  clear	  contravention	  of	  the	  accepted	  mythic	  place	  of	  the	  author	  in	  the	  French	  regime.	  
2.6	  Reconsidering	  Natural	  Right	  Theory	  	   The	  personhood	  theory	  posits	  that	  intellectual	  works	  are	  the	  product	  of	  the	  “self”	  and	  lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human,	  our	  ability	  to	  think	  and	  reason.	  To	  deny	  one	  the	  right	  to	  control	  the	  creations	  of	  their	  intellect	  would	  be	  in	  effect	  to	  deny	  their	  personhood.	  This	  position	  proved	  very	  popular	  during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.	  The	  notion	  of	  romantic	  genius	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  divine	  spark	  within	  humanity	  and	  became	  a	  rallying	  point	  for	  authorial	  existence	  and	  rights	  ascribed	  to	  it.	  The	  natural-­‐‑right	  theory	  however	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  historical	  practice	  of	  simply	  borrowing	  works	  from	  other	  creators,	  nor	  does	  it	  recognize	  that	  virtually	  all	  intellectual	  products	  are	  the	  by-­‐‑products	  of	  the	  material	  that	  has	  been	  infused	  and	  digested.	  To	  suggest	  that	  new	  works	  have	  sprung	  “a	  priori”	  from	  the	  void	  is	  arguably	  the	  greatest	  romantic	  fantasy.	  Artistic	  works	  are	  often	  based	  on	  pre-­‐‑existing	  works,	  inspired	  by	  other	  works	  and	  virtually	  always	  reflect	  and	  reference	  other	  works	  albeit	  not	  necessarily	  in	  an	  obvious	  fashion.	  As	  Sir	  Isaac	  Newton	  said,	  “If	  I	  have	  seen	  further	  than	  others	  it	  is	  because	  I	  was	  standing	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  giants,”45	  which	  is	  simply	  to	  say	  that	  all	  intellectual	  growth	  depends	  upon	  both	  the	  great	  and	  minor	  works	  which	  have	  preceded	  it	  to	  inspire	  and	  provoke.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Ibid.	  
45 Sir Isaac Newton in a letter to a fellow scientist, Robert Hooke, Feb 5, 1675. The Quotations Page 
online: <http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Isaac_Newton/>. 
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2.7	  The	  Economic	  Core	  at	  the	  Heart	  of	  Copyright	  	   While	  the	  French	  regime	  has	  couched	  itself	  in	  the	  fabric	  of	  authorial	  genius	  Ginsburg	  has	  made	  clear	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  historical	  context.	  Similarly,	  while	  the	  Anglo-­‐‑American	  tradition	  has	  justified	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  efficiency	  it	  has	  nonetheless	  relied	  on	  the	  public	  face	  of	  the	  author	  to	  lend	  credibility	  to	  these	  regimes.	  However	  as	  stated	  at	  the	  outset	  these	  two	  traditionally	  disparate	  organizing	  principles	  share	  one	  fundamental	  purpose	  in	  common,	  the	  creation	  of	  capital.	  	  We	  have	  long	  been	  inculcated	  to	  revere	  the	  notion	  of	  authorial	  genius,	  and	  in	  that	  respect,	  as	  David	  Vaver	  has	  noted,	  copyright	  is	  “politically	  astute”.	  Dressed	  in	  that	  romantic	  concept	  copyright	  regimes	  can	  maintain	  a	  tenuous	  justification	  in	  our	  contemporary	  world.	  However,	  there	  is	  an	  irony	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  given	  the	  neo-­‐‑liberal	  obsession	  with	  economic	  rationalization,	  it	  is	  the	  economic	  literature	  being	  promulgated	  within	  the	  copyright	  discourse	  that	  is	  proving	  the	  failure	  of	  these	  regimes	  to	  achieve	  their	  stated	  policy	  purpose.	  More	  importantly	  the	  economic	  literature	  is	  removing	  the	  romantic	  mantle	  from	  copyright’s	  justifications.	  	  	  The	  primary	  purpose	  of	  copyright	  is	  to	  create	  capital;	  the	  author	  is	  only	  of	  value	  insofar	  as	  he	  or	  she	  can	  provide	  a	  suitable	  justification	  for	  the	  regime.	  As	  Nigel	  Parker	  has	  noted	  copyright	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  incent	  creation,	  	  [I]t	  is	  an	  incentive	  to	  invest.	  The	  music	  business	  has	  grown	  up	  based	  on	  long-­‐‑tail	  income	  from	  established	  copyrights.	  Accumulations	  of	  copyrights	  spread	  	  risks	  and	  generates	  funds	  to	  finance	  new	  music.	  Without	  long	  term	  profits	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  from	  the	  most	  successful	  creators,	  investment	  in	  new	  music	  would	  be	  almost	  non-­‐‑existent.46	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Supra	  note	  27.	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In	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Industries:	  Incentives	  and	  Earnings47	  Ruth	  Towse	  drew	  together	  as	  much	  data	  as	  possible	  to	  determine	  what	  income	  artists	  derive	  from	  copyright	  sources.	  She	  found	  that	  despite	  high	  aggregate	  earnings	  from	  copyright	  “the	  large	  sums	  of	  royalty	  income	  that	  copyright	  law	  enables	  to	  be	  collected	  goes	  mainly	  to	  the	  publishers	  (music	  publishers	  and	  record	  companies)	  and	  to	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  high	  earning	  performers.”48	  	  	  But	  the	  tentative	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  economic	  power	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  cultural	  industries,	  which	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  vertically	  integrated	  oligopolies,	  strengthened	  as	  they	  are	  by	  copyright	  law,	  is	  such	  that	  conceivable	  changes	  to	  that	  law	  could	  not	  vastly	  improve	  the	  earnings	  of	  artists.	  	  At	  a	  time	  in	  which	  the	  future	  of	  copyright	  law	  is	  being	  considered	  in	  the	  light	  of	  technological	  upheaval,	  we	  must	  also	  ask	  if	  it	  has	  anyway	  served	  the	  public	  well.49	  	  As	  posited	  at	  the	  outset,	  the	  actual	  status	  of	  the	  author	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  copyright	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  long	  as	  an	  author	  or	  a	  creator,	  or	  an	  artist	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  rallying	  point	  for	  public	  opinion	  they	  will	  be	  called	  forth	  and	  put	  on	  display.	  	  However	  increasingly	  the	  author	  as	  a	  concept	  has	  been	  called	  into	  question,	  and	  more	  importantly	  the	  contemporary	  ease	  of	  information	  transfer	  and	  manipulation	  is	  giving	  birth	  to	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  creators,	  citizen	  journalists	  and	  creativity	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  massive	  growth	  of	  YouTube,	  Flickr	  and	  literally	  millions	  of	  blogs50.	  As	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  consumer/user/creator	  is	  reached	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ruth Towse, “Copyright and the Cultural Industries: Incentives and Earnings” (Paper delivered at the 
Korea Infomedia Lawyers Association, 2003) [unpublished]. 48	  Ibid	  at	  16.	  	  
49 Ibid at 17. 50	  While	  it	  is	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  capture	  all	  the	  blogs	  actually	  operating,	  as	  of	  October	  2015,	  there	  were	  260.5	  million	  operating	  just	  within	  Tumblr, “Cumulative total of Tumblr blogs between May 
2011 and October 2015” online: <http://www.statista.com/statistics/256235/total-cumulative-number-of-
tumblr-blogs/>. 
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justifications	  for	  an	  increasingly	  irrelevant	  copyright	  regime	  become	  more	  difficult	  to	  maintain.	  	  
2.8	  Gramsci,	  Hegemony	  &	  Copyright	   	  	  	   While	  this	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  a	  single	  aspect	  of	  copyright,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  remember	  that	  copyright	  as	  a	  process	  controls	  the	  flow,	  distribution,	  use	  and	  reuse	  of	  information	  throughout	  society.	  Within	  that	  context,	  copyright	  can	  and	  has	  been	  used	  as	  tool	  of	  capital	  within	  business	  and	  publishing	  dimensions.	  Copyright	  has	  provided	  those	  interests	  with	  a	  means	  to	  deny	  or	  limit	  the	  use	  of	  information	  by	  society,	  and	  in	  particular	  those	  members	  of	  society	  who	  make	  up	  the	  working	  class/users	  of	  the	  information.	  The	  successful	  imposition	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  created	  the	  precedent	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  further	  owners’	  rights	  across	  a	  spectrum	  of	  information	  and	  not	  merely	  the	  public	  performance	  of	  musical	  works.	  The	  recent	  critical	  discourse	  surrounding	  the	  collective	  licensing	  of	  educational	  materials	  is	  directly	  attributable	  to	  the	  success	  of	  that	  hegemonic	  order.	  	  Gramsci’s	  concept	  of	  hegemony	  is	  situated	  within	  a	  political	  economic	  view	  of	  society,	  and	  is	  formulated	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  fundamental	  Marxist	  positions.	  Economic	  relations	  are	  the	  base	  in	  a	  base-­‐‑superstructure	  hierarchy	  and	  within	  the	  historical	  processes	  delineated	  by	  Marx,	  determine	  derivative	  structures	  that	  form	  the	  superstructure	  (the	  realms	  of	  the	  political,	  the	  social	  and	  the	  intellectual).	  An	  orthodox	  interpretation	  holds	  that	  the	  movements	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  independent	  units	  of	  society	  are	  a	  result	  of	  these	  established	  and	  inherited	  property	  structures,	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and	  within	  these	  units	  of	  organization,	  cultural	  activity	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  controlling	  economic	  interests.	  	  For	  Gramsci	  however,	  society	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  its	  cultural	  and	  ideological	  parts	  and	  is	  not	  simply	  driven	  by	  economic	  divisions.	  Therefore,	  the	  dialectic	  nature	  of	  the	  social	  order,	  with	  its	  varying	  influences	  and	  exchanges,	  can	  and	  does	  have	  political	  outcomes	  regardless	  of	  class	  status.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  French	  revolution	  Gramsci	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  upheaval	  was	  not	  simply	  determined	  by	  economic	  inequalities:	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  rupture	  of	  the	  equilibrium	  of	  forces	  did	  not	  occur	  as	  the	  result	  of	  direct	  mechanical	  causes	  -­‐‑-­‐‑	  i.e.	  the	  impoverishment	  of	  the	  social	  group	  which	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  breaking	  the	  equilibrium,	  and	  which	  did	  in	  fact	  break	  it.	  It	  occurred	  in	  the	  context	  of	  conflicts	  on	  a	  higher	  plane	  than	  the	  immediate	  world	  of	  the	  economy;	  conflicts	  related	  to	  class	  “prestige”	  (future	  economic	  interests),	  and	  to	  an	  inflammation	  of	  sentiments	  of	  independence,	  autonomy	  and	  power.	  51	  	  As	  evidenced	  by	  this	  analysis	  Gramsci	  rejects	  a	  rigid	  base-­‐‑superstructure	  model	  because	  it	  relies	  too	  heavily	  upon	  class	  status,	  and	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  appreciate	  the	  intellectual	  and	  philosophical	  impact	  of	  the	  culture	  and	  individuals	  within	  it.	  	   	  Within	  a	  Gramscian	  hegemonic	  framework,	  the	  dominant	  class	  relies	  not	  only	  upon	  coercion	  and	  naked	  power	  to	  subvert	  the	  subordinate	  class	  to	  their	  goals,	  but	  also	  manufactures	  consent	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  cross-­‐‑class	  alliances.	  This	  theory	  assumes	  a	  consent	  given	  by	  the	  majority	  in	  a	  particular	  direction	  as	  suggested	  by	  those	  in	  power.	  Consent	  is	  not	  always	  peaceful	  and	  may	  also	  be	  induced	  by	  means	  of	  coercion	  through	  physical,	  legal	  or	  cultural	  processes.	  The	  consent	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  “common	  sense,”	  but	  is	  in	  reality	  an	  ideology	  of	  dominance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York: International 
Publishers, 1971) at 184 [Gramsci]. 
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that	  has	  become	  so	  widespread,	  powerful	  and	  increasingly	  unnoticeable	  that	  over	  time	  society’s	  members	  no	  longer	  question	  it:	  “The	  ‘spontaneous’	  consent	  given	  by	  the	  great	  masses	  of	  population	  to	  the	  general	  direction	  imposed	  on	  social	  life	  by	  the	  dominant	  fundamental	  group;	  this	  consent	  is	  ‘historically’	  caused	  by	  the	  prestige	  (and	  consequent	  confidence)	  which	  the	  dominant	  group	  enjoys	  because	  of	  its	  position	  and	  function	  in	  the	  world	  of	  production.”	  52	  This	  pattern	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  journals	  crisis	  endemic	  within	  academic	  libraries.	  Gramsci	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  dominant	  group	  must	  be	  imposed	  on	  the	  subordinate	  group,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  dominant	  group’s	  interests	  
become	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  subordinate.	  “A	  third	  moment	  is	  that	  in	  which	  one	  becomes	  aware	  that	  one’s	  own	  corporate	  interests,	  in	  their	  present	  and	  future	  development,	  transcend	  the	  corporate	  limits	  of	  the	  purely	  economic	  class,	  and	  can	  and	  must	  become	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  subordinate	  groups	  too.”53	  Herein	  lies	  the	  notion	  of	  consent	  that	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  hegemony.	  Within	  Gramsci’s	  view	  of	  society	  as	  a	  hegemonic	  order,	  the	  subordinate	  class	  participates	  in	  and	  consents	  to	  the	  historical	  processes	  of	  change.	  The	  subordinate	  members	  of	  society	  are	  empowered	  through	  a	  participatory	  process,	  and	  because	  of	  this	  they	  experience	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  and	  involvement	  when	  changes	  take	  place.	  While	  the	  system	  is	  participatory,	  it	  is	  not	  equal,	  and	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  order	  ensures	  that	  the	  values	  of	  the	  dominant	  order	  will	  perpetually	  be	  inculcated	  into	  the	  culture	  as	  a	  whole.54	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid at 12. 
53 Ibid at 181.   
54 Ibid. 
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2.9	  The	  Public	  Performance	  Right	  	   It	  is	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  work	  that	  enjoys	  all	  the	  economic	  rights	  delineated	  in	  subsection	  3(1)	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  including	  the	  “sole	  right	  to	  produce	  or	  reproduce	  the	  work	  or	  any	  substantial	  part	  thereof	  in	  any	  material	  form	  whatever,	  to	  perform	  the	  work	  or	  any	  substantial	  part	  thereof	  in	  public	  or,	  if	  the	  work	  is	  unpublished,	  to	  publish	  the	  work	  or	  any	  substantial	  part	  thereof.”55	  These	  economic	  rights	  provide	  the	  means	  of	  compensation	  for	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  work.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  economic	  rights	  delineated	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  it	  is	  the	  right	  to	  “perform	  the	  work	  or	  any	  substantial	  part	  thereof	  in	  public”	  that	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  copyright	  collectives	  and	  this	  work.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  is	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  recompense	  unique	  to	  cultural	  goods,	  and	  is	  fundamentally	  dominant	  in	  the	  area	  of	  musical	  goods.	  	  The	  public	  performance	  right	  is	  literally	  the	  right	  to	  perform	  a	  work	  in	  public,	  	  be	  it	  spoken	  text,	  a	  dramatic	  text	  or	  a	  musical	  work.	  Note	  that	  this	  is	  an	  additional	  economic	  right	  given	  beyond	  what	  would	  normally	  be	  the	  case	  with	  other	  goods.	  The	  economic	  rights	  assigned	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  “right	  to	  produce	  or	  reproduce”	  includes	  the	  right	  of	  sale	  or	  rental	  of	  the	  work.	  Thus,	  either	  directly	  or	  as	  a	  function	  of	  their	  contracts	  with	  their	  publishers,	  owners	  are	  compensated	  via	  the	  reproduction	  right	  for	  sales	  or	  rental	  of	  their	  works.	  The	  performance	  right	  however	  is	  an	  economic	  right	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  sale	  and	  rental.	  Thus	  the	  copyright	  owners	  are	  in	  fact	  recompensed	  for	  both	  the	  sale,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  work.	  It	  is	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particularly	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  a	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  is	  also	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  traditional	  medium	  of	  copyright	  into	  an	  ephemeral	  realm.	  	  Historically	  copyright	  has	  dealt	  with	  the	  right	  to	  copy	  an	  existing	  work.	  That	  work	  might	  have	  been	  a	  book,	  a	  sculpture,	  a	  piece	  of	  music	  manuscript	  or	  a	  work	  of	  fine	  art.	  In	  each	  instance	  there	  was	  a	  single	  extant	  work	  originally	  and	  a	  copy	  was	  made	  of	  it.	  However,	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  public	  performance	  there	  is	  no	  copy.	  A	  single	  piece	  of	  music	  manuscript	  exists	  prior	  to	  the	  performance,	  and	  only	  a	  single	  piece	  of	  manuscript	  exists	  following.	  The	  performance	  itself	  is	  ephemeral.	  It	  exists	  in	  the	  moment	  and	  then	  is	  gone	  forever.	  In	  this	  respect	  a	  performance	  differs	  markedly	  from	  a	  recording.	  	  While	  a	  performance	  may	  be	  captured	  in	  a	  recording,	  once	  this	  is	  done	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  performance,	  but	  rather	  a	  recording	  and	  as	  such	  triggers	  an	  economic	  right	  within	  copyright	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  musical	  work	  now	  enclosed	  in	  a	  container,	  be	  that	  vinyl,	  tape,	  CD	  or	  the	  binary	  code	  held	  in	  a	  storage	  medium.	  Even	  if	  we	  were	  to	  consider	  a	  recording	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  a	  performance,	  there	  remains	  a	  significant	  problem	  in	  the	  historic	  acceptance	  of	  a	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  music.	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  music	  took	  place	  during	  a	  period	  in	  which	  there	  was	  no	  aural	  recording	  medium	  yet	  in	  existence.	  A	  legal	  right	  of	  ownership	  was	  extended	  to	  something	  without	  physical	  form	  or	  substance,	  and	  that	  legal	  right	  would	  be	  extended	  extensively	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century	  and	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  collective	  licensing.	  	  	   	  Though	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  are	  not	  transparently	  borne	  by	  the	  individual	  user,	  it	  nonetheless	  impacts	  significantly	  in	  the	  operating	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costs	  of	  the	  larger	  community.	  In	  2014,	  the	  three	  major	  North	  American	  performing	  rights	  organizations,	  the	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authors	  and	  Music	  Publishers	  of	  Canada	  (SOCAN),	  the	  American	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authors	  and	  Publishers	  (ASCAP)	  and	  Broadcast	  Music	  International	  (BMI)	  collected	  a	  little	  over	  $2.315	  billion.56	  In	  Canada,	  the	  four	  largest	  collectives,	  SOCAN,	  Access	  Copyright,	  SODRAC	  and	  CPCC	  reported	  revenues	  of	  342,280	  million57.	  Given	  the	  current	  population	  of	  just	  over	  35	  million58	  the	  combined	  cost	  of	  SOCAN,	  Access	  Copyright,	  CPCC	  and	  SODRAC	  to	  end	  users	  was	  $9.78	  per	  capita.	  	  	   Most	  intriguing	  is	  the	  question	  of	  why	  music	  was	  treated	  differently	  to	  begin	  with.	  We	  do	  not	  pay	  additional	  fees	  to	  the	  engineer	  who	  designed	  our	  cars	  every	  time	  we	  take	  a	  drive,	  or	  to	  the	  architect	  who	  designed	  our	  homes	  for	  every	  time	  we	  use	  them.	  Arguably,	  our	  lives	  are	  enriched	  in	  significant	  ways	  by	  the	  end	  results	  of	  these	  efforts,	  and	  yet	  there	  are	  no	  ongoing	  royalty	  payments	  made	  to	  these	  creators,	  nor	  to	  the	  industrial	  interests	  that	  support	  them.	  Nor	  are	  aggregate	  uses	  of	  them	  licensed	  after	  the	  point	  of	  sale.	  	  	   Despite	  our	  contemporary	  conception	  (both	  legal	  and	  social)	  of	  what	  may	  constitute	  a	  performance	  now,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  significantly	  what	  the	  performing	  rights	  organizations	  want	  us	  to	  believe	  constitutes	  a	  performance,	  historically	  during	  the	  period	  of	  its	  inception	  and	  for	  a	  significant	  time	  period	  to	  follow,	  the	  only	  type	  of	  performance	  that	  existed	  with	  respect	  to	  music	  was	  a	  live	  in	  the	  moment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 BMI 2014 revenue press release online: <http://www.bmi.com/press/entry/572180> and ASCAP 2014 
annual report online: <http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/about/annual-
reports/ascap_annual_report_2014.pdf>, SOCAN 2014 annual report online: 
<http://www.socanannualreport.ca>.	  
57 Supra note 8. 
58 CIA World Factbook (July 2015) online: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/docs/guidetowfbook.html>. 
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transmission	  between	  audience	  and	  performer(s).	  Thus	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  is	  not	  only	  an	  additional	  economic	  right	  that	  was	  unique	  to	  musical	  works	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  rights	  of	  reproduction	  and	  distribution,	  but	  in	  its	  historic	  inception	  it	  was	  attached	  to	  something	  that	  had	  no	  physical	  form.	  Perhaps	  a	  performance	  is	  better	  viewed	  as	  the	  light	  which	  radiates	  from	  a	  streetlamp.	  While	  it	  is	  there	  and	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  its	  existence,	  we	  can	  not	  touch	  it,	  and	  when	  the	  current	  is	  stopped,	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  music	  the	  performer	  stops	  performing,	  the	  performance	  and	  the	  light	  no	  longer	  exist,	  they	  are	  only	  a	  memory.	  	  
2.10	  Hegemonic	  Resistance	  Gramsci	  recognized	  that	  at	  various	  times	  within	  the	  hegemonic	  process,	  crises	  would	  develop,	  and	  while	  some	  would	  be	  insignificant	  others	  would	  be	  organic,	  representative	  of	  deep	  pockets	  of	  discontent	  within	  society.	  “If	  the	  ruling	  class	  has	  lost	  its	  consensus,	  i.e.	  is	  no	  longer	  ‘leading’	  but	  only	  ‘dominant,’	  exercising	  coercive	  force	  alone,	  this	  means	  precisely	  that	  the	  great	  masses	  have	  become	  detached	  from	  their	  traditional	  ideologies,	  and	  no	  longer	  believe	  what	  they	  used	  to	  believe	  previously.”	  59	  If	  unsuccessful,	  the	  class	  attempting	  to	  wrest	  control	  would	  simply	  fade	  back	  into	  the	  social	  frame	  until	  such	  time	  as	  another	  opportunity	  arose.	  	  Within	  the	  performance	  rights	  framework	  there	  were	  numerous	  instances	  of	  such	  resistance	  ranging	  from	  the	  publishing	  class	  themselves	  at	  the	  outset,	  through	  various	  trade	  and	  social	  unions	  as	  well	  as	  larger	  media	  interests.	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  would	  result	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  two	  Royal	  Commissions	  to	  investigate	  its	  operation	  within	  the	  first	  ten	  years	  of	  operation.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Supra note 41 at 275-76.  
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Royal	  Commissions	  would	  eventually	  lead	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  (now	  simply	  the	  Copyright	  Board)	  to	  deal	  with	  complaints.	  Despite	  the	  ongoing	  opposition	  none	  of	  the	  adversaries	  have	  ever	  successfully	  challenged	  the	  dominant	  group,	  though	  they	  have	  influenced	  some	  outcomes.	  In	  fact,	  as	  Gramsci	  predicted	  would	  happen	  in	  the	  hegemonic	  process,	  most	  adversaries	  to	  the	  hegemonic	  process	  established	  by	  the	  performing	  rights	  collectives	  have	  ultimately	  been	  assimilated	  into	  the	  process	  and	  have	  become	  part	  of	  that	  which	  they	  opposed.	  Indeed,	  that	  has	  been	  the	  overwhelming	  success	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  order.	  	   The	  current	  discourses	  surrounding	  file	  sharing	  and	  copyright	  generally	  reflect	  new	  modes	  of	  thought	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  copyright;	  owning	  and	  sharing,	  notions	  which	  are	  certainly	  not	  those	  being	  advocated	  by	  the	  dominant	  order.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  our	  contemporary	  society	  views	  copyright	  with	  respect	  to	  reuse	  and	  sharing	  within	  our	  social	  frames	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  industrial	  concerns	  would	  like	  it	  to	  be	  seen.	  It	  is	  now	  quite	  common	  for	  young	  children	  to	  create	  works	  in	  various	  media	  and	  post	  them	  to	  the	  web.	  The	  growth	  of	  MakerSpaces	  in	  libraries	  and	  community	  centres	  speaks	  to	  the	  level	  of	  growing	  interest	  in	  creation	  and	  sharing.60	  Theorists	  such	  as	  Lawrence	  Lessig61,	  Siva	  Vaidyanathan,62	  James	  Boyle63	  and	  Joanna	  Demers64	  (to	  name	  just	  a	  few)	  have	  made	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In a 2013 survey of librarians in practice, Gary Price found that 41% were currently providing 
makerspaces in their libraries and 36% were planning to add one: “Results From “Makerspaces in 
Libraries” Study Released” (16 December 2013), online: Library Journal  
<http://www.infodocket.com/2013/12/16/results-of-makerspaces-in-libraries-study-released/>. 61	  Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock  
Down Culture and Control Creativity (New York: Penguin Books, 2004). 62	  Siva Vaidyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and  
How It Threatens Creativity (New York: New York University Press, 2001). 
63 James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2008). 
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clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  clash	  between	  the	  growing	  user-­‐‑generated	  culture	  and	  established	  industrial	  interests.	  The	  simple	  fact	  that	  intellectual	  property	  issues	  and	  policies	  have	  become	  an	  increasingly	  common	  source	  of	  debate	  and	  point	  of	  discussion	  in	  the	  popular	  media	  indicates	  a	  general	  awareness	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  twenty	  years	  ago.	  This	  new	  mode	  of	  thinking	  has	  led	  to	  a	  new	  discourse,	  which	  has	  begun	  to	  question	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  dominant	  order	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  restructuring	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  process.	  The	  questioning	  of	  the	  dominant	  order’s	  ideology	  in	  regard	  to	  copyright	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  significant	  response	  to	  the	  proposed	  Access	  Copyright	  tariff	  for	  colleges	  and	  universities	  filed	  in	  2010.	  Considering	  the	  general	  lack	  of	  awareness	  surrounding	  copyright	  collectives,	  the	  response	  to	  the	  proposed	  tariff	  was	  unparalleled.	  As	  has	  historically	  been	  the	  case	  with	  collectives	  they	  looked	  for	  an	  increase	  in	  tariff	  to	  offset	  losses	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  their	  business	  environment.	  65	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Access	  Copyright,	  the	  drop	  in	  income	  was	  primarily	  attributable	  to	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  electronic	  serials	  and	  other	  open	  or	  licensed	  resources	  combined	  with	  a	  significant	  drop	  in	  the	  use	  of	  course	  packs.	  	  While	  tariff	  requests	  are	  made	  public	  via	  the	  Canada	  Gazette,	  they	  are	  largely	  unknown	  except	  to	  the	  interested	  parties.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  the	  model	  has	  been	  so	  successful	  for	  the	  collectives.	  The	  general	  public	  is	  unaware	  of	  their	  existence,	  and	  while	  the	  large	  scale	  users	  may	  wish	  to	  reduce	  their	  operating	  costs	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  tariffs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Joanna Demers, Steal This Music: How Intellectual Property Law Affects Musical  
Creativity (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006). 
65 In the 1935 Royal Commission Judge Parker specifically noted that the collectives were looking for an 
increase in tariffs to offset their losses in sheet music sales. Similarly, in the United Kingdom the 
establishment of the Performing Right Society followed significant losses in the publishing industry due to 
falling sheet music sales and the advent of mechanized musical machinery (player pianos, gramophones 
etc.). See also supra note 10. 
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they	  know	  that	  ultimately	  they	  will	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  to	  the	  end	  user.	  	  However,	  in	  this	  instance	  the	  proposed	  tariff	  of	  $45	  per	  student,	  as	  well	  as	  onerous	  and	  invasive	  reporting	  requirements,	  resulted	  in	  an	  outpouring	  of	  protest	  and	  anger	  in	  the	  general	  academic	  community.	  The	  opposition	  was	  only	  strengthened	  with	  the	  pentalogy	  rulings,	  which	  would	  follow	  the	  tariff	  request.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  broad	  response	  to	  the	  Access	  Copyright	  tariff	  proposal,	  the	  July	  2012	  copyright	  pentalogy	  rulings	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  may	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  indicate	  the	  disconnection	  between	  the	  ruling	  hegemony	  and	  the	  changing	  copyright	  discourse.66	  Within	  that	  context	  the	  dominant	  voice	  of	  the	  publishing	  concerns67	  has	  always	  held	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  however	  the	  courts’	  expansive	  definition	  of	  fair	  dealing	  and	  the	  enhanced	  status	  of	  the	  user	  in	  the	  process	  has	  led	  to	  remarkable	  changes.	  As	  Raymond	  Williams	  has	  noted	  “[a]	  lived	  hegemony	  is	  always	  a	  process.	  It	  is	  not,	  except	  analytically,	  a	  system	  or	  a	  structure.	  It	  is	  a	  realized	  complex	  of	  experiences,	  relationships,	  and	  activities,	  with	  specific	  and	  changing	  pressures	  and	  limits.”68	  Thus	  hegemony	  is	  a	  dialectic	  process,	  the	  “push	  and	  pull”	  of	  relationships	  and	  cultures	  within	  the	  social	  structure	  which	  impact,	  and	  are	  impacted	  by,	  the	  processes	  surrounding	  it—cultural,	  social,	  legal	  and	  political.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 
2012 SCC 34; Rogers Communications Inc v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of 
Canada, 2012 SCC 35; Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012 SCC 38; Society 
of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36; Alberta (Education) 
v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37. 
67 While copyright collectives are in theory collections of creators the reality of copyright ownership and 
the distributive nature of the economic rights within copyright has always resulted in industry having a 
disproportionate level of power and representation in these organizations. For a greater discussion of this 
issue see supra note 10.  
68 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) at 112. 
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Constantly	  shifting,	  changing	  and	  negotiating	  yet	  fundamentally	  driven	  by	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  dominant	  group	  as	  it	  responds	  to	  challenges	  and	  crises.	  	  	   It	  was	  this	  hegemonic	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board.	  Though	  it	  was	  originally	  formed	  as	  oversight	  on	  behalf	  of	  users	  its	  recent	  operations	  had	  distanced	  it	  from	  that	  original	  purpose.	  	  However,	  the	  changing	  policy	  landscape	  surrounding	  copyright,	  and	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  in	  particular,	  seem	  to	  have	  brought	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  user	  back	  into	  focus	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  later	  chapters.	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Chapter	  3:	  Parallel	  Evolutions	  of	  Copyright	  Tribunals	  
	  	  	   This	  chapter	  will	  consider	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  copyright	  tribunals,	  their	  enabling	  legislation,	  structure	  and	  operation.	  Beyond	  simply	  the	  historical	  justifications,	  this	  chapter	  will	  attempt	  to	  situate	  the	  role	  of	  the	  tribunals	  within	  the	  context	  of	  current	  social	  construction.	  Given	  the	  transformations	  of	  society	  and	  culture	  between	  the	  early	  and	  late	  twentieth	  centuries,	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  well	  the	  historical	  entity	  fits	  within	  contemporary	  social	  thinking	  will	  be	  considered.	  The	  history	  of	  the	  collective	  administration	  of	  copyright	  is	  interwoven	  with	  the	  history	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  music,	  and	  their	  interdependent	  growth.	  Without	  the	  inculcation	  of	  music	  performing	  rights	  organizations	  there	  would	  likely	  be	  no	  collective	  licensing	  within	  copyright.	  This	  topic	  has	  been	  the	  basis	  of	  several	  books	  and	  assorted	  academic	  theses	  and	  articles.69	  	  Canada	  and	  Australia	  both	  trace	  their	  copyright	  lineage	  back	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1911.70	  The	  original	  Act	  of	  1911	  however	  made	  no	  provision	  for	  copyright	  tribunals.	  All	  three	  countries	  now	  have	  active	  tribunals	  operating	  within	  their	  copyright	  regimes.	  Strangely	  however	  the	  mother	  country,	  England,	  was	  not	  the	  leader	  in	  this	  regard,	  but	  it	  was	  instead	  a	  colony,	  Canada.	  The	  first	  common-­‐‑law	  copyright	  tribunal,	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada,	  was	  formed	  in	  Canada	  in	  1936.	  England	  would	  follow	  with	  its	  tribunal	  in	  1956,	  with	  Australia’s	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1968	  bringing	  the	  Australian	  tribunal	  into	  existence.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 For a full discussion of this issue see supra note 10. 
70 Copyright Act, 1911, l & 2 GEO. 5. CH. 46 [1911 Act]. 
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3.1	  Creation	  of	  the	  First	  Tribunal	  While	  there	  were	  pre-­‐‑existing	  performance	  right	  collectives	  under	  French	  law	  as	  early	  as	  185171,	  and	  an	  explicit	  performance	  right	  in	  music	  was	  created	  in	  the	  1842	  Copyright	  Act	  in	  England,	  collectives	  did	  not	  successfully	  begin	  operation	  in	  common	  law	  regimes	  until	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  (PRS)	  in	  England	  in	  1914.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  PRS	  the	  American	  Society	  for	  Composers	  Authors	  and	  Publishers	  (ASCAP)	  would	  be	  formed	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  These	  collectives	  represented	  member	  publishers,	  composers	  and	  authors72	  and	  collected	  licensing	  fees	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  granted	  under	  Copyright.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  ASCAP	  and	  the	  PRS’s	  inception	  a	  public	  performance	  would	  have	  been	  limited	  to	  paid	  public	  performances,	  however	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  would	  qualify	  as	  a	  public	  performance	  would	  change	  significantly	  over	  time.	  	   In	  1925	  PRS	  would	  join	  forces	  with	  their	  American	  counterpart	  ASCAP	  to	  set	  up	  an	  office	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  (CPRS),	  which	  would	  be	  jointly	  owned	  by	  the	  parent	  agencies.73	  Perhaps	  because	  of	  the	  closer	  geographic	  relationship	  between	  Canada	  and	  America,	  or	  the	  shared	  emerging	  culture,	  the	  CPRS	  increasingly	  tracked	  the	  aggressive	  American	  mandate.	  Their	  attempts	  to	  impose	  license	  fees	  on	  varying	  users	  across	  the	  country	  would	  lead	  to	  numerous	  complaints	  in	  the	  Canadian	  House	  of	  Commons,	  eventually	  leading	  to	  the	  first	  of	  three	  Royal	  Commissions	  charged	  with	  investigating	  their	  operations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The Societe de Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique [SACEM].  
72 Within this context authors are understood as the lyricists. 
73 An initial attempt to create the CPRS had been made by the PRS in 1924. However, it failed due to the 
fact that 1924 Copyright Act of Canada, required registration of works for copyright protection. The initial 
attempt by CPRS to enforce its license through the courts was dismissed for this reason, see Canadian 
Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Famous Players Canadian Corporation Ltd., [1927] 2 D.L.R. 928; 60 
O.L.R. 280 (Ont. S.C.). 
	   41	  
In	  1932	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Activities	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  Limited,	  was	  formed	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Mr.	  Justice	  Ewing.	  The	  commission	  was	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  CPRS	  was	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  Copyright	  Act;	  whether	  CPRS	  had	  substantial	  control	  of	  performing	  rights	  in	  dramatico-­‐‑musical	  or	  musical	  works;	  whether	  CPRS	  had	  unduly	  withheld	  the	  issue	  or	  grants	  of	  licenses;	  whether	  the	  CPRS	  fees	  were	  excessive	  and	  any	  other	  matters	  the	  Commissioner	  might	  deem	  relevant.74	  	  	   The	  Ewing	  Commission	  consolidated	  the	  complaints	  into	  a	  small	  number,	  chief	  among	  them	  the	  fact	  that	  though	  the	  society	  claimed	  control	  of	  two	  to	  three	  million	  musical	  works,	  they	  had	  failed	  to	  list	  their	  assignments	  with	  the	  copyright	  office.75	  Further,	  the	  Society	  had	  claimed	  the	  right	  for	  some	  musical	  works	  that	  were,	  in	  fact,	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  (specifically	  some	  of	  the	  old	  masters	  such	  as	  Beethoven).	  The	  bulk	  of	  Ewing’s	  fourteen-­‐‑page	  report	  dealt	  with	  the	  disparity	  in	  licensing	  fees	  for	  western	  radio	  stations	  as	  opposed	  to	  those	  located	  in	  the	  more	  densely	  populated	  regions	  of	  eastern	  Canada.	  76	  Ewing	  found	  that	  the	  Society	  had	  not	  fulfilled	  its	  legal	  obligations	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  had	  dealt	  unfairly	  with	  the	  public.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  Commission	  recommended	  that	  the	  fees	  charged	  be	  reduced	  to	  one-­‐‑fifth	  the	  amount	  suggested	  by	  the	  Society.77	  
	   Three	  years	  later,	  in	  1935,	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  to	  Investigate	  the	  Activities	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society,	  Limited,	  and	  Similar	  Societies,78	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Activities	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  Limited,	  Albert	  Freeman	  Ewing	  chair,	  1932	  [Ewing].	  
75 Ibid at 5.  
76 Ibid at 8-13. 
77 Ibid at 16. 
78 Royal Commission to Investigate the Activities of the Canadian Performing Right Society, Limited, and 
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convened	  by	  his	  Honour	  Judge	  Parker,	  to	  investigate	  continued	  complaints	  about	  the	  CPRS.	  Unlike	  the	  Ewing	  Commission,	  the	  Parker	  Commission	  gave	  public	  notice	  of	  meetings,	  and	  heard	  testimony	  from	  interested	  parties.	  In	  his	  findings	  Judge	  Parker	  made	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Society	  to	  file	  a	  list	  of	  holdings	  with	  the	  Copyright	  Office	  along	  with	  a	  statement	  of	  fees	  (tariffs).79	  Judge	  Parker	  observed	  that	  societies	  controlling	  these	  copyrights	  “have	  looked	  to	  the	  fees	  from	  licenses	  conferring	  the	  performing	  right	  on	  music	  users	  to	  compensate	  them	  in	  part	  for	  the	  losses	  suffered	  from	  the	  decrease	  in	  sales	  of	  sheet	  music	  and	  records.	  This	  consideration	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  determining	  the	  tariff	  of	  fees	  for	  performing	  rights”.80	  The	  position	  being	  advocated	  by	  CPRS	  in	  1935	  is	  one	  still	  heard	  today	  with	  respect	  to	  losses	  attributed	  to	  online	  sharing.	  	  	   Judge	  Parker	  noted	  that	  CPRS	  had	  still	  failed	  to	  file	  its	  lists	  with	  the	  Copyright	  Office	  despite	  its	  legal	  obligation	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  to	  do	  so	  (even	  though	  foreign	  societies	  had	  done	  so	  on	  their	  own).81	  He	  recommended	  the	  broadcast	  fee	  be	  reduced	  by	  22.5%,82	  and	  the	  theatre	  rate	  reduced	  to	  the	  1931	  tariff.	  The	  judge	  also	  said	  that	  CPRS	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  “super	  monopoly”	  83	  and	  though	  he	  allowed	  that	  there	  might	  be	  valid	  reasons	  for	  its	  existence,	  nonetheless	  Canadians	  should	  be	  protected	  from	  any	  undue	  burdens	  as	  a	  result.	  The	  Parker	  Report	  concluded	  by	  recommending	  that	  a	  permanent	  tribunal	  be	  established	  to	  approve	  any	  future	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Similar Societies, Report of his Honour Judge Parker, a Commissioner Appointed by the Inquiries Act and 
the Copyright Amendment Act of 1931, pursuant to Order in Council no. 738, 1935 [Parker]. 
79 Ibid at 7. 
80 Ibid at 9. 
81 Ibid at 32. 
82 Ibid at 36. 
83 Ibid at 19. 
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tariffs	  and	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  music	  users	  to	  appeal	  any	  fees	  or	  policies	  set	  by	  the	  performance	  rights	  societies.	  That	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  be	  amended	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  Appeal	  Tribunal,	  to	  determine	  disputes	  arising	  out	  of	  performance	  in	  public	  and	  to	  approve	  of	  the	  tariffs	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  Limited	  from	  time	  to	  time	  before	  they	  become	  effective.	  The	  position	  now	  is	  that	  the	  Society,	  having	  a	  monopoly	  of	  the	  performing	  rights	  in	  copyright	  music,	  has	  also	  the	  right	  to	  impose	  whatever	  fees	  it	  chooses.84	  	  	  This	  recommendation	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  in	  Canada	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  (CAB)	  in	  1936.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  disagreement	  between	  two	  business	  interests	  as	  is	  often	  suggested	  by	  rationales	  of	  various	  collectives.	  Complaints	  about	  the	  CPRS	  activities	  by	  music	  users	  had	  been	  raised	  in	  the	  Canadian	  House	  of	  Commons,	  where	  vivid	  debate	  characterized	  the	  CPRS	  as	  “evil”	  and	  that	  some	  form	  of	  control	  was	  needed	  to	  “put	  an	  end	  to	  price	  fixing	  and	  extortion”.85	  These	  debates	  are	  particularly	  noteworthy	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  over	  time	  the	  notion	  of	  oversight	  and	  protection	  of	  music	  users	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  lost	  or	  at	  the	  least	  replaced	  by	  notions	  of	  economic	  health	  and	  regulation.	  Another	  Royal	  Commission	  would	  consider	  the	  issue	  of	  copyright	  collectives	  less	  than	  20	  years	  later.	  The	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Patents,	  Copyright	  and	  Industrial	  Designs	  (Ilsley	  Commission)	  sat	  between	  1954	  and	  1960.	  Its	  brief	  was:	  [T]o	  enquire	  as	  to	  whether	  federal	  legislation	  relating	  in	  any	  way	  to	  patents	  of	  invention,	  industrial	  designs,	  copyright	  and	  trademarks	  affords	  reasonable	  incentive	  to	  invention	  and	  research,	  to	  the	  development	  of	  literary	  and	  artistic	  talents,	  to	  creativeness,	  and	  to	  making	  available	  to	  the	  Canadian	  public	  scientific,	  technical,	  literary	  and	  artistic	  creations	  and	  other	  adaptations,	  applications	  and	  uses,	  in	  a	  manner	  and	  on	  terms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Ibid at 49. 
85 House of Commons Debates, 17th Parl 20th Sess, No 20 (1936) at 644 (Hon C H Cahan). 
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adequately	  safeguarding	  the	  paramount	  public	  interest.86	  	   The	  Commission	  delivered	  its	  report	  in	  two	  sections.	  The	  first	  section	  was	  devoted	  to	  copyright,	  an	  entire	  chapter	  of	  which	  was	  devoted	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  Performing	  Right	  Societies.	  	  Although	  the	  performing	  right	  societies	  presented	  only	  one	  issue87	  to	  the	  Ilsley	  commission,	  the	  same	  could	  not	  be	  said	  of	  music	  users	  who	  filed	  a	  long	  list	  of	  concerns	  with	  the	  Commission.	  Once	  again,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  complete	  listing	  of	  assignments	  was	  among	  them,	  an	  issue	  that	  had	  been	  raised	  almost	  continuously	  since	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  rights	  organizations	  in	  Canada	  in	  1927.	  The	  Commission	  was	  relatively	  sympathetic	  with	  respect	  to	  many	  of	  the	  music	  users’	  positions,	  however	  the	  most	  important	  recommendation	  to	  arise	  from	  the	  concerns	  of	  music	  users	  was	  that	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  should	  be	  greatly	  enlarged	  and	  that	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  should	  have	  the	  power	  not	  only	  to	  approve	  the	  tariffs,	  but	  also	  to	  set	  them.	  In	  addition	  to	  enlarged	  powers	  and	  increased	  discretion	  for	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board,	  the	  Ilsley	  Commission	  recommended	  that	  a	  new	  Royal	  Commission	  be	  immediately	  appointed	  to:	  [M]ake	  a	  complete	  investigation	  in	  the	  whole	  field	  of	  performing	  rights	  in	  so	  far	  as	  such	  rights	  are	  owned	  by	  performing	  rights	  societies.	  This	  commission	  should	  be	  empowered	  to	  determine	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  licenses	  for	  all	  classes	  of	  users,	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  proposed	  tariff	  rates	  of	  fees.	  The	  users	  as	  well	  as	  the	  societies	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  make	  proposals	  to	  this	  commission	  and	  the	  commission	  should	  have	  the	  power	  to	  initiate	  proposals	  itself.88	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The Royal Commission on Patents, Copyright and Industrial Design (Ottawa: Ilsley Commission, 1957) 
at 7 [Ilsley]. 
87 The	  collectives	  questioned	  the	  right	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  to	  regulate	  them. 
88 Supra note 86 at 106. 
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  No	  such	  commission	  was	  ever	  struck.	  	  
3.2	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  of	  Canada	  
	   In	  its	  initial	  form	  as	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  (CAB)	  the	  board	  dealt	  with	  only	  one	  collective,	  the	  single	  collective	  then	  permissible	  under	  the	  Act,	  the	  copyright	  collective	  for	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  music.	  Throughout	  much	  of	  this	  period	  that	  right	  was	  represented	  by	  a	  single	  entity,	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society,	  which	  in	  1945	  would	  change	  its	  name	  to	  the	  Canadian	  Association	  of	  Publishers	  Authors	  and	  Composers	  of	  Canada	  [CAPAC]).89	  In	  1940	  Broadcast	  Music	  International90	  would	  open	  a	  Canadian	  office	  thus	  creating	  a	  second	  collective	  in	  Canada.91	  In	  1976	  BMI	  Canada	  officially	  separated	  from	  its	  US	  parent	  corporation	  and	  was	  reorganized	  as	  wholly	  Canadian	  and	  non-­‐‑profit92	  known	  as	  the	  Performing	  Rights	  Organization	  of	  Canada	  (PROCAN).93	  	  Oddly,	  the	  government	  of	  the	  day	  suggested	  PROCAN	  and	  CAPAC	  form	  a	  single	  monopoly	  to	  represent	  music	  owners.	  Given	  anti-­‐‑trust	  concerns	  neither	  group	  was	  overly	  eager,	  but	  according	  to	  Jan	  Matejcek,	  in	  September	  of	  1985	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  urged	  PROCAN	  and	  CAPAC	  to	  “Pursue	  a	  ‘harmonization’	  and	  ‘uniformization’	  of	  their	  tariffs.”94	  Bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  ‘harmonization’	  would	  create	  a	  single	  monopoly	  for	  public	  performance	  rights	  in	  Canada,	  it	  is	  quite	  remarkable	  that	  a	  government	  body	  would	  actually	  suggest	  it.	  According	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Supra note 10 at 186. 
90 Broadcast Music International was formed in the United States in 1941 by the National Association of 
Broadcasters in an attempt to break the monopoly control of music licensing held by ASCAP.  
91 Supra note 10 at 188. 
92 Ibid at 36. 
93 Ibid at 41. 
94 Ibid at 87. 
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Competition	  Bureau	  of	  Canada,	  the	  Competition	  Act	  “	  contains	  both	  criminal	  and	  civil	  provisions	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  anti-­‐‑competitive	  practices	  in	  the	  marketplace.”95	  	  	   During	  this	  period	  the	  CAB	  was	  essentially	  a	  part	  time	  operation	  involving	  a	  single	  Judge	  of	  the	  Exchequer	  Court	  (later	  known	  as	  the	  Federal	  Court)	  and	  two	  civil	  servants.	  For	  all	  those	  involved	  their	  responsibilities	  to	  the	  CAB	  were	  part	  time	  and	  done	  in	  conjunction	  with	  their	  full	  time	  duties.96	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  CAB,	  unlike	  its	  successor	  was	  purely	  limited	  to	  the	  oversight	  of	  rate	  setting	  in	  regard	  to	  music	  collectives	  performance	  right	  tariffs.	  This	  would	  change	  dramatically	  following	  the	  1988	  revisions	  to	  the	  Act,	  as	  would	  the	  number	  of	  collectives	  seeking	  tariffs.	  	  
3.3	  The	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada	  	   In	  1988	  Canada	  would	  enact	  the	  first	  significant	  overhaul	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  since	  its	  original	  inception	  in	  1922.	  Commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Phase	  One	  revisions	  they	  would	  create	  massive	  changes	  in	  the	  area	  of	  collective	  management.	  While	  previously	  collectives	  were	  only	  allowed	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  music	  the	  Phase	  One	  revisions	  would	  allow	  collectives	  to	  be	  formed	  for	  any	  group	  of	  copyright	  owners	  as	  defined	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  section	  three.	  	  Within	  the	  Act	  collective	  societies	  are	  defined	  as,	  “collective	  society”	  means	  a	  society,	  association	  or	  corporation	  that	  carries	  on	  the	  business	  of	  collective	  administration	  of	  copyright	  or	  of	  the	  remuneration	  right	  conferred	  by	  section	  19	  or	  81	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  those	  who,	  by	  assignment,	  grant	  of	  licence,	  appointment	  of	  it	  as	  their	  agent	  or	  otherwise,	  authorize	  it	  to	  act	  on	  their	  behalf	  in	  relation	  to	  that	  collective	  administration,	  and	  	  	   (a)"operates	  a	  licensing	  scheme,	  applicable	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  repertoire	  of	  works,	  performer’s	  performances,	  sound	  recordings	  or	  communication	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Competition Bureau of Canada, online: <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/h_00148.html>. 
96 Supra note 11.  
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signals	  of	  more	  than	  one	  author,	  performer,	  sound	  recording	  maker	  or	  broadcaster,	  pursuant	  to	  which	  the	  society,	  association	  or	  corporation	  sets	  out	  classes	  of	  uses	  that	  it	  agrees	  to	  authorize	  under	  this	  Act,	  and	  the	  royalties	  and	  terms	  and	  conditions	  on	  which	  it	  agrees	  to	  authorize	  those	  classes	  of	  uses,	  or	  	  	   (b)"carries	  on	  the	  business	  of	  collecting	  and	  distributing	  royalties	  or	  levies	  payable	  pursuant	  to	  this	  Act;97	  	  In	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time	  following	  the	  revisions	  to	  the	  Act	  Canada	  moved	  from	  having	  two	  copyright	  collectives,	  CAPAC	  &	  PROCAN,	  both	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  music	  performance	  rights	  to	  having	  thirty	  eight	  collecting	  in	  varied	  areas.98	  With	  the	  expansion	  of	  possible	  collectives	  came	  a	  reorganization	  of	  the	  board.	  The	  Copyright	  Board	  is	  formed	  under	  section	  66	  of	  the	  Act	  and	  by	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Act	  the	  board	  must	  consist	  of	  no	  more	  than	  five	  persons,	  two	  of	  whom	  must	  be	  the	  chairman	  and	  vice-­‐‑chairman,	  all	  of	  whom	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  Governor	  in	  Council.	  99	  While	  members	  of	  the	  board	  may	  be	  appointed	  full-­‐‑time	  or	  part-­‐‑time,	  the	  chairman	  must	  be	  a	  “judge,	  either	  sitting	  or	  retired,	  of	  a	  superior,	  county	  or	  district	  court.”100	  	  However,	  the	  Act	  does	  not	  require	  that	  there	  be	  a	  chairman	  and	  the	  board	  has	  operated	  without	  one	  in	  the	  past.	  In	  fact,	  after	  the	  retirement	  of	  Mr.	  Justice	  Vancise	  in	  June	  of	  2014,	  the	  chairmanship	  remained	  unfilled	  until	  the	  appointment	  of	  Mr.	  Justice	  Blair	  in	  June	  of	  2015.	  In	  its	  2013-­‐‑2014	  annual	  report	  the	  board	  listed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Supra note 1 at s 2.  
98 For example, collectives now exist for reprography (Access Copyright), music videos (Audio Visual 
Licensing Agency [AVLA]), visual arts (Canadian Artists Representation Copyright Collective [CARCC]) 
and off air taping (Canadian Broadcasters Rights Agency [CBRA]). For a full list of copyright collectives 
see the Copyright Board of Canada website online: at <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca>. 
99 Supra note 1 at s 66.  
100 Ibid s 66 (3). 
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three	  board	  members	  (Chairman,	  vice-­‐‑chairman	  and	  one	  additional	  member)	  and	  an	  additional	  fourteen	  support	  staff.101	  	  
3.4	  The	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  of	  Great	  Britain	  	   According	  to	  Paul	  Torremans	  the	  Mechanical	  Copyright	  Licenses	  Company	  Ltd.	  was	  formed	  in	  the	  U.K.	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  mechanical	  royalties	  from	  Gramophone	  companies	  even	  before	  the	  1911	  Act	  had	  been	  adopted.102	  In	  1914	  the	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  was	  formed	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  music.	  Torremans	  also	  notes	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  sound	  recording	  performance	  right	  initiated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  case	  of	  Gramaphone	  Co.	  ltd,	  v	  Stephen	  Cawardine	  	  &	  co..103	  This	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  Phonographic	  Performance	  ltd.	  in	  1934	  (PPL).104	  PPL’s	  Canadian	  equivalent	  would	  be	  the	  Canadian	  Musical	  Reproduction	  Rights	  Agency	  (CMRRA).	  However	  CMRRA	  was	  not	  formed	  until	  1975.105	  	   The	  extension	  of	  the	  performance	  right	  into	  sound	  recordings	  is	  noteworthy	  given	  that	  much	  like	  our	  present	  era,	  the	  evolving	  technologies	  of	  the	  period	  were	  stretching	  the	  original	  media	  boundaries	  under	  which	  the	  performance	  right	  had	  been	  established.	  The	  early	  20th	  century	  saw	  not	  only	  gramophones	  but	  also	  recording	  technology	  (Dictaphone)	  radio	  and	  even	  early	  television	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Copyright Board of Canada, Annual Report 2013-14, online: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-
apropos/annual-annuel/2013-2014-e.pdf>. 
102 Paul Torremans “Collective Management in the United Kingdom and Ireland” in Daniel Gervais, ed, 
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights 2d (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2010) 
[Gervais]. 
103 Gramophone Co. ltd, v Stephen Cawardine & Co. [1934] Ch 450. 
104 Interestingly, as is often the case the collective was begun not by artists or creators, but rather by the 
industry exploiting them, in this instance by EMI & Decca. See Company History online: 
<http://www.ppluk.com/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Company-history/>. 
105 Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency ‘About Us’ online: 
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experimentation.106	  The	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  performance	  rights	  would	  extend	  to	  radio	  broadcasts	  was	  particularly	  contentious.	  In	  Great	  Britain,	  though	  the	  BBC	  contested	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  performance	  right	  in	  broadcasting,	  they	  nevertheless	  paid	  the	  tariff	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  their	  public	  broadcasts.107	  In	  Canada	  the	  issue	  was	  settled	  by	  the	  1931	  Copyright	  Amendment	  Act,	  which	  defined	  a	  performance	  as	  “.	  .	  .	  any	  acoustic	  representation	  of	  a	  work	  or	  any	  visual	  representation	  of	  any	  dramatic	  action	  in	  a	  work,	  including	  such	  	  a	  representation	  made	  by	  means	  of	  any	  
mechanical	  instrument	  or	  by	  radio	  communication.”(emphasis	  added)108	  	  In	  Australia	  the	  Australasian	  Performing	  Right	  Association	  would	  begin	  collecting	  revenues	  from	  broadcasters	  in	  1929.109	  	  	   In	  1952	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Committee	  noted	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  three	  operating	  collectives	  in	  Britain	  amounted	  to	  a	  ‘quasi’	  monopoly,	  and	  recommended	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  regulatory	  body.110	  In	  1956	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  would	  be	  revised	  and	  in	  the	  process	  create	  what	  is	  now	  known	  as	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal.111	  Similar	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  in	  Canada	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  was	  limited	  to	  regulation	  of	  tariffs	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  musical	  collectives.	  As	  with	  the	  Canadian	  experience	  the	  continuing	  technological	  change	  would	  create	  new	  challenges	  particularly	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  reprography.	  Interestingly	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  saw	  the	  creation	  of	  their	  reprography	  collective	  earlier	  than	  Canada	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 According to Television History – The First 75 Years online: <http://www.tvhistory.tv/Baird%20TV-
Early%20Years.htm>, the first television sets went on sale in Great Britain in 1928. 
107 Supra note 16 at 47. 
108 Copyright Amendment Act 1931 at s. 2. 
109 Australasian Performing Right Association History online: 
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the	  creation	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Licensing	  Agency	  Ltd.	  in	  1982.	  	  Canada’s	  reprography	  collective	  would	  form	  in	  1988	  after	  the	  phase	  one	  revisions	  to	  the	  Act,	  	   The	  United	  Kingdom	  would	  create	  a	  new	  Copyright	  Act	  in	  1988,112	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  Canada	  was	  bringing	  in	  the	  Phase	  One	  revisions	  to	  their	  own	  Act.	  Like	  the	  Canadian	  Act,	  the	  UK	  Act	  would	  change	  the	  name	  and	  enlarge	  the	  role	  of	  tribunal.	  Chapter	  VIII	  of	  the	  1988	  UK	  Act	  defines	  the	  makeup	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal.	  Consisting	  of	  a	  chairmen	  and	  two	  deputy	  chairmen	  appointed	  by	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  the	  board	  would	  have	  at	  minimum	  two	  more	  regular	  members,	  but	  no	  more	  then	  eight	  under	  any	  circumstance.113	  The	  Act	  also	  requires	  that	  the	  chairman	  and	  deputy	  chairmen	  meet	  eligibility	  standards,	  specifically,	  (a)he	  satisfies	  the	  judicial-­‐‑appointment	  eligibility	  condition	  on	  a	  5-­‐‑year	  basis;(b)he	  is	  an	  advocate	  or	  solicitor	  in	  Scotland	  of	  at	  least	  5	  years’	  standing;	  (c)he	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Bar	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  or	  solicitor	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Judicature	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  of	  at	  least	  5	  years’	  standing;	  or	  (d)he	  has	  held	  judicial	  office.114	  	  Unlike	  the	  Canadian	  tribunal	  (and	  Australian	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  shortly)	  a	  judge,	  sitting	  or	  retired,	  was	  not	  required,	  though	  was	  certainly	  eligible.	  Also	  interesting	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  other	  than	  the	  executive	  roles	  of	  the	  board	  the	  remaining	  members	  have	  no	  minimum	  eligibility,	  which	  in	  practice	  could	  allow	  for	  true	  representation	  of	  users	  as	  opposed	  to	  those	  with	  inherent	  interests	  in	  the	  outcomes	  historically	  or	  otherwise.	  Another	  interesting	  point	  specified	  in	  the	  Act	  allows	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  or	  the	  Chairman	  or	  Deputy	  Chairman	  the	  freedom	  to	  remove	  a	  member	  from	  the	  tribunal	  if	  “he	  has	  become	  bankrupt	  or	  made	  an	  arrangement	  with	  his	  creditors	  or,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, c 48. 
113 Ibid at 145 2. 
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in	  Scotland,	  his	  estate	  has	  been	  sequestrated	  or	  he	  has	  executed	  a	  trust	  deed	  for	  his	  creditors	  or	  entered	  into	  a	  composition	  contract.”115	  However,	  unlike	  Canada	  there	  is	  no	  limitation	  on	  term	  appointment,116	  nor	  is	  there	  any	  specification	  against	  members	  of	  the	  public	  service	  such	  as	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  Canadian	  Act,117	  or	  any	  prohibition	  in	  regard	  to	  possible	  conflicts	  of	  interest.118	  Presently	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  consists	  of	  the	  maximum	  Chairman,	  two	  Deputy	  Chairmen	  and	  seven	  members.119	  	   In	  1996	  the	  Monopolies	  and	  Mergers	  Commission	  of	  the	  U.K.	  published	  a	  report	  into	  performing	  rights	  and	  the	  agencies	  and	  user	  groups	  involved	  with	  them.	  Titled	  Performing	  Rights120	  it	  stands	  alone	  as	  the	  only	  fully	  public	  study	  of	  a	  performance	  right	  collective	  and	  one	  of	  the	  few	  inquiries	  into	  the	  growing	  arena	  of	  collective	  management.	  While	  not	  focusing	  heavily	  upon	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  investigation	  and	  those	  appearing	  before	  it	  raised	  several	  concerns	  about	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  tribunal.	  Given	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  tribunal	  as	  cited	  by	  the	  commission	  was	  to	  “provide	  a	  quick,	  cheap	  and	  easy	  way	  of	  resolving	  disputes.”121	  The	  commission	  was	  greatly	  disturbed	  “to	  hear	  that	  those	  who	  used	  the	  Tribunal	  felt	  that	  it	  provided	  neither	  a	  quick,	  cheap	  nor	  easy	  means	  of	  settling	  disputes.”122	  This	  is	  a	  complaint	  often	  made	  in	  regard	  to	  dealing	  with	  copyright	  tribunals,	  and	  one	  that	  comes	  both	  from	  industry	  and	  users.	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119 Copyright Tribunal of the United Kingdom Membership online:  
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3.5	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  of	  Australia	  
	   The	  last	  of	  the	  three	  nations	  under	  discussion	  to	  create	  a	  tribunal,	  Australia,	  would	  not	  form	  their	  tribunal	  until	  they	  enacted	  new	  legislation	  with	  their	  Copyright	  
Act	  of	  1968.123	  Under	  section	  138	  of	  the	  Act	  of	  1968	  the	  tribunal	  shall	  “consist	  of	  a	  President,	  and	  such	  number	  of	  Deputy	  Presidents	  and	  other	  members	  as	  are	  appointed	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  Division”124	  Similar	  to	  Canada	  the	  President	  (chairman	  in	  Canada)	  “must	  be	  a	  judge	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Australia”125	  but	  unlike	  Canada	  the	  Deputy	  President(s)	  also	  “must	  be,	  or	  have	  been,	  a	  judge	  of	  a	  federal	  court	  or	  a	  State	  or	  Territory	  Supreme	  Court.”126	  The	  criteria	  for	  members	  are	  on	  first	  blush	  similarly	  daunting	  since	  to	  qualify	  “a)	  he	  or	  she	  is	  or	  has	  been	  a	  Judge;	  	  (b)	  he	  or	  she	  is	  enrolled	  as	  a	  legal	  practitioner	  of	  the	  High	  Court,	  of	  another	  federal	  court	  or	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  a	  State	  or	  Territory	  and	  has	  been	  so	  enrolled	  for	  not	  less	  than	  5	  years;”	  127	  However	  the	  following	  sections	  allow	  for	  greater	  freedom	  in	  appointment,	  (c)	  he	  or	  she	  has	  had	  experience,	  for	  not	  less	  than	  5	  years,	  at	  a	  high	  level	  in	  industry,	  commerce,	  business,	  public	  administration,	  education	  or	  the	  practice	  of	  a	  profession;	  (d)	  he	  or	  she	  has	  obtained	  a	  degree	  of	  a	  university,	  or	  an	  educational	  qualification	  of	  a	  similar	  standing,	  after	  studies	  in	  the	  field	  of	  law,	  economics	  or	  public	  administration;	  or	  (e)	  he	  or	  she	  has,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Governor-­‐‑General,	  special	  knowledge	  or	  skill	  relevant	  to	  the	  duties	  of	  a	  member.	  128	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Sections	  C	  through	  E	  while	  not	  guaranteeing	  anything	  certainly	  provide	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  participation	  beyond	  legal	  professionals,	  unlike	  the	  requirements	  in	  Canada.	  The	  present	  Australian	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  consists	  of	  five	  members,	  three	  of	  whom	  are	  the	  President	  and	  two	  Deputy	  Presidents.129	  
3.6	  Considering	  the	  Three	  Regimes	  	   As	  has	  been	  noted	  in	  the	  various	  national	  sections,	  there	  are	  many	  similarities	  between	  the	  regimes.	  Beyond	  the	  obvious	  common	  root	  of	  the	  UK	  1911	  Act,	  all	  of	  them	  also	  began	  their	  regulatory	  functions	  due	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  music	  collective	  management	  organizations.	  Even	  more	  precisely	  all	  began	  their	  functions	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  (PRS).	  The	  PRS	  established	  itself	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  1914.	  It	  established	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  (CPRS)	  initially	  in	  1924	  and	  then	  successfully	  in	  1925,	  and	  the	  Australian	  Performing	  Right	  Association	  in	  1926.130	  	  To	  reiterate	  a	  position	  mentioned	  at	  the	  outset,	  the	  growth	  of	  collective	  management	  owes	  its	  success	  to	  the	  successful	  establishment	  of	  collectives	  for	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  in	  music.	  Clearly,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  these	  three	  nations	  music	  collectives	  have	  provided	  not	  only	  a	  successful	  and	  lucrative	  model	  for	  others	  to	  follow,	  but	  also	  the	  catalyst	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  regulatory	  bodies.	  	  	   Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  collective	  for	  the	  performance	  right	  was	  established	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  well	  in	  advance	  of	  Canada,	  the	  first	  regulatory	  agency	  would	  appear	  in	  Canada.	  While	  there	  was	  a	  long	  history	  of	  opposition	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  performance	  right	  in	  Victorian	  England,	  by	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Australian Copyright Tribunal, “Members” online: <http://www.copyrighttribunal.gov.au/members>. 
130 Mario Bouchard, “Collective Management in Commonwealth Jurisdictions: Comparing Canada with 
Australia” in Gervais supra note 93 at 310. 
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battle	  was	  essentially	  finished,	  and	  other	  financial	  consideration	  had	  created	  unions	  that	  would	  have	  previously	  been	  unthinkable.131	  While	  that	  war	  may	  have	  been	  finished	  in	  the	  U.K	  it	  was	  a	  fresh	  battlefield	  in	  Canada	  and	  as	  the	  Debates	  of	  the	  House,	  and	  the	  ensuing	  Royal	  Commissions,	  made	  clear	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  collectives	  was	  less	  than	  exemplary.132	  Although	  it	  is	  unclear	  if	  similar	  circumstances	  surrounded	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  APRA,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  think	  they	  did	  as	  there	  is	  often	  a	  significant	  disconnect	  between	  the	  historical	  fact	  and	  the	  romantic	  creation	  myth	  surrounding	  such	  organizations.133	  	  	   Another	  similarity	  between	  the	  three	  groups	  has	  been	  the	  breakdown	  of	  collection	  revenue.	  Despite	  the	  wide-­‐‑ranging	  addition	  to	  the	  number	  and	  types	  of	  collectives,	  particularly	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  those	  connected	  to	  music	  provide	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  revenue.	  As	  Gervais	  noted	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  Canadian	  system	  those	  collectives	  operating	  under	  section	  67	  of	  the	  Act,	  specifically	  those	  concerned	  with	  the	  performance	  or	  telecommunication	  of	  musical	  works,	  or	  sound	  recordings	  of	  musical	  works134“collect	  and	  distribute	  more	  money	  than	  all	  s.	  70.1	  collectives	  combined.”135	  	  	   Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  connections	  between	  all	  the	  agencies	  is	  the	  general	  level	  of	  dissatisfaction	  amongst	  those	  who	  are	  forced	  to	  deal	  with	  them.	  Despite	  what	  may	  have	  been	  the	  underlying	  intent	  in	  their	  creation,	  as	  was	  noted	  in	  the	  Monopolies	  and	  Mergers	  Commission	  Report	  Performing	  Rights,	  they	  do	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 For a detailed discussion of this see supra note 9 chapters 5-6. 132	  House	  of	  Commons	  Debates,	  17th	  Parliament,	  2nd	  Session,	  Vol.	  1,	  at	  901	  (1935).	  
133 Supra note 10 chapter 7. 
134 Supra note 1 at s. 67 a & b. 
135 Daniel Gervais “A Uniquely Canadian Institution: The Copyright Board of Canada” in Y. Gendreau, ed, 
An Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
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provide	  ‘quick,	  cheap	  or	  easy’	  resolutions	  to	  disputes.	  	  Nor	  is	  this	  a	  complaint	  limited	  to	  one	  side	  of	  the	  table.	  As	  Howard	  Knopf	  has	  noted	  this	  affects	  all	  parties	  seeking	  resolution.	  “Even	  in	  recent	  times,	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  has	  been	  known	  to	  take	  as	  much	  as	  18	  months	  to	  render	  a	  decision	  from	  the	  time	  the	  hearing	  is	  over,	  which	  may	  in	  turn	  be	  some	  years	  after	  the	  tariff	  was	  originally	  filed.”136	  	  In	  some	  instances	  this	  lag	  time	  can	  be	  even	  more	  problematic	  because	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Canadian	  board,	  decisions	  are	  retroactive.	  	  	  
3.7	  Systemic	  Differences	  	   Of	  the	  three	  agencies	  only	  Canada	  has	  a	  full	  time	  board,	  the	  other	  are	  both	  part	  time.137	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  number	  of	  collectives	  in	  operation,	  Canada,	  with	  thirty-­‐‑eight,	  has	  double	  the	  amount	  of	  collectives	  operating	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Australia	  manages	  with	  only	  seven	  collectives,	  roughly	  a	  fifth	  of	  Canada’s	  cohort.138	  The	  author	  has	  noted	  in	  a	  previous	  work	  that	  much	  of	  this	  is	  attributable	  to	  the	  Canadian	  policy	  decision	  to	  actively	  encourage	  collective	  management.139	  	   	  	   Unlike	  Canada	  both	  the	  U.K	  and	  Australia	  can	  award	  costs	  in	  their	  decisions.	  This	  has	  been	  something	  that	  has	  been	  suggested	  might	  enhance	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  Canadian	  system,	  however	  it	  was	  noted	  in	  the	  U.K.	  investigation	  Performing	  
Rights	  that	  “	  [u]sers	  were	  also	  concerned	  that	  the	  Tribunal’s	  present	  practice	  of	  awarding	  costs	  so	  as	  to	  reflect	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  acts	  as	  a	  deterrent,	  particularly	  to	  small	  users,	  to	  recourse	  to	  the	  Tribunal.”140	  However	  that	  may	  also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Supra note 11 at 30. 
137 Ibid at 14. 
138 For a list of collecting societies see 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_copyright_collection_societies>. 
139 Supra note 10. 
140 Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Performing Rights (London: HMSO, 1996) at 2.94. 
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be	  the	  result	  of	  the	  narrower	  interpretation	  taken	  with	  respect	  to	  Users	  in	  the	  Commonwealth	  tradition.	  That	  historic	  practice	  and	  its	  variance	  with	  the	  Canadian	  system	  were	  noted	  in	  the	  Alberta	  v.	  Access	  Copyright	  (Alberta	  v	  AC)	  decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada.141	  	   Another	  difference	  between	  the	  nations	  is	  that	  Canada	  does	  not	  have	  an	  appeals	  process	  included	  within	  our	  tribunal	  system.	  In	  Canada	  the	  only	  appeal	  of	  a	  tribunal	  decision	  is	  to	  the	  Federal	  Court.	  Conversely	  both	  Australia	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  have	  an	  appeals	  tribunal	  as	  part	  of	  their	  systems,	  however	  it	  does	  not	  preclude	  appealing	  to	  the	  federal	  court	  if	  the	  appellant	  is	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  appeals	  tribunal.	  	  
	   Arguably	  the	  most	  significant	  divergence	  between	  the	  three	  jurisdictions	  has	  been	  the	  emergence	  of	  User’s	  Rights	  within	  the	  Canadian	  regime.	  This	  reached	  its	  zenith	  in	  July	  of	  2012	  when	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  handed	  down	  five	  rulings	  on	  copyright	  related	  cases	  in	  the	  same	  day.	  It	  was	  a	  historic	  moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Canadian	  copyright,	  and	  perhaps	  common-­‐‑law	  copyright	  as	  a	  whole,	  though	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  Beyond	  their	  relationship	  as	  copyright	  cases,	  the	  five	  cases	  all	  held	  something	  else	  in	  common.	  All	  five	  had	  arrived	  at	  the	  SCC	  on	  appeal	  from	  the	  Federal	  Appeals	  Court	  where	  they	  had	  in	  turn	  been	  on	  review	  from	  decisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada.	  These	  cases	  will	  be	  considered	  later	  as	  part	  of	  a	  review	  of	  the	  judicial	  appeals	  of	  the	  board	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  Board.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37 
[Alberta v AC]. 
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Table	  1.	  
Tribunal	  Comparison	  	   Can.	   U.	  K.	   Aus.	  
	   	   	   	  Collective	  Society	  Established	   1925	   1914	   1926	  Extension	  of	  Performance	  Right	  to	  Broadcasting	   1931	   1934	   1929	  Tribunal	  Established	   1936	   1956	   1968	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  Full	  Time	  Board	  (FT)	  Part	  Time	  (PT)	   FT	   PT	   PT	  Support	  Staff	  (number)	   14	   1	   0****	  Chair/President	  required	  to	  be	  a	  sitting	  or	  former	  Judge	   Y	   N*	   N	  Deputy	  (#)	   1-­‐‑2	   2	   2**	  Deputies	  require	  legal	  background	   N	   Y	  	   Y	  Additional	  Members	  (number)	   3max	   2min	  8max	   2***	  Additional	  members	  require	  legal	  background?	   N	   N	  	   N	  	   	   	   	  Appeal	  available	  within	  tribunal	  system	   N	   Y	   Y	  Appeal	  available	  to	  court	  of	  law	   Y	   Y	  	   Y	  Costs	  awarded	   N	   Y	   Y	  Number	  of	  collectives	  monitored	   36	   18	   7	  	   	   	   	  Recognition	  of	  Users	  Rights	   Y	   N	   N	  *:	  President	  and	  Deputies	  must	  meet	  a	  minimum	  standard	  of	  legal	  knowledge	  including	  formal	  status	  but	  not	  necessarily	  requiring	  role	  of	  judge.	  **	  Presently	  2	  Deputies,	  but	  more	  could	  be	  created	  under	  the	  Act	  if	  needed.	  ***	  2	  presently	  but	  under	  legislation	  as	  many	  as	  needed	  may	  be	  appointed.	  ****	  The	  tribunal	  has	  no	  physical	  resource	  of	  its	  own.	  The	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Australia	  manages	  necessary	  funding.	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Chapter	  4	  The	  User	  Returns	  
	  
While all World Trade Organization member nations enforce rights for copyright 
owners at a minimum standard based on the Berne Convention for Literary and Artistic 
Works,142 not all nations similarly enforce a minimum standard of user’s rights, or 
exceptions to the infringement of owner’s rights. The simple reason for this is that there 
is no minimum standard set within Berne or the WTO. This chapter will consider the 
status of user’s rights within the Canadian, British and Australian copyright regimes. In 
the author’s estimation the Canadian regime now represents the benchmark against which 
all other regimes should be measured with respect to user’s rights.  
 While both the Canadian and Australian copyright regimes are based historically 
on the British tradition, they contain slight variances likely due to their own unique socio-
historical circumstances. While the first Canadian Act was almost an exact copy of the 
British Act, there have been changes over time. Historically Canada has been a nation 
dominated by both French and English colonial interests. While the battle on the Plains of 
Abraham may have settled the ownership issues in favour of the English, it did not 
remove the impact of francophone culture from the Canadian social, economic and legal 
frames. Thus, while most of Canada follows an Anglo-American common law system 
derived from the British tradition, Quebec follows the Civil tradition similar to France. 
Canada is also officially bilingual which means that the official French title for the Act is 
“Droit d’Auteur”. This	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  of	  semantics;	  Myra	  Tawfik	  considered	  this	  fundamental	  difference	  in	  approach	  when	  she	  noted	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  had	  split	  along	  legal	  traditions	  when	  it	  rendered	  its	  decision	  in	  the	  case	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Berne Convention for Literary and Artistic Works September 9, 1886, amendments through September 
28, 1979, available online <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=28369>. 
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Théberge	  v.	  Galerie	  d’Art	  du	  Petit	  Champlain	  Inc.143 With respect to the effect of this 
dual nature underlying Canadian copyright, Justice Binnie wrote, It	  is	  not	  altogether	  helpful	  that	  in	  the	  French	  and	  English	  versions	  of	  the	  Act	  the	  terms	  “copyright”	  and	  “droit	  d’auteur”	  are	  treated	  as	  equivalent.	  While	  the	  notion	  of	  “copyright”	  has	  historically	  been	  
associated	  with	  economic	  rights	  in	  common	  law	  jurisdictions,	  the	  term	  
“droit	  d’auteur”	  is	  the	  venerable	  French	  term	  that	  embraces	  a	  bundle	  of	  
rights	  which	  include	  elements	  of	  both	  economic	  rights	  and	  moral	  rights	  (emphasis	  added).144   
 
4.1 Fair Dealing as a User Right 
 Canada can trace its fair dealing exceptions back to the 1911 Copyright Act of the 
United Kingdom (1911 Act). “Provided the following acts shall not constitute an 
infringement of copyright: (i) Any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private 
study, research, criticism, review, or news summary “145 The five areas denoted by the 
1911 Act would remain the only fair dealing exemptions under Canadian law until the 
2012 revision to the Act. Following the 2012 revision fair dealing would be expanded to 
include a right of parody, satire and education. These additions to the specified 
exemptions were the result of a long period of copyright consideration led in large part by 
the Supreme Court of Canada.  
 In March of 2004 the SCC would bring down a landmark ruling that would shake 
the foundations of Owner’s rights groups in Canada and lead the way for significant 
discussion about the nature of copyright in the 21st century with the case of CCH	  
Canadian	  Limited	  v.	  Law	  Society	  of	  Upper	  Canada,	  [2004]	  1	  SCR	  339	  (CCH).146. The 
case involved a group of publishers who claimed their copyrights had been infringed by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  Myra	  Tawfik,	  “Copyright	  as	  Droit	  d’Auteur”	  (2003)	  17	  IPJ	  58.	  	  	  
144 Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain 2002 SCC 34 [Theberge]. 
145 Supra note 70 s 2.1 (i). 
146 Supra note 18. 
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the Great library of Osgoode hall in their provision of document service to distant 
researchers. The case is particularly important for its establishment of boundaries with 
respect to fair dealing within Canadian law. For the purposes of this discussion it is also 
extremely relevant that the court was very specific in noting that limitations to owner’s 
rights were not simply ‘loopholes’ but were in fact ‘user’s rights’. Noting “The 
exceptions to copyright infringement, perhaps more properly understood as users’ 
rights, are set out in ss. 29 and 30 of the Act.”(Emphasis added)147  The court also 
emphasized the importance of the exceptions as users’ rights in the balance of copyright. The	  fair	  dealing	  exception,	  like	  other	  exceptions	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  is	  a	  user’s	  right.	  	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  proper	  balance	  between	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  copyright	  owner	  and	  users’	  interests,	  it	  must	  not	  be	  interpreted	  restrictively.	  	  As	  Professor	  Vaver,	  supra,148	  has	  explained,	  at	  p.	  171:	  	  “User	  rights	  are	  not	  just	  loopholes.	  	  Both	  owner	  rights	  and	  user	  rights	  should	  therefore	  be	  given	  the	  fair	  and	  balanced	  reading	  that	  befits	  remedial	  legislation.	  149	  150	  	  	   The	  court	  also	  reasserted	  the	  purpose	  of	  Copyright,	  referring	  to	  the	  earlier	  Thèberge	  ruling,	  As	  mentioned,	  in	  Théberge,	  supra,	  this	  Court	  stated	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  copyright	  law	  was	  to	  balance	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  promoting	  the	  encouragement	  and	  dissemination	  of	  works	  of	  the	  arts	  and	  intellect	  and	  obtaining	  a	  just	  reward	  for	  the	  creator.	  	  When	  courts	  adopt	  a	  standard	  of	  originality	  requiring	  only	  that	  something	  be	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  copy	  or	  that	  someone	  simply	  show	  industriousness	  to	  ground	  copyright	  in	  a	  work,	  they	  tip	  the	  scale	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  author’s	  or	  creator’s	  rights,	  at	  the	  loss	  of	  society’s	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  a	  robust	  public	  domain	  that	  could	  help	  foster	  future	  creative	  innovation.151 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Ibid at 12. 
148 David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000). 
149 Supra note 18 at 48. 
150 Anecdotally the author recalls attending a political economy class on the day following the publication 
of the SCC ruling in which the American legal scholar, Siva Vaidyanathan, was a guest. Mr. 
Vaidyanathan’s reaction was one of shock (pleasurable) that the SCC had stated explicitly that user’s had 
rights.  
151 Supra note 18 at 21. 
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  This	  notion	  of	  balance	  first	  stated	  explicitly	  in	  Thèberge,	  and	  then	  reaffirmed	  in	  CCH	  is	  critical	  to	  understanding	  the	  courts	  position	  regarding	  fair	  dealing	  and	  user’s	  rights.	  Although	  the	  section	  cited	  from	  Thèberge	  was	  written	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  threshold	  of	  originality,	  the	  issue	  of	  balance	  used	  to	  justify	  a	  threshold	  of	  originality	  also	  underpins	  the	  courts’	  explicit	  formulation	  of	  both	  user’s	  rights	  and	  the	  boundaries	  of	  fair	  dealing.	  	  	   Arguably	  the	  greatest	  impact	  of	  CCH	  was	  the	  clarification	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  fair	  dealing.	  Referring	  back	  to	  an	  earlier	  court	  of	  appeal	  decision	  the	  SCC	  noted	  that	  there	  could	  be	  no	  one	  single	  definition	  of	  “fair	  dealing”	  since	  the	  decision	  of	  what	  constituted	  fair	  dealing	  would	  always	  depend	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  each	  individual	  case.	  Nonetheless	  the	  SCC	  accepted	  the	  six	  criteria	  suggested	  by	  the	  court	  of	  appeal	  as	  being	  factors	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  any	  determination	  of	  fair	  dealing.	  “(1)	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  dealing;	  (2)	  the	  character	  of	  the	  dealing;	  (3)	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  dealing;	  (4)	  alternatives	  to	  the	  dealing;	  (5)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  work;	  and	  (6)	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  dealing	  on	  the	  work.”152	  The	  court	  went	  further	  however	  to	  develop	  these	  six	  points	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  provide	  guidance	  for	  owners	  and	  users.	  	  1  The	  Purpose	  of	  the	  Dealing.	  It	  will	  be	  fair	  if	  it	  is	  for	  one	  of	  the	  allowable	  purposes	  delineated	  under	  s	  .29:	  research,	  private	  study,	  criticism,	  review	  or	  news	  reporting	  (since	  2012,	  education,	  parody	  or	  satire	  are	  also	  included).153	  It	  expresses	  that	  "these	  allowable	  purposes	  should	  not	  be	  given	  a	  restrictive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152  CCH supra note 18 at 53. 
153  Ibid at 54 
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interpretation	  or	  this	  could	  result	  in	  the	  undue	  restriction	  of	  users'	  rights."154	  The	  Court	  also	  stressed	  the	  need	  to	  give	  "a	  large	  and	  liberal	  interpretation"155	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  research,	  stating,	  "lawyers	  carrying	  on	  the	  business	  of	  law	  for	  profit	  are	  conducting	  research	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  s.	  29	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act".156	  2  The	  Character	  of	  the	  Dealing.	  How	  were	  the	  works	  dealt	  with?	  Were	  multiple	  copies	  made,	  or	  were	  copies	  distributed	  widely	  or	  to	  a	  limited	  group	  of	  people?	  Was	  the	  copy	  destroyed	  after	  being	  used?	  What	  is	  the	  general	  practice	  in	  the	  industry?	  157	  3  The	  Amount	  of	  the	  Dealing.	  Not	  simply	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  work,	  but	  also	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  portion	  quoted	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  	  The	  court	  commented	  that	  “...the	  quantity	  of	  the	  work	  taken	  will	  not	  be	  determinative	  of	  fairness,	  but	  it	  can	  help	  in	  the	  determination”.158	  In	  other	  words	  even	  a	  trivial	  amount	  might	  not	  be	  fair	  dealing	  depending	  on	  its	  significance	  to	  the	  whole.	  Conversely	  in	  some	  instances	  (photographs	  for	  example)	  use	  of	  the	  entire	  work	  might	  be	  ‘fair’	  as	  “there	  might	  be	  no	  other	  way	  to	  criticize	  or	  review	  certain	  types	  of	  works”.159	  	  4  Alternatives	  to	  the	  Dealing.	  Was	  there	  a	  “non-­‐‑copyrighted	  equivalent	  of	  the	  work”?	  Was	  the	  dealing	  "reasonably	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  ultimate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid at 51. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid at 55. 
158 Ibid at 56. 
159 Ibid. 
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purpose"?160	  For	  example	  is	  it	  necessary	  to	  use	  a	  photograph	  in	  which	  copyright	  subsists	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  educating	  a	  class	  as	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  specific	  genus	  of	  flower?	  If	  there	  were	  a	  non-­‐‑copyright	  version	  available	  that	  would	  serve	  the	  purpose	  equally	  well	  then	  it	  would	  be	  harder	  to	  establish	  a	  case	  for	  fair	  dealing.	  5  The	  Nature	  of	  the	  Work.	  Copying	  from	  a	  work	  that	  has	  never	  been	  published	  could	  be	  more	  fair	  than	  from	  a	  published	  work	  "in	  that	  its	  reproduction	  with	  acknowledgement	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  wider	  public	  dissemination	  of	  the	  work	  -­‐‑	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  copyright	  law.	  If,	  however,	  the	  work	  in	  question	  was	  confidential,	  this	  may	  tip	  the	  scales	  towards	  finding	  that	  the	  dealing	  was	  unfair."161	  6  Effect	  of	  the	  Dealing	  on	  the	  Work.	  If	  the	  work	  that	  is	  reproduced	  might	  compete	  in	  the	  marketplace	  with	  the	  original,	  then	  the	  dealing	  may	  not	  be	  fair.	  However	  the	  court	  also	  noted	  "Although	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  dealing	  on	  the	  market	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  is	  an	  important	  factor,	  it	  is	  neither	  the	  only	  factor	  nor	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  that	  a	  court	  must	  consider	  in	  deciding	  if	  the	  dealing	  is	  fair."162	  	   While	  the	  notion	  of	  fairness	  will	  always	  be	  situational,	  “whether	  something	  is	  fair	  is	  a	  question	  of	  fact	  and	  depends	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  each	  case”,163	  the	  six	  points	  provided	  by	  the	  court	  created	  a	  set	  of	  guidelines	  for	  users	  to	  consider	  prior	  to	  use,	  which	  is	  far	  more	  than	  had	  been	  available	  previously.	  The	  guidelines	  would	  be	  given	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161 Ibid at 58. 
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even	  more	  depth	  in	  the	  subsequent	  rulings	  of	  the	  pentalogy.	  
4.2	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  
	   Fair	  dealing	  under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  also	  allows	  for	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  without	  licensing	  in	  limited	  situations.	  Sections	  29	  and	  30	  of	  the	  Copyright,	  Designs	  and	  Patents	  Act	  1988,	  define	  those	  circumstances	  under	  which	  fair	  dealing	  is	  a	  valid	  defense.	  Specifically,	  where	  the	  use	  is	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  research	  or	  private	  study,	  where	  it	  is	  to	  allow	  for	  criticism	  or	  review,	  and	  where	  it	  is	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  reporting	  current	  events.	  As	  of	  1	  October	  2014,	  Section	  30A	  provides	  for	  fair	  dealing	  as	  a	  defense	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  infringement	  was	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  caricature,	  parody	  or	  pastiche.	  Under	  the	  UK	  Act	  research	  and	  study	  are	  narrowly	  defined	  and	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  commercial	  research.	  They	  also	  do	  not	  include	  infringements	  of	  broadcasts,	  sound	  recordings	  or	  film.	  Research	  cannot	  be	  private	  (and	  in	  a	  non-­‐‑academic	  setting	  must	  also	  not	  have	  a	  future	  potential	  commercial	  purpose),	  as	  this	  exception	  is	  justified	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  research	  provides	  a	  benefit	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  A	  further	  limitation	  is	  set	  out	  Section	  29(3)(b)	  which	  designates	  that	  the	  copying	  cannot	  be	  fair	  dealing	  if	  the	  copier	  knows	  it	  will	  result	  in	  "copies	  of	  substantially	  the	  same	  material	  being	  provided	  to	  more	  than	  one	  person	  at	  substantially	  the	  same	  time	  and	  for	  substantially	  the	  same	  purpose."164	  As	  an	  example	  unlike	  the	  ruling	  in	  Alberta	  v	  AC,	  a	  teacher	  could	  not	  print	  multiple	  copies	  of	  a	  work	  for	  their	  students	  while	  depending	  on	  the	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions.	  Infringers	  must	  not	  only	  demonstrate	  their	  copying	  falls	  into	  one	  of	  the	  fair	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dealing	  categories,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  also	  "fair".	  Factors	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  determining	  the	  "fairness"	  of	  the	  use	  can	  include	  the	  quantity	  of	  the	  work	  taken,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  was	  previously	  published,	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  infringer	  and	  what	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  infringement	  on	  the	  original	  author's	  returns	  for	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  will	  be.	  Unlike	  fair	  dealing	  within	  Canada,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  accurately	  similar	  to	  Fair	  Dealing	  in	  Canada	  prior	  to	  CCH	  and	  the	  Pentalogy,	  the	  guidelines	  for	  the	  Fair	  Dealing	  criteria	  in	  the	  UK	  are	  not	  well	  defined.	  As	  noted	  on	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Government	  webpage	  “There	  is	  no	  statutory	  definition	  of	  fair	  dealing	  -­‐‑	  it	  will	  always	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  degree	  and	  impression	  in	  each	  case.	  The	  question	  to	  be	  asked	  is:	  how	  would	  a	  fair-­‐‑minded	  and	  honest	  person	  have	  dealt	  with	  the	  work?”165	  	  
4.3	  Australia	  	   In	  Australia,	  the	  grounds	  for	  fair	  dealing	  are:	  
◦   Research	  and	  study166	  	  
◦   Review	  and	  criticism167	  	  
◦   Reporting	  the	  news168	  	  
◦   Legal	  advice169	  	  
◦   Parody	  and	  Satire170	  	  The	  2006	  Copyright	  Amendment	  Act	  2006171	  added	  parody	  and	  satire	  to	  the	  fair	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Government of the United Kingdom, “Exceptions to Copyright” online: 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/exceptions-to-copyright>.  
166 Supra note 123 at s 40. 
167 Ibid at s 41. 
168 Ibid at s 42. 
169 Ibid at s 43. 
170 Ibid at s 41(a). 
171 Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Australia) (Cth) No. 158 of 2006 
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dealing	  exceptions	  (though	  only	  within	  certain	  circumstances)	  and	  also	  added	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  and	  limited	  exceptions	  to	  copyright	  for	  personal	  use	  of	  AV	  material,	  including	  time	  shifting172	  and	  format	  shifting.173	  Generally	  these	  exceptions	  have	  been	  narrowly	  defined,	  and	  as	  the	  Law	  Reform	  Commission	  for	  Australia	  has	  noted	  on	  its	  webpage	  “it	  is	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  decide	  whether	  particular	  uses	  of	  copyright	  material	  constitute	  fair	  dealing.”174	  Similar	  to	  the	  criteria	  used	  to	  determine	  fairness	  in	  Canada,	  Australia	  reviews	  the	  purpose	  and	  character	  of	  the	  dealing,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  work,	  the	  possibility	  of	  obtaining	  the	  work	  commercially	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  use	  on	  the	  potential	  market	  for	  the	  work	  or	  on	  its	  value,	  and	  how	  much	  of	  a	  work	  is	  copied.	  While	  no	  specific	  amount	  is	  specified	  in	  the	  Australian	  Copyright	  Act	  most	  educational	  institutions	  suggest	  a	  10%	  guideline	  under	  fair	  dealing	  provisions	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  research	  and	  study.175	  Contrast	  this	  with	  the	  Canadian	  approach	  delineated	  in	  CCH	  which	  stated	  “...the	  quantity	  of	  the	  work	  taken	  will	  not	  be	  determinative	  of	  fairness,	  but	  it	  can	  help	  in	  the	  determination”.176	  	  Another	  important	  distinction	  in	  the	  Australian	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  person	  making	  the	  copy,	  “the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  law	  with	  respect	  to	  fair	  dealing—which	  directs	  a	  court	  to	  look	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  person	  making	  the	  copy	  rather	  than	  the	  actual	  user	  of	  the	  copy—the	  ‘maker’	  of	  the	  copy	  ...	  may	  not	  be	  in	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Ibid at s 111. 
173 Ibid at s 43C, 547J, 109A and 100AA. 
174 Australian Law Reform Commission, online: <https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/7-fair-
dealing/current-law>. 




176 Supra note 18 at 56. 
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position	  to	  claim	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  fair	  dealing	  exception”.177	  Once	  again	  contrast	  this	  with	  the	  rulings	  of	  SCC,	  specifically	  CCH	  &	  Alberta	  v	  AC	  where	  the	  SCC	  was	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  the	  position	  of	  the	  user	  that	  should	  be	  considered.	  
4.4	  Conclusion	  	   When	  viewed	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  British	  and	  Australian	  regimes,	  the	  fair	  dealing	  exemptions	  within	  Canadian	  copyright	  are	  notably	  expansive.	  Given	  that	  they	  have	  developed	  from	  the	  same	  fundamental	  root,	  the	  1911	  Act,	  one	  might	  presume	  the	  differences	  between	  Canada	  and	  Australia	  would	  not	  be	  so	  significant.	  However,	  most	  common	  law	  jurisdictions	  view	  fair	  dealing	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  exceptions	  only.	  The	  Canadian	  approach	  is	  very	  different.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  CCH,	  the	  court	  made	  clear	  that	  these	  were	  users’	  rights	  and	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  copyright	  not	  simply	  a	  ‘loophole’.	  This	  approach	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  one	  of	  mere	  exception.	  There	  are	  exceptions	  to	  a	  rule	  but,	  as	  of	  CCH,	  in	  Canada	  the	  exception	  is	  part	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  not	  merely	  a	  defense	  against	  it.	  As	  Hugenholtz	  and	  Senftleben	  have	  pointed	  out,	  within	  author	  centric	  systems	  the	  approach	  to	  limitations	  as	  exceptions	  has	  been	  critical	  to	  maintaining	  the	  system	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  owners’	  rights	  (though	  couched	  in	  the	  persona	  of	  the	  author).	  178	  They	  also	  point	  out	  however	  that	  this	  has	  played	  out	  similarly	  in	  utilitarian	  justified	  regimes	  noting	  that,	  	  
[I]nspired	  by	  economic	  theories	  (and	  powerful	  lobbies)	  that	  posit	  copyright	  as	  (intellectual)	  ‘property’,	  the	  economic	  rights	  that	  the	  law	  grants	  to	  copyright	  owners	  are	  increasingly	  perceived,	  by	  courts,	  politicians	  and	  some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Universities Australia submission to Australian Law Reform Commission supra note 164. 
178 P B Hugenholtz	  and	  Martin	  Senftleben,	  “Fair	  Use	  in	  Europe:	  In	  Search	  of	  Flexibilities,	  2011”	  at	  7,	  online:	  SSRN:	  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959554>. 
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scholars	  alike,	  as	  absolute.	  According	  to	  these	  theories,	  just	  as	  property	  rights	  in	  tangible	  goods	  warrant	  complete	  and	  perpetual	  control,	  making	  unauthorized	  uses	  unlawful	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  copyright	  should	  ideally	  become	  a	  perpetual	  and	  absolute	  right	  that	  tolerates	  few	  or	  no	  ‘free’	  uses.	  179	  	   The	  recognition	  of	  users’	  rights	  in	  addition	  to	  those	  of	  owners	  has	  precipitated	  a	  larger	  discourse	  in	  the	  area	  of	  fair	  dealing.	  From	  a	  national	  perspective	  it	  is	  gratifying	  to	  see	  Canada	  at	  the	  leading	  edge	  of	  this	  discussion	  though	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  disappointing	  that	  our	  jurisprudence	  has	  not	  had	  a	  greater	  impact	  on	  other	  common-­‐‑law	  jurisdictions.	  The	  series	  of	  changes	  that	  took	  place	  within	  eight	  years	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  were	  absolutely	  staggering.	  They	  have	  culminated	  in	  a	  fair	  use	  regime	  that	  is	  unparalleled	  in	  common-­‐‑law	  regimes,	  and	  one	  that	  will	  hopefully	  serve	  as	  a	  model	  for	  those	  other	  regimes.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  chapter	  five,	  the	  recognition	  of	  user’s	  rights	  has	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada.	  Though	  it	  has	  taken	  a	  considerable	  time	  for	  the	  full	  impact	  to	  be	  felt,	  the	  change	  in	  the	  Board	  is	  evident	  from	  recent	  decisions	  and	  signals	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  Board’s	  understanding	  of	  its	  role	  in	  the	  process	  of	  collective	  management.	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Chapter	  5:	  The	  Copyright	  Board	  Under	  Review	  	  	   While	  all	  tribunals	  are	  bound	  by	  their	  enabling	  legislation	  and	  the	  jurisprudence	  surrounding	  their	  individual	  areas,	  they	  are	  generally	  held	  to	  be	  the	  
experts	  in	  their	  field.	  As	  Chief	  Justice	  McLachlin	  noted	  in	  a	  2013	  address	  to	  the	  Annual	  Conference	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Canadian	  Administrative	  Tribunals,	  “Acceptance	  of	  the	  specialized	  expertise	  and	  policy	  perspectives	  that	  administrative	  decision-­‐‑makers	  bring	  to	  their	  special	  tasks	  of	  judging	  and	  the	  consequent	  need	  for	  deference	  is	  universal”.180	  However,	  as	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  noted	  elsewhere	  in	  her	  speech,	  this	  has	  not	  always	  been	  the	  case,	  nor	  does	  this	  mean	  such	  tribunals	  operate	  entirely	  without	  review.	  Despite	  the	  deference	  shown	  by	  the	  courts,	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  has	  not	  gone	  unchallenged	  or	  unquestioned	  in	  its	  operations.	  	   Howard	  Knopf,	  in	  a	  2008	  address	  to	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Upper	  Canada,	  listed	  a	  number	  of	  concerns	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Board.	  Noting	  the	  Board’s	  willingness	  to	  accept,	  and	  its	  reliance	  upon,	  ‘expert’	  testimony,	  and	  the	  questionable	  nature	  of	  those	  experts,	  he	  comments,	  	  The	  Board	  places	  considerable	  reliance	  on	  opinion	  evidence	  presented	  by	  supposed	  expert	  although	  it	  often	  does	  not	  formally	  qualify	  the	  experts	  as	  such.	  Some	  of	  the	  experts	  who	  appear	  before	  the	  board	  do	  so	  quite	  regularly	  and	  have	  close	  economic	  ties	  if	  not	  outright	  dependency	  on	  the	  party	  calling	  them.	  While	  these	  persons	  may	  have	  considerable	  “expertise,”	  they	  may	  have	  little	  or	  no	  independence	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  party	  paying	  for	  their	  services.181	  	  While	  the	  independence	  of	  ‘expert’	  witnesses	  may	  not	  have	  been	  noted	  by	  the	  court	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “Administrative Tribunals and the Courts: An Evolutionary 
Relationship” (Address delivered at the Annual Conference of the Council of Canadian Administrative 
Tribunals, 2013) at 4, online: Supreme Court of Canada <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-
juges/spe-dis/bm-2013-05-27-eng.aspx>. 
181 Supra note 11 at 22. 
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  the	  preponderance	  of	  expert	  testimony	  certainly	  has,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  this	  statement	  of	  the	  court	  in	  Canadian	  recording	  Industry	  Association	  v.	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  
Authours	  and	  Music	  Publishes	  of	  Canada,182	  “As	  is	  so	  often	  the	  case,	  the	  hearings	  before	  the	  Board	  were,	  in	  large	  part,	  a	  contest	  of	  experts.”183	  Another	  common	  complaint	  in	  regard	  to	  Board	  practice	  noted	  in	  C.	  Craig	  Parks’	  review	  of	  Copyright	  Collectives	  for	  Heritage	  Canada,184	  as	  well	  in	  more	  recent	  submissions	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  consultation	  process,	  is	  the	  long	  delay	  in	  decisions	  of	  the	  board.	  In	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  current	  responses	  made	  to	  the	  Board’s	  request	  for	  consultation	  on	  procedural	  issues185	  the	  two	  most	  common	  concerns	  noted	  were	  the	  length	  of	  time	  taken	  for	  decisions	  and	  the	  uneven	  nature	  of	  the	  interrogatory	  process.	  186	   	  Howard	  Knopf’s	  comments	  in	  response	  to	  the	  current	  consultation	  process	  were	  insightful,	  though	  not	  particularly	  supportive	  of	  the	  process;	  however,	  Knopf	  makes	  a	  very	  interesting	  comparison.	  Despite	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  need	  for	  more	  funding	  and	  staff	  to	  address	  issues	  before	  the	  board,	  the	  2014	  budget	  for	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada	  is	  approximately	  10%	  of	  the	  Budget	  for	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada.	  However,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Canadian Recording Industry Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishes of 
Canada, 2010 FCA 322. 
183 Ibid at 7. 
184 C. Craig Parks, A Report on Copyright Collectives Operating in Canada (2006), online:  
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2007/ch-pc/CH44-125-2007E.pdf>. 
185 Copyright Board of Canada, Letter to Stakeholders (5 February 2015), online: Copyright Board of 
Canada <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/pdf/vp-letter.pdf>. 
186 See comments from collectives, online: Copyright Board of Canada <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-
apropos/index-e.html>. 
	   71	  
The Copyright Board typically renders only about two or three (more or less) 
substantive decisions a year that typically require several years to reach the 
hearing stage. The hearings are rarely longer than a week or two. There is 
typically a 1.5 to 2 year (or even more) delay after the hearing before a decision is 
rendered, and the	  decisions are often then reversed after judicial review. By 
contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2013 received 529 applications for 
leave to appeal, heard 75 appeals and rendered judgment in 78 cases. The average 
time between a hearing and the rendering of a judgment was 6.2 months.187  Knopf’s	  comment	  with	  regard	  to	  judicial	  review	  is	  particularly	  noteworthy	  given	  decisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  review	  by	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  twenty-­‐‑one	  times	  between	  2004	  and	  2014.	  This	  is	  not	  insignificant	  given	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  decisions	  released	  by	  the	  Board,	  and	  as	  Knopf	  noted	  in	  in	  2008,	  “[a]lthough	  the	  FCA	  will	  doubtless	  continue	  to	  defer	  to	  the	  Board,	  to	  some	  extent	  at	  least,	  on	  ‘core’	  matters	  relating	  to	  fact	  finding	  and	  rate	  calculation,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  there	  will	  be	  no	  deference	  and	  increasing	  decisiveness	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  legal	  reasoning.”188	  	  It	  is	  also	  useful	  to	  consider	  the	  Boards	  decisions	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  Tribunals,	  though	  finding	  equivalent	  comparators	  is	  difficult.	  Data	  from	  the	  Canadian	  Agricultural	  Review	  Tribunal	  (CART)	  during	  the	  period	  2008-­‐‑1014,	  The	  Competition	  Tribunal	  between	  2004-­‐‑2014	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Human	  Rights	  Tribunal	  between	  2008	  and	  2014	  can	  provide	  a	  limited	  frame	  of	  reference	  for	  tribunal	  decisions	  on	  a	  very	  general	  level.	  There	  are	  no	  other	  tribunals	  dealing	  solely	  with	  copyright	  issues,	  and	  few	  that	  have	  such	  a	  narrow	  focus	  combined	  with	  a	  small	  public	  profile.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  three	  comparators	  being	  proffered,	  the	  Human	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Letter from Howard	  P.	  Knopf	  to	  Gilles	  McDougall,	  “Re:	  WORKING	  COMMITTEE	  ON	  THE	  OPERATIONS,	  PROCEDURES	  AND	  PROCESSES	  OF	  THE	  COPYRIGHT	  BOARD”	  (6	  March	  2015),	  online:	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada	  <http://www.cb-­‐‑cda.gc.ca/about-­‐‑apropos/pdf/KNOPF.pdf>. 
188 Supra note 11 at 30. 
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Rights	  Tribunal	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  widely	  known,	  with	  both	  the	  Competition	  Tribunal	  and	  CART	  known	  to	  a	  smaller	  group	  of	  stakeholders.	  During	  the	  period	  2008-­‐‑2014	  CART	  delivered	  200	  decisions.	  Similar	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Board,	  the	  only	  avenue	  of	  appeal	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  CART	  decisions	  is	  to	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  Of	  the	  two	  hundred	  decisions	  twenty	  would	  be	  reviewed	  by	  the	  FCA.	  Of	  those,	  sixteen	  or	  80%,	  would	  be	  allowed.189	  	  Also	  interesting	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  combined	  budget	  for	  2013-­‐‑14,	  a	  year	  in	  which	  it	  would	  issue	  forty-­‐‑three	  decisions,	  	  was	  five	  hundred	  and	  seventy-­‐‑four	  thousand	  dollars.	  Conversely	  in	  the	  same	  year	  the	  Board	  would	  issue	  9	  decisions	  with	  an	  operating	  budget	  of	  just	  under	  three	  and	  one	  half	  million.	  190	  	  The	  Canadian	  Human	  Rights	  Tribunal	  would	  issue	  two	  hundred	  and	  eighty-­‐‑nine	  decisions	  between	  2004	  and	  2009,	  of	  which	  thirty-­‐‑two,	  or	  4.5%	  would	  receive	  judicial	  review	  and	  41%	  would	  be	  allowed.191	  The	  Competition	  Tribunal	  192	  would	  render	  two	  hundred	  and	  seventy-­‐‑four	  decisions	  between	  2004	  and	  2014,	  compared	  to	  the	  Board’s	  sixty-­‐‑three,	  of	  which	  twenty-­‐‑one,	  or	  8%	  of	  all	  decisions,	  would	  receive	  review.	  Of	  those	  twelve,	  or	  57%	  would	  find	  against	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Tribunal.	  The	  budget	  for	  the	  Competition	  tribunal,	  while	  varying	  over	  the	  years,	  averages	  approximately	  one	  and	  one	  quarter	  million	  a	  year	  compared	  to	  the	  Boards	  three	  and	  one	  half	  million	  in	  2014.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Canadian Agricultural Review Tribunal Annual Reports online http://cart-crac.gc.ca/eng/annual-
reports/?id=1278107179184 
190 Supra note 186. 
191 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Annual Reports online http://www.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/NS/reports-
rapports/ar-ra-eng.asp 
192  Competition Tribunal of Canada Annual Reports online http://www.ct-
tc.gc.ca/ResourcesRessources/DPR-RSR/DPR-RMR-eng.asp 
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One	  of	  the	  more	  striking	  aspects	  of	  these	  comparators	  is	  the	  volume	  of	  decisions	  being	  rendered.	  All	  of	  the	  tribunals	  noted	  issued	  a	  minimum	  of	  two	  hundred	  decisions	  in	  the	  periods	  cited	  compared	  to	  only	  ninety	  decisions	  throughout	  the	  full	  eleven-­‐‑year	  span	  by	  the	  Copyright	  Board.193	  An	  average	  of	  10%	  or	  less	  of	  total	  decisions	  by	  the	  other	  tribunals	  were	  subject	  to	  judicial	  review,	  while	  the	  Board	  had	  an	  average	  of	  23%.	  Also	  where	  operating	  budgets	  were	  available	  (Competition	  Tribunal	  and	  CART),	  they	  were	  less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  budget	  noted	  for	  the	  Board	  despite	  all	  other	  tribunals	  delivering	  more	  than	  twice	  as	  many	  decsions.	  While	  the	  Board’s	  reversals	  on	  review	  may	  reflect	  a	  reasonable	  pattern	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  tribunals,	  the	  percentage	  of	  cases	  being	  reviewed	  is	  more	  than	  double	  that	  of	  the	  highest	  comparator.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  area	  of	  administrative	  law	  in	  Canada	  has	  been	  commented	  upon	  in	  recent	  years	  for	  the	  frequency	  of	  change	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  stable	  structural	  framework	  which	  also	  affect	  the	  process	  of	  judicial	  review.	  Justice	  David	  Stratas	  has	  stated	  “Our	  administrative	  law	  is	  a	  never-­‐‑ending	  construction	  site	  where	  one	  crew	  builds	  structures	  and	  then	  a	  later	  crew	  tears	  them	  down	  to	  build	  anew,	  seemingly	  without	  an	  overall	  plan.”194	  This	  instability	  may	  also	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  judicial	  reviews.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Copyright Board of Canada, Annual Reports, online: http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/reports-
rapports-e.html. 
194 Stratas, David, The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency 
(February 17, 2016). Available online:  SSRN:   <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2733751>. 
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5.1	  Contextualizing	  the	  Federal	  Court	  Review	   	  	  	   By	  virtue	  of	  section	  28	  (j)	  of	  the	  Federal	  Courts	  Act,	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  is	  the	  only	  means	  of	  judicial	  review	  for	  decisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board.195	  In	  her	  address	  to	  the	  6th	  Annual	  Conference	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Administrative	  Tribunals,	  Chief	  Justice	  McLachlin	  noted	  that	  over	  time	  the	  standard	  of	  review	  for	  administrative	  tribunals	  has	  changed	  considerably.196	  In	  our	  current	  period	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  in	  Dunsmuir	  v	  New	  Brunswick197	  has	  defined	  the	  standard	  of	  review	  for	  tribunal	  decisions	  in	  Canada.	  The	  Dunsmuir	  decision	  was	  notable	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  reduced	  the	  tripartite	  nature	  of	  the	  previous	  standard	  by	  reducing	  two	  separate	  standards	  of	  review	  into	  a	  single	  reasonableness	  standard.198	  	   	  	   As	  Chief	  Justice	  McLachlin	  has	  commented	  it	  is	  primarily	  in	  this	  area	  that	  deference	  has	  been	  shown	  based	  in	  large	  part	  on	  the	  presumed	  expert	  knowledge	  of	  the	  tribunals	  in	  their	  specific	  subject	  areas.	  In	  the	  Dunsmuir	  decision	  the	  court	  noted,	  	  
[A]	  court	  conducting	  a	  review	  for	  reasonableness	  inquires	  into	  the	  qualities	  that	  make	  a	  decision	  reasonable,	  referring	  both	  to	  the	  process	  of	  articulating	  the	  reasons	  and	  to	  outcomes.	  In	  judicial	  review,	  reasonableness	  is	  concerned	  mostly	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  justification,	  transparency	  and	  intelligibility	  
within	  the	  decision-­‐‑making	  process	  and	  with	  whether	  the	  decision	  falls	  within	  a	  range	  of	  possible,	  acceptable	  outcomes	  which	  are	  defensible	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  facts	  and	  the	  law.	  [emphasis	  added]199	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  Federal	  Courts	  Act,	  RSC	  1985,	  c	  F-­‐‑7,	  s.	  1;	  2002,	  c.	  8,	  s.	  14.	  	  
196 Supra note 170. 
197 Dunsmuir	  v	  New	  Brunswick,	  2008	  SCC	  9	  [Dunsmuir]. 
198 Prior to Dunsmuir there existed both a reasonableness (simpliciter) and a patent unreasonableness 
standard.                        
199 Supra note 197 at	  47	  [emphasis added].  
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5.2	  Decisions	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  The	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  reviewed	  twenty-­‐‑one	  decisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  between	  2004	  and	  2014200.	  Utilizing	  aspects	  of	  a	  methodology	  developed	  by	  Margaret	  Ann	  Wilkinson	  in	  her	  review	  of	  the	  SCC	  copyright	  decisions201	  this	  section	  will	  consider	  the	  body	  of	  decisions	  as	  a	  whole.	  All	  of	  the	  decisions	  reviewed	  took	  place	  following	  the	  SCC	  decision	  in	  CCH	  and	  its	  ensuing	  impact	  on	  the	  Canadian	  Copyright	  landscape.	  Of	  the	  twenty-­‐‑one	  cases	  heard	  by	  the	  court,	  nine	  or	  approximately	  43%,	  were	  found	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  appellants.	  Within	  those,	  six	  granted	  the	  appeal	  in	  whole	  and	  three	  in	  part.	  Five	  of	  these	  twenty-­‐‑one	  cases	  would	  subsequently	  be	  appealed	  to	  the	  SCC	  and	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  what	  has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  Pentalogy.	  Three	  of	  the	  Pentalogy	  decisions	  would	  overturn	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  FAC,	  resulting	  in	  a	  total	  of	  twelve	  decisions	  (or	  57%)	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  appellants	  relative	  to	  the	  twenty-­‐‑one	  decisions	  of	  the	  board	  reviewed.	  Therefore,	  almost	  60%	  of	  the	  Board’s	  decisions	  were	  overturned	  following	  review	  by	  the	  Federal	  and	  Supreme	  courts..	  	  Of	  the	  twenty-­‐‑one	  cases	  reviewed	  by	  the	  FCA	  sixteen	  were	  decided	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  correctness,	  with	  two	  of	  those	  also	  submitting	  issues	  subject	  to	  the	  reasonableness	  standard.	  Including	  the	  two	  cases,	  which	  were	  submitted	  on	  both	  a	  standard	  of	  correctness	  and	  reasonableness,	  seven	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐‑one	  cases	  were	  considered	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  reasonableness.	  Of	  the	  seven	  reviewed	  on	  the	  ground	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 See table 2 for a list of all related appeals in this review. 
201 Margaret Ann Wilkinson “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” in Michael Geist, ed, 
The Copyright Pentalogy How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian 
Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012). 
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of	  reasonableness,	  three	  were	  granted.	  While	  it	  is	  unnecessary	  to	  review	  all	  twenty-­‐‑one	  cases,	  some	  of	  the	  more	  significant	  decisions	  are	  worth	  noting	  in	  detail.	  The	  2004	  Canadian	  Private	  Copying	  Collective	  v.	  Canadian	  Storage	  Media	  
Association,202	  case	  revolved	  around	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Board	  to	  approve	  a	  blank	  media	  levy	  in	  respect	  of	  MP3	  players	  such	  as	  the	  Apple	  iPod.	  The	  court	  noted,	  “In	  my	  respectful	  view,	  it	  is	  for	  Parliament	  to	  decide	  whether	  digital	  audio	  recorders	  such	  as	  MP3	  players	  are	  to	  be	  brought	  within	  the	  class	  of	  items	  that	  can	  be	  levied	  under	  Part	  VIII.”203	  Thus	  the	  court	  determined	  the	  Board	  had	  overstepped	  its	  jurisdiction	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Act.	  A	  similar	  issue	  would	  arise	  in	  Apple	  v.	  
Canadian	  Private	  Copying	  Collective,204	  in	  2008.	  In	  this	  instance	  the	  Board	  publicized	  a	  proposed	  tariff	  submitted	  by	  Canadian	  Private	  Copying	  Collective	  [CPCC].	  Apple	  sought	  to	  have	  the	  section’	  addressing	  digital	  audio	  recorders	  removed	  from	  the	  proposed	  tariff	  given	  the	  decision	  in	  Canadian	  Private	  Copying	  Collective	  v.	  Canadian	  
Storage	  Media	  Association,	  the	  Board	  dismissed	  their	  concern.	  In	  the	  subsequent	  decision	  of	  the	  court,	  the	  FCA	  noted	  that	  “[I]t is necessary to consider only the 
principle established in Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media 
Alliance (C.A.), [2005] 2 F.C.R. 654, which is dispositive.”205 Simply put the court had 
clearly stated that the decision regarding the inclusion of digital audio recorders under the 
Act, was Parliament’s, not the Board’s nor CPCC’s.  The	  notion	  of	  transparency	  and	  intelligibility	  raised	  in	  the	  Dunsmuir	  decision	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  decisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board.	  As	  the	  Federal	  court	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Association, 2004 FCA 424. 
203 Ibid at 164. 
204 Apple v. Canadian Private Copying Collective, 2008 FCA 6. 
205 Ibid at 3. 
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noted	  in	  Canadian	  Association	  of	  Broadcasters	  v.	  SOCAN206	  “The	  board	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  greatest	  deference	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  its	  discretion…	  However,	  it	  must	  explain	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  decisions	  that	  enables	  the	  Court	  on	  Judicial	  review	  to	  determine	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  reasons,	  read	  in	  context,	  whether	  the	  decision	  was	  rationally	  supportable.”207	  And	  in	  the	  following	  paragraph	  “It	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  say	  in	  effect:	  “We	  are	  the	  experts.	  This	  is	  the	  figure.	  Trust	  us.””208	  Howard	  Knopf	  has	  noted	  that	  for	  many	  years	  the	  Board	  considered	  its	  decisions	  to	  be	  ‘bullet	  proof’,209	  however	  the	  court’s	  decision	  made	  it	  clear	  they	  were	  not.	   In	  the	  2010	  SOCAN	  v.	  Bell210	  the	  issue	  under	  review	  was	  the	  Board’s	  decision	  that	  the	  downloading	  of	  a	  preview	  of	  music	  no	  more	  than	  thirty	  seconds	  in	  length	  fell	  within	  the	  Fair	  Dealing	  exceptions	  under	  section	  29	  of	  the	  Act,	  and	  as	  such	  was	  not	  compensable	  by	  tariff.	  SOCAN	  disagreed,	  taking	  the	  position	  that	  the	  Board	  had	  erred	  in	  their	  interpretation	  of	  section	  29.	  The	  court	  however	  agreed	  with	  the	  Board	  noting	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  Boards’	  written	  decision	  that	  “This	  passage	  shows	  that	  the	  Board	  found	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  dealing	  to	  be	  the	  length	  of	  each	  preview	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  length	  of	  the	  complete	  work.	  In	  making	  this	  determination,	  it	  also	  considered	  the	  user’s	  objective	  of	  researching	  a	  purchase.”211	  Ultimately	  the	  court	  believed	  that	  the	  Board	  had	  taken	  the	  proper	  approach	  to	  the	  decision	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  balance	  between	  users	  and	  owners	  as	  brought	  forth	  in	  Theberge	  and	  the	  criteria	  for	  Fair	  Dealing	  as	  delineated	  in	  CCH.	  Unsatisfied	  with	  the	  outcome,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Canadian Association of Broadcasters v. SOCAN, 2006 FCA 337. 
207 Ibid at para 16. 
208 Ibid at para 17. 
209 Supra note 11 at 24. 
210 Socan v. Bell, 2010 FCA 123. 
211 Ibid at para 27. 
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SOCAN	  would	  appeal	  this	  to	  the	  SCC	  and	  it	  would	  be	  one	  of	  the	  cases	  released	  in	  the	  pentalogy.	  
Alberta	  (Education)	  v.	  Access	  Copyright212would	  also	  be	  included	  in	  a	  later	  appeal	  to	  the	  SCC.	  At	  issue	  was	  the	  number	  of	  copies	  made	  for	  distribution	  in	  the	  classroom.	  The	  Board	  had	  included	  those	  copies	  in	  the	  number	  used	  for	  setting	  the	  tariff	  rate	  to	  be	  collected	  by	  Access	  Copyright,	  however	  the	  applicants	  felt	  the	  board	  had	  erred	  in	  their	  decision.	  The	  applicants	  believed	  their	  uses	  of	  multiple	  copies	  in	  the	  classroom	  fell	  outside	  the	  tariff	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  Fair	  Dealing	  provisions.	  In	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  issue	  the	  court	  ultimately	  focused	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  	  ‘appropriate	  medium’	  as	  noted	  within	  section	  29.4(3)	  of	  the	  Act,	  “Except	  in	  the	  case	  of	  manual	  reproduction,	  the	  exemption	  from	  copyright	  infringement	  provided	  by	  […]	  subsection	  (2)	  does	  not	  apply	  if	  the	  work	  or	  other	  subject	  matter	  is	  commercially	  available	  in	  a	  medium	  that	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  purpose	  referred	  to	  in	  that	  paragraph	  or	  subsection,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be.”213	  The	  court	  felt	  that	  the	  Board	  had	  not	  considered	  the	  issue	  of	  medium	  sufficiently	  in	  their	  analysis	  and	  thus	  returned	  it	  to	  the	  Board	  for	  review.	  	  2010	  was	  a	  busy	  year	  for	  the	  court	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  review	  of	  Board	  decisions,	  with	  seven	  cases	  being	  heard	  that	  year.	  In	  addition	  to	  SOCAN	  v.	  Bell	  and	  
Alberta	  (Education)	  v.	  Access	  Copyright,	  the	  court	  would	  hear	  two	  more	  cases	  that	  year	  that	  would	  ultimately	  reach	  the	  SCC.	  In	  Shaw	  Cablesystems	  G.P.	  v.	  Society	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Alberta (Education) v. Access Copyright, 2010 FCA 198. 
213 Supra note 1 at s 29.4(3). 
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Composers,	  Authours	  and	  Music	  Publishes	  of	  Canada,214	  Shaw	  would	  appeal	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Board	  which	  determined	  that	  the	  delivery	  of	  a	  musical	  work	  over	  the	  internet	  was	  a	  ‘communication’	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Act.	  Delivery	  in	  this	  instance	  was	  the	  downloading	  of	  a	  musical	  work	  purchased	  online	  and	  then	  downloaded	  to	  the	  individual	  purchaser’s	  device	  via	  the	  internet.	  Though	  the	  appellants	  had	  made	  the	  case	  before	  the	  board	  and	  the	  court	  that	  the	  works	  downloaded	  had	  already	  triggered	  a	  payment	  for	  reproduction	  at	  the	  point	  of	  sale	  and	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  royalty	  by	  means	  of	  a	  tariff	  for	  communication	  was	  in	  essence	  double	  dipping,	  the	  court	  found	  that	  the	  Boards	  decision	  was	  valid.	  
Entertainment	  Software	  Association	  v.	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authours	  and	  
Music	  Publishes	  of	  Canada215	  focused	  on	  the	  Boards	  decision	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  downloading	  of	  purchased	  games	  from	  online	  software	  vendors.	  SOCAN	  held	  that	  such	  games,	  which	  included	  music	  as	  part	  of	  their	  soundtrack,	  constituted	  a	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  and	  as	  such	  triggered	  a	  tariff.	  The	  Board	  agreed	  with	  SOCAN’s	  position.	  The	  Entertainment	  Software	  Association	  (ESA)	  disagreed	  noting	  that	  (similar	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Shaw	  Cablesystems	  G.P.	  v.	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authours	  
and	  Music	  Publishes	  of	  Canada)	  the	  music	  in	  the	  games	  was	  already	  subject	  to	  license	  prior	  to	  sale	  and	  that	  the	  download	  was	  simply	  the	  delivery	  to	  the	  individual	  purchaser	  and	  not	  a	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  court	  agreed	  with	  the	  Board	  and	  dismissed	  ESA’s	  appeal.	  This	  too	  would	  ultimately	  become	  part	  of	  the	  Pentalogy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214  Shaw Cablesystems G.P. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishes of Canada, 2010 FCA 
220. 
215 Entertainment	  Software	  Association	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  Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishes of Canada, 
2010 FCA 221. 
	   80	  
The	  final	  decision	  appealed	  to	  the	  FAC	  that	  would	  appear	  as	  part	  of	  the	  pentalogy	  of	  rulings	  from	  the	  SCC	  was	  RE:SOUND	  v.	  Motion	  Picture	  Theatre	  
Associations	  of	  Canada216.	  The	  issue	  revolved	  around	  Re:	  Sound’s	  attempt	  to	  create	  two	  new	  tariffs,	  one	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  pre-­‐‑existent	  recordings	  into	  the	  soundtrack	  accompanying	  a	  movie	  when	  shown	  in	  a	  theatre	  and	  another	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  works	  but	  when	  broadcast	  over	  air,	  satellite	  or	  other	  such	  services.	  The	  court	  determined	  that	  the	  Board	  had	  acted	  appropriately	  given	  their	  decision	  was	  fundamentally	  grounded	  in	  the	  definition	  within	  the	  Act,	  specifically,	  “”[S]ound	  recording”	  means	  a	  recording	  fixed	  in	  any	  material	  form,	  consisting	  of	  sounds,	  whether	  or	  not	  of	  a	  performance	  of	  a	  work,	  but	  excludes	  any	  soundtrack	  
of	  a	  cinematographic	  work	  where	  it	  accompanies	  the	  cinematographic	  
work.”217	  (Emphasis	  added)	  
	   In	  July	  of	  2012	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  would,	  as	  Michael	  Geist	  so	  eloquently	  noted,	  ‘shake	  the	  foundations	  of	  copyright	  law’	  when	  it	  delivered	  five	  rulings	  on	  copyright	  in	  a	  single	  day.	  Generally	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  pentalogy,	  the	  five	  cases	  all	  dealt	  with	  different	  issues	  but	  were	  united	  in	  singular	  aspect.	  All	  of	  them	  involved	  decisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada.	  	  
5.3	  The	  Pentalogy	  
ESA	  v	  SOCAN	  	   ESA	  v	  SOCAN	  addressed	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  Board	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  downloading	  of	  purchased	  games	  on	  the	  Internet.	  In	  its	  original	  ruling	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  had	  determined	  that	  the	  downloading	  of	  a	  purchased	  game	  did	  constitute	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Re:Sound v. Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2011 FCA 70.  
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communication	  to	  the	  public	  and	  as	  such	  was	  subject	  to	  a	  tariff.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  however	  would	  focus	  on	  the	  historical	  determination	  of	  communication	  ultimately	  deciding	  that	  the	  intent	  of	  parliament	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  communication	  right	  had	  always	  been	  one	  based	  on	  a	  performative	  experience.	  	  In	  our	  view,	  the	  Board	  improperly	  concluded	  that	  the	  Internet	  delivery	  of	  copies	  of	  video	  games	  containing	  musical	  works	  amounts	  to	  “communicating”	  the	  works	  to	  the	  public.	  	  This	  view	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  which	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  right	  to	  “communicate”	  is	  historically	  connected	  to	  the	  right	  to	  perform	  a	  work	  and	  not	  the	  right	  to	  reproduce	  permanent	  copies	  of	  the	  work.218	  	  The	  case	  demonstrated	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  court	  to	  reconsider	  the	  previously	  largely	  unchecked	  powers	  of	  the	  copyright	  collectives,	  SOCAN	  in	  particular	  and	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board.	  While	  CCH	  had	  hinted	  there	  might	  be	  changes	  with	  the	  declaration	  that	  the	  availability	  of	  a	  license	  was	  irrelevant	  in	  a	  fair	  dealing	  discussion,219	  ESA	  v	  SOCAN	  pointedly	  addressed	  the	  overreaching	  practice	  of	  the	  collectives	  and	  addressed	  there	  tendency	  to	  double	  dip,	  given	  the	  owners	  had	  already	  been	  paid	  for	  the	  licensing	  of	  the	  works.	  
SOCAN	  v	  Bell	  
	   In	  SOCAN	  v	  Bell	  the	  case	  turned	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  preview	  of	  music	  was	  in	  fact	  research	  and	  as	  such	  justified	  under	  fair	  dealing.	  In	  its	  analysis	  the	  SCC	  revisited	  some	  of	  its	  previous	  rulings	  to	  reiterate	  several	  issues.	  Invoking	  
Thèberge,	  the	  court	  returned	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  balance	  within	  copyright	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  ensuring	  a	  fair	  and	  equitable	  balance	  between	  owners	  and	  users.220	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 
2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 231 at 12 [ESA v SOCAN]. 
219 Supra note 18 at 70. 
220Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 
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court	  also	  recognized	  that	  Thèberge	  had	  initiated	  a	  move	  away	  from	  a	  historically	  ‘author-­‐‑centric’	  practice	  that	  had	  informed	  previous	  rulings.221	  The	  court	  went	  on	  to	  note	  that	  CCH	  had	  also	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  establishing	  the	  necessity	  of	  users	  rights	  within	  the	  balance	  of	  copyright	  and	  the	  integral	  role	  of	  fair	  dealing	  in	  the	  Act.	  The	  court	  stressed	  once	  again	  the	  necessity	  of	  not	  interpreting	  the	  notion	  of	  research	  restrictively	  in	  the	  application	  of	  fair	  dealing.222	  	   In	  its	  deliberation	  the	  court	  noted	  that	  SOCAN	  had	  argued	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘research’	  within	  fair	  dealing	  had	  been	  misconstrued	  by	  the	  Board	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  two	  ways.	  First	  SOCAN	  claimed	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  research	  was	  overly	  broad	  and	  was	  not	  intended	  to	  encompass	  retail	  activities.	  Secondly	  SOCAN	  argued	  that	  research	  should	  be	  viewed	  from	  the	  position	  of	  the	  online	  vendor,	  not	  the	  end	  user.	  223	  Again	  returning	  to	  CCH	  the	  court	  noted	  its	  admonition	  that	  research	  not	  be	  interpreted	  restrictively.	  The	  court	  continued	  to	  comment	  that	  SOCAN’s	  argument	  that	  research	  must	  result	  in	  some	  new	  creative	  work	  was	  contradictory	  to	  SOCAN’s	  second	  objection	  since	  from	  the	  vendor’s	  perspective	  research	  into	  users	  desires	  would	  not	  result	  in	  any	  new	  created	  copyright	  eligible	  works.224	  	  	   The	  court	  then	  viewed	  the	  issue	  through	  the	  six	  step	  fair	  dealing	  analysis	  it	  had	  posited	  in	  CCH.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  initial	  question	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  dealing	  the	  court	  agreed	  with	  both	  the	  Board	  and	  the	  lower	  court	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  user	  in	  listening	  to	  the	  previews	  was	  research.	  While	  the	  research	  was	  for	  a	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commercial	  purpose,	  the	  purchase	  of	  music,	  as	  had	  been	  noted	  in	  CCH	  that	  did	  not	  automatically	  negate	  its	  qualification	  under	  fair	  dealing.	  Given	  the	  broad	  interpretation	  the	  court	  had	  sought	  with	  respect	  to	  research,	  consumer	  research	  could	  also	  be	  encompassed	  within	  it.225	  Looking	  at	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  character	  of	  the	  dealing	  the	  court	  noted	  that	  only	  a	  single	  preview	  was	  streamed	  and	  that	  the	  stream	  would	  automatically	  delete	  itself	  from	  the	  users	  computer	  once	  it	  had	  been	  heard.226	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  dealing,	  SOCAN	  had	  noted	  that	  the	  aggregate	  downloads	  represented	  a	  significant	  loss	  to	  its	  members,	  however	  the	  court	  once	  again	  noted	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  fair	  dealing	  the	  view	  taken	  must	  be	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  single	  user,	  not	  an	  aggregate,	  and	  within	  that	  context	  a	  thirty	  second	  stream	  was	  not	  egregious.227	  Though	  alternatives	  to	  the	  work	  were	  suggested	  such	  as	  advertising	  and/or	  purchase	  and	  return	  of	  the	  actual	  works,	  the	  court	  rejected	  these	  as	  being	  inefficient	  or,228	  in	  the	  case	  of	  advertising,	  insufficiently	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  fundamental	  need;	  what	  the	  musical	  work	  sounds	  like.	  
Alberta	  v	  Access	  Copyright	  	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Alberta	  (Education)	  v.	  Canadian	  Copyright	  Licensing	  Agency	  
(Access	  Copyright)229	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  had	  stated	  that	  while	  the	  purpose	  was	  for	  research	  or	  private	  study,	  it	  did	  not	  feel	  it	  qualified	  as	  fair	  dealing	  because	  the	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copying	  had	  been	  done	  at	  the	  teachers	  direction	  and	  not	  the	  individual	  students.230	  The	  court	  of	  appeal	  had	  agreed	  with	  the	  board.	  The	  SCC	  however	  took	  a	  different	  approach.	  	  Again	  relying	  on	  the	  groundwork	  laid	  in	  CCH	  the	  SCC	  returned	  to	  the	  theme,	  “allowable	  purposes	  must	  be	  given	  a	  “large	  and	  liberal	  interpretation”,	  and	  that	  “research”	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  non-­‐‑commercial	  or	  private	  contexts.”231	  The	  court	  noted	  that	  the	  cases	  brought	  in	  support	  of	  the	  copying	  as	  instruction	  as	  opposed	  to	  study	  while	  somewhat	  germane,	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  spirit	  of	  balance	  or	  the	  users	  rights	  perspective	  brought	  forth	  in	  CCH.	  More	  importantly	  the	  court	  noted	  that	  the	  cases	  offered	  in	  support232	  “do	  not	  stand	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  “research”	  and	  “private	  study”	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  instructional	  purposes,	  but	  for	  the	  principle	  that	  copiers	  cannot	  camouflage	  their	  own	  distinct	  purpose	  by	  purporting	  to	  conflate	  it	  with	  the	  research	  or	  study	  purposes	  of	  the	  ultimate	  user.”233	  	  	   While	  recognizing	  that	  the	  ‘purpose	  of	  the	  dealing’	  could	  well	  impact	  the	  decision	  as	  to	  fairness,	  particularly	  in	  circumstances	  such	  as	  those	  cited	  in	  the	  UK	  cases,	  in	  this	  instance	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  teacher	  was	  not	  separable	  from	  that	  of	  the	  student	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  instruction,	  but	  rather	  the	  teachers	  “are	  there	  to	  facilitate	  the	  students’	  research	  and	  private	  study.”234	  And	  moreover	  that	  the	  “teacher/copier	  therefore	  shares	  a	  symbiotic	  purpose	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Ibid at para 14. 
231 Ibid at para 19. 
232 Ibid at paras 16-20. 
233 Ibid at para 21. 
234 Ibid at para 23. 
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student/user	  who	  is	  engaging	  in	  research	  or	  private	  study.	  	  Instruction	  and	  research/private	  study	  are,	  in	  the	  school	  context,	  tautological.”235	  236	  	   With	  respect	  to	  the	  remaining	  factors	  in	  a	  fair	  dealing	  consideration,	  the	  board	  had	  taken	  the	  position	  that	  because	  the	  teacher,	  a	  single	  individual,	  had	  made	  multiple	  copies	  it	  was	  akin	  to	  a	  single	  user	  making	  multiple	  requests	  within	  the	  criteria	  laid	  out	  in	  CCH.	  However,	  the	  court	  found	  that	  the	  Board	  had	  erred,	  in	  part	  because	  it	  failed	  to	  recognize	  the	  teacher	  was	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  user	  student.	  	  The	  teacher	  was	  not	  making	  multiple	  copies	  for	  himself,	  but	  rather	  individual	  copies	  for	  the	  individual	  students.237	  This	  mirrors	  the	  position	  taken	  by	  the	  SCC	  in	  CCH,	  where	  the	  librarian	  was	  held	  to	  be	  standing	  in	  the	  shoes	  of	  the	  patron238.	  More	  importantly	  in	  this	  decision	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  dealing	  is	  the	  proportional	  relationship	  between	  the	  excerpt	  and	  the	  work	  as	  a	  whole,	  not	  the	  aggregate	  amount	  of	  copies	  made	  of	  the	  excerpt.239	  	  With	  respect	  to	  alternatives,	  the	  board	  had	  suggested	  that	  if	  public	  domain	  works	  were	  not	  suitable	  then	  the	  copyrighted	  works	  were	  widely	  available	  for	  purchase.	  The	  court	  dismissed	  this	  as	  being	  unrealistic.240	  Finally	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  ‘effect	  of	  the	  dealing	  on	  the	  work’	  the	  court	  found	  that	  board	  had	  erred	  in	  its	  tacit	  acceptance	  of	  Access	  Copyright’s	  submission	  that	  the	  30%	  drop	  in	  textbook	  sales	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Ibid. 236	  Given the broad interpretation the court has indicated needs to given to the concept of research this 
statement of the court might also be interpreted to include guest artist performances and workshops run 
within schools of music as part of their programming. Arguably these activities support the pedagogical 
function of the programs but presently they are liable for license under SOCAN tariff. It remains to be seen 
if this will be challenged.	  
237 Supra note 229 at para 29. 
238 Supra note 18 at para 83. 
239 Supra note 229. 
240 Ibid at para 32. 
	   86	  
over	  a	  twenty-­‐‑year	  period	  was	  attributable	  to	  illicit	  photocopying.241	  Although	  the	  onus	  is	  on	  the	  respondent	  to	  prove	  no	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  copyrighted	  works’	  market,	  as	  in	  CCH	  no	  quantifiable	  data	  was	  forthcoming	  from	  the	  publishers	  to	  prove	  any	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  drop	  in	  textbook	  sales	  and	  the	  copying	  of	  excerpts.	  	  Given	  the	  expansive	  growth	  and	  availability	  of	  online	  journals,	  coupled	  with	  increasing	  public	  sources	  and	  archives	  of	  information	  available	  online	  it	  seems	  a	  bit	  simplistic	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  drop	  in	  textbook	  sales	  was	  the	  result	  of	  illicit	  photocopying.	  As	  Michael	  Geist	  noted,	  the	  changes	  with	  regard	  to	  fair	  dealing	  had	  created	  an	  environment	  where	  collective	  licensing	  for	  reprography	  was	  of	  increasingly	  little	  value.	  Referring	  to	  guidelines	  made	  available	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  Universities	  and	  Colleges	  of	  Canada,	  he	  commented,	  “the	  new	  policies	  will	  mean	  greater	  flexibility	  in	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  materials,	  fewer	  restrictive	  reporting	  requirements,	  and	  access	  to	  more	  materials	  as	  universities	  reallocate	  funds	  from	  unnecessary	  collective	  licenses	  to	  digitization	  of	  materials	  and	  wider	  access	  to	  electronic	  databases.“242	  	  
Rogers	  Communications	  Inc.	  v	  SOCAN	  	   The	  case	  dealt	  with	  two	  issues,	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  download	  of	  a	  purchased	  file	  was	  a	  transmission	  to	  the	  public,	  and	  whether	  a	  ‘on	  demand’	  streamed	  file	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Ibid at paras 33-34. 
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containing	  musical	  works	  was	  a	  performance	  to	  the	  ‘public’.243	  The	  decision	  in	  ESA	  v	  
SOCAN	  applied	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  downloading	  to	  individuals	  rendered	  that	  aspect	  of	  the	  case	  moot	  and	  thus	  that	  portion	  of	  the	  appeal	  was	  allowed.	  However,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  streaming	  of	  works	  the	  court	  noted,	  	  [I]t	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  broader	  context	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  given	  point‑to‑point	  transmission	  engages	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  communicate	  to	  the	  public.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  online	  music	  services,	  it	  is	  hardly	  possible	  to	  maintain	  that	  there	  is	  no	  intention	  that	  the	  same	  work	  ever	  be	  transmitted	  again.244	  	  
Re:Sound	  v	  Motion	  Picture	  Theatre	  Associations	  of	  Canada	  
	   In	  Re:Sound	  v	  Motion	  Picture	  Theatre	  Associations	  of	  Canada	  the	  SCC	  unanimously	  agreed	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  lower	  court,	  that	  soundtrack	  includes	  the	  use	  of	  pre-­‐‑existing	  recordings	  and	  as	  such	  ‘soundtracks’	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  ‘sound	  recording’	  when	  used	  to	  accompany	  a	  cinematographic	  work.	  While	  Re:Sound	  had	  argued	  that	  “the	  word	  “soundtrack”	  as	  used	  in	  s.	  2	  refers	  only	  to	  the	  aggregate	  of	  sounds	  accompanying	  a	  cinematographic	  work	  and	  not	  to	  the	  soundtrack’s	  constituent	  parts”.245	  	  The	  court	  disagreed	  referring	  to	  S	  2	  of	  the	  Act,	  the	  court	  noted	  “According	  to	  s.	  2,	  a	  “sound	  recording”	  is	  a	  recording	  consisting	  of	  sounds,	  “but	  excludes	  any	  soundtrack	  of	  a	  cinematographic	  work	  where	  it	  accompanies	  the	  cinematographic	  work”.	  Therefore,	  a	  “soundtrack”	  is	  a	  “sound	  recording”	  except	  where	  it	  accompanies	  the	  motion	  picture.	  Otherwise,	  the	  exclusion	  would	  be	  superfluous.”246	  	  The	  court	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  soundtrack	  no	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  Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 
SCC 35.	  
244 Ibid. 
245 Supra note 216 at para 2. 
246 Ibid at para 35. 
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longer	  accompanying	  a	  cinematographic	  work,	  a	  CD	  recording	  of	  a	  film	  soundtrack	  for	  example,	  would	  trigger	  the	  application	  of	  s.	  19.247	  
5.4	  Impact	  of	  CCH	  &	  Pentalogy	  
	   In	  retrospect	  CCH	  was	  a	  pivotal	  moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  copyright	  law	  both	  in	  Canada	  and	  for	  international	  common-­‐‑law	  jurisdictions.	  While	  the	  incident	  that	  triggered	  the	  case	  was	  confined	  to	  libraries,	  the	  impact	  was	  felt	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  all	  users	  of	  copyrighted	  materials.	  In	  a	  single	  instance	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  established	  and	  championed	  the	  existence	  of	  user’s	  rights;	  the	  viability	  of	  fair	  dealing	  not	  only	  as	  a	  defence,	  but	  also	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  copyright,	  and	  going	  further	  defined	  boundaries	  in	  respect	  of	  fair	  dealing.	  Though	  CCH	  defined	  these	  issues	  it	  was	  the	  2012	  pentalogy	  that	  would	  strengthen	  their	  implementation	  with	  an	  expanded	  definition	  of	  fair	  dealing	  and	  an	  enhanced	  conception	  of	  user’s	  rights.	  	   SOCAN	  v	  Bell	  served	  to	  reaffirm	  the	  expanded	  scope	  of	  fair	  dealing	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  research	  specifically.	  The	  court	  made	  clear	  that	  research	  should	  be	  given	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  and	  not	  narrowly	  construed	  solely	  within	  an	  educational	  context.	  The	  courts	  rejection	  of	  SOCAN’s	  argument	  that	  a	  music	  preview	  was	  simply	  a	  search	  and	  not	  research	  extensively	  broadened	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  might	  be	  construed	  as	  research	  within	  the	  fair	  dealing	  context,	  particularly	  when	  considered	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Alberta	  v	  AC.	  It	  also	  placed	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  ravenous	  expansion	  of	  the	  copyright	  collectives.	  	   Alberta	  v	  AC	  also	  served	  to	  broaden	  the	  scope	  of	  research,	  making	  clear	  that	  the	  term	  ‘private’	  did	  not	  require	  that	  the	  research	  be	  done	  in	  solitude	  to	  qualify,	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and	  more	  importantly	  recognizing	  the	  tautological	  relationship	  between	  teaching	  and	  private	  research	  and	  study.	  The	  courts	  decision	  seemed	  in	  many	  ways	  to	  look	  back	  to	  the	  original	  purpose	  and	  intent	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  Anne,248	  namely	  ‘the	  encouragement	  of	  learning’.	  Alberta	  v	  AC	  also	  served	  to	  clarify	  that	  the	  restrictive	  approach	  taken	  to	  fair	  dealing	  within	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  was	  not	  appropriate	  in	  Canada	  given	  the	  courts	  previous	  direction	  in	  CCH	  in	  which	  it	  recognized	  not	  only	  the	  necessity	  for	  balance	  within	  copyright	  but	  the	  absolute	  recognition	  of	  users	  rights	  within	  that	  regime.	  	  	   With	  respect	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board,	  CCH	  &	  the	  Pentalogy	  represented	  a	  watershed	  moment	  in	  their	  operation.	  The	  court’s	  recognition	  of	  the	  user	  within	  the	  balance	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  Act	  as	  posited	  in	  CCH	  returned	  an	  element	  of	  oversight	  on	  behalf	  of	  users	  that	  seemed	  to	  have	  been	  lost	  despite	  its	  seminal	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Board.	  This	  position	  would	  only	  be	  strengthened	  in	  the	  subsequent	  rulings	  of	  the	  Pentalogy.	  Beyond	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Board	  were	  the	  basis	  for	  all	  the	  rulings	  given	  in	  the	  Pentalogy,	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  court	  also	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  indicate	  a	  greater	  need	  for	  diligence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  board	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  research	  and	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  user	  as	  a	  legitimate	  participant	  in	  the	  copyright	  equation.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Supra note 27. 
	   90	  
Table	  2:	  FAC	  Decisions	  	   Citation	   Case	   Basis	   Dism-­‐‑
issed	  
Granted	  in	  
Part	  (P)	  or	  
Whole	  (W)	  1	   2004	  FCA	  424	   CPCC	  v	  Can	  Storage	  Media	  Ass	  
Review	  of	  Board	  decision	  approving	  levies	  on	  blank	  media	  	  (MP3	  players)	  and	  issue	  2	  did	  they	  err	  in	  setting	  of	  rate	  thereon.	  
	   P:	  FAC	  says	  it	  is	  responsibility	  of	  Parliament	  to	  decide	  if	  MP3’s	  et	  al	  are	  subject	  to	  Act.	  	  2	   2006	  FCA	  336	   CRIA	  v	  Canada	   CRIA	  requests	  review	  to	  set	  aside	  decision	  of	  the	  Board	  ordering	  it	  to	  inform	  its’	  members	  that	  it	  would	  no	  be	  representing	  “B”	  class	  members	  in	  a	  proceeding	  before	  the	  Board.	  
Y	   	  
3	   2006	  FCA	  337	   CAB	  v	  SOCAN	  	   CAB	  has	  challenged	  the	  tariffs	  on	  two	  grounds:	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Board	  to	  consider	  an	  objection	  by	  CAB	  to	  the	  tariffs	  proposed	  by	  the	  collective	  societies,	  and	  inadequacies	  in	  
the	  Board’s	  reasons.	  
	   W	  
4	   2007	  FCA	  338	   Apple	  V	  CPCC	   CRIA	  requests	  intervener	  status	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  appeal	  	   	   P	  granted	  but	  court	  limits	  the	  terms	  of	  its	  involvement	  in	  light	  of	  CPCC	  objections.	  5	   2008	  FCA	  6	   Can	  Wireless	  Assn	  V	  SOCAN	  
Request	  a	  review	  of	  Board	  decision	  that	  ringtones	  were	  communication	  under	  the	  Act	   Y	   	  6	   2008	  FCA	  9	   Apple	  v	  CPCC	   Applicants	  sought	  to	  have	  digital	  audio	  recorders	  dismissed	  from	  a	  proposed	  tariff.	  Board	  denied	  
	   W;	  citing	  CPCC	  v	  CSM	  	  
7	   2010	  FCA	  123	   SOCAN v BELL SOCAN feels Board erred in applying ‘fair dealing + 
research” to preview of musical 
works prior to possible purchase. 
Y	   	  
8	   2010	  FCA	  139	   SOCAN v BELL Did Board err in law by refusing tariff request for simulcast of Y	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CBC radio service over internet 
and/or by refusing an ‘other 
sites’ category to tariff? Did 
Board deny procedural fairness 
by relying on evidence not part 
of record (agreement between 
CBC & SOCAN)? Was Boards’ 
finding capricious? 9	   2010	  FCA	  198	   ALBERTA ED v 
AC 
Multiple copies made in course 
of education still Fair Dealing 
	   W	  referred	  back	  to	  Board	  for	  reconsider	  with	  regard	  to	  “medium	  that	  is	  appropriate’	  10	   2010	  FCA	  220	   SHAW v SOCAN Appeal of decision that delivery over internet is a 
‘communication’ under the Act 
Y	   	  
11	   2010	  FCA	  221	   ESA v SOCAN ESA argues Board erred in finding downloading of a game 
including music was a 
‘communication’ under the Act. 
Y	   	  
12	   2010	  FCA	  322	   CRIA vs SOCAN 	   -The Copyright Board made a decision without evidentiary 
basis. 
-Should the rate be nominal? 
-The Copyright Board’s reasons 
are wholly inadequate. 	  
Y	   	  




Appellants challenging the 
Board’s determination of a 
number of legal issues relating 
to the royalty entitlement 	  
Y	   	  
14	   2011	  FCA	  70	   RESOUND	  v	  MPTA	   Review	  of	  the	  Board’s	  decision	  that	  no	  remuneration	  was	  due	  to	  collective	  when	  sound	  recording	  was	  part	  of	  a	  soundtrack	  
Y	   	  
15	   *2012	  FCA	  22	   AUCC	  &	  U.	  Manitoba	  v	  AC	   AUCC	  requesting	  the	  appeals	  court	  consider	  an	  additional	  affidavit	  that	  was	  not	  placed	  before	  the	  Board	  in	  the	  decision	  under	  review.	  
Y	   	  
16	   **2012	  FCA	  96	   AUCC	  &	  U.	  Manitoba	  v	  AC	   Request judicial review of interlocutory decisions of Board re educational tariff Y	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  17	   2013	  FCA	  60	   CBC	  v	  SODRAC;	  ASTRAL	  	  SODRAC	  
Request	  for	  stay	  of	  Board	  decision	  pending	  judicial	  review	   	   W	  18	   2013	  FCA	  61	   CBC	  v	  SODRAC	   Request	  for	  review	  of	  interim	  decision	  of	  the	  Board	   	   W	  19	   2013	  FCA	  91	   Manitoba	  et	  al	  v	  AC	   Board	  determined	  provinces	  are	  not	  exempt	  form	  Copyright	  Act,	  provinces	  appealing	  decision	  
Y	   	  












S INC.  
RESOUND	  requests	  Board	  decision	  on	  Tariff	  6B	  be	  set	  aside	   	   W	  
21	   2014	  FCA	  84	   CBC	  v	  SODRAC	  2003	  INC.	   CBC	  et	  al	  request	  review	  of	  Board	  decision	  which	  determined	  ephemeral	  recordings	  were	  still	  subject	  to	  tariff	  despite	  SCC	  decision	  in	  ESA	  v	  SOCAN	  
	   P:	  supports	  Board	  in	  principle	  but	  allows	  application	  with	  respect	  to	  amendment	  of	  royalty	  formula.	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Chapter	  6:	  Inquiring	  Into	  the	  Process	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Canadian	  Royal	  Commissions,	  which	  would	  result	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  first	  copyright	  tribunal,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  other	  inquiries	  in	  both	  Australia	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  which	  have	  dealt	  with	  tribunal	  issues,	  albeit	  often	  in	  a	  peripheral	  manner.	  Of	  all	  the	  reports	  that	  followed	  the	  seminal	  Canadian	  inquiries,	  the	  most	  interesting	  and	  unique	  was	  the	  2008	  report	  from	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  entitled	  “The	  work	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  
Copyright	  Tribunal”249.	  This	  is	  the	  only	  report	  within	  the	  comparative	  jurisdictions	  devoted	  solely	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  a	  copyright	  tribunal.	  The	  report	  noted	  that	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  was	  the	  successor	  to	  the	  previous	  Performing	  Right	  Tribunal,	  which	  it	  replaced	  in	  1988,250	  and	  while	  commenting	  on	  the	  narrow	  function	  of	  the	  tribunal	  it	  nonetheless	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  its	  function	  	  “to	  adjudicate	  in	  commercial	  disputes	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  monopoly	  which	  copyright	  holders	  and	  their	  agents,	  the	  collecting	  societies,	  have	  is	  not	  abused”.251	  At	  the	  time	  of	  publication,	  the	  tribunal	  had	  dealt	  with	  one	  hundred	  and	  six	  referrals.	  Of	  those	  ninety-­‐‑five	  had	  been	  dealt	  with	  and	  eleven	  were	  still	  pending.	  Of	  the	  ninety-­‐‑five,	  forty-­‐‑four	  were	  withdrawn,	  twenty-­‐‑eight	  resolved	  following	  a	  hearing,	  fourteen	  settled	  prior	  to	  being	  heard	  and	  one	  was	  dismissed,252	  resulting	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 UK, HC, Innovation, Universities & Skills Committee, The work and operation of the Copyright 
Tribunal, (Report HC 245), (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2008). 
250 Ibid at 1. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid at 3. 
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an	  average	  of	  roughly	  one	  and	  a	  half	  hearings	  per	  year	  given	  the	  twenty-­‐‑year	  operation	  of	  the	  tribunal	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  report.	  One	  point	  made	  in	  the	  report	  was	  very	  misleading	  however.	  	  The	  report	  stated,	  “The	  collecting	  societies	  are	  non-­‐‑profit	  making	  organisations	  and	  the	  money	  that	  they	  collect,	  apart	  from	  administration	  costs,	  goes	  to	  their	  members	  –	  writers,	  composers,	  artists	  and	  performers”.253	  However	  collecting	  societies	  do	  not	  collect	  only	  on	  behalf	  of	  authors	  but	  rather	  on	  behalf	  of	  owners	  and,	  as	  noted	  previously	  in	  the	  case	  of	  music	  and	  literary	  works,	  the	  copyright	  in	  the	  work	  is	  almost	  always	  assigned	  to	  a	  publisher	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  publication.	  Under	  such	  terms	  the	  Publisher	  also	  shares	  in	  the	  performing	  rights,	  and	  while	  the	  terms	  may	  differ	  between	  legal	  jurisdictions	  the	  publishers	  share	  is	  significant.254	  This	  item	  reflects	  back	  to	  the	  pervasive	  issue	  of	  copyright	  myth	  noted	  previously.	  	  Given	  that	  this	  is	  the	  body	  charged	  with	  oversight,	  it	  is	  unsettling	  that	  they	  would	  define	  the	  role	  of	  collectives	  in	  an	  author-­‐‑centric	  manner,	  which	  only	  serves	  to	  propagate	  the	  myth.	  The	  report	  also	  references	  evidence	  given	  by	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  stating	  that	  in	  2005	  creative	  industries	  in	  the	  united	  Kingdom	  had	  been	  responsible	  for	  7.3%	  of	  gross	  value	  added	  to	  the	  British	  economy,	  which	  put	  them	  on	  par	  with	  the	  financial	  sector,	  and	  over	  an	  eight	  year	  period	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Ibid at 4. 
254 As an example in the United Kingdom the Performing Right Society (the music performing right 
collective) distributes the performance right tariff one third to publisher, one third to composer and one 
third to lyricist (author). SOCAN, the Canadian equivalent, distributes 50% to Publisher and 50% to 
composer & lyricist. However, in many instances even these numbers may be suspect as the terms of 
individual contract can vary greatly. In a 2007 internal investigation of distribution in Access Copyright 
(the Canadian reprography collective) the Friedland report noted that roughly 60% of revenues were 
flowing to publishers and 40% to authors. Martin L Friedland, “Report To Access Copyright On 
Distribution Of Royalties” (15 February 2007), online: Access Copyright 
<http://www.accesscopyright.ca/media/1795/FriedlandReport.pdf>. 
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(1997-­‐‑2005)	  their	  impact	  had	  grown	  by	  average	  6%	  per	  year,	  double	  the	  national	  average.255	  Interestingly,	  this	  period	  also	  coincides	  with	  the	  creation	  and	  peak	  of	  the	  Napster	  file	  sharing	  software,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  BitTorrent,	  Kaaza	  and	  numerous	  other	  platforms,	  not	  too	  mention	  overlapping	  with	  the	  impacts	  research	  done	  by	  Oberholzer-­‐‑Gee	  and	  Strumpf	  noted	  in	  chapter	  two.	  All	  of	  which	  underscores	  the	  fact	  that	  losses	  alleged	  to	  file	  sharing	  during	  this	  period	  were	  highly	  suspect.	  The	  Society	  of	  College,	  National	  and	  University	  Libraries	  (SCONUL)	  commented	  that	  current	  structures	  are	  based	  on	  a	  traditional	  notion	  that	  “copyright	  disputes	  occur	  between	  businesses”	  and	  that	  this	  assumption	  was	  no	  longer	  applicable	  in	  a	  digital	  age	  when	  in	  addition	  to	  businesses	  “educational	  and	  cultural	  institutions	  and	  private	  individuals	  are	  increasingly	  engaged	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  creative	  works”.256	  The	  traditional	  position	  was	  strongly	  advocated	  by	  Phonograph	  Performance	  Limited,	  which	  commented,	  “[t]he	  mere	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  called	  a	  Tribunal	  implies	  there	  was	  a	  feeling	  that	  collecting	  societies	  were	  monopolies,	  they	  needed	  to	  be	  controlled	  in	  some	  way”.257	  PPL	  continued	  to	  point	  out	  that	  present	  disputes	  were	  between	  large	  commercial	  interests,	  collectives	  and	  industries	  or	  associations.	  The	  committee	  seemed	  to	  support	  this	  representation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  tribunal	  concluding	  that	  the	  “nub	  of	  allegations	  concerning	  unfairness	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  is	  the	  imbalance	  in	  the	  rights	  of	  collecting	  societies	  and	  users	  to	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal.”258	  There	  was	  no	  mention	  of	  any	  imbalance	  in	  power	  with	  respect	  to	  users	  and	  corporations,	  nor	  was	  there	  any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Supra 249 at 10. 
256 Ibid at 16. 
257 Ibid at 19. 
258 Ibid at 21. 
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thought	  given	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  appearance	  by	  the	  user	  as	  being	  a	  result	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  appearance.	  Couple	  this	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  awareness	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  value	  of	  tariffs	  to	  the	  publishing	  interests	  and	  it	  creates	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  tribunal	  badly	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  copyright	  environment.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  general	  operations	  of	  the	  tribunal,	  the	  length	  and	  costs	  involved	  have	  been	  a	  regular	  cause	  for	  complaint.	  As	  early	  as	  1996	  the	  Monopolies	  and	  Mergers	  Commission	  noted	  in	  their	  inquiry	  into	  the	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  
Performing	  Rights,	  that	  “Those	  who	  us	  the	  [Copyright}	  Tribunal	  felt	  that	  it	  provided	  neither	  a	  quick,	  cheap	  nor	  easy	  means	  of	  settling	  disputes”.259	  This	  inquiry	  would	  hear	  much	  of	  the	  same.	  British	  Music	  Rights	  noted	  that	  its	  referrals	  to	  the	  tribunal	  have	  been	  “unduly	  lengthy	  and	  costly,	  involving	  complex	  and	  legalistic	  procedures,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  their	  members	  are	  invariably	  prejudiced,	  regardless	  of	  the	  final	  decisions”.260	  Ultimately	  the	  report	  noted	  that	  “[w]e	  are	  concerned	  that	  the	  complaints	  about	  delays	  and	  costs	  at	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  going	  back	  20	  years	  were	  not	  resolved	  by	  the	  Patent	  Office.	  We	  hold	  it	  (now	  operating	  as	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office)	  responsible	  for	  this	  unacceptable	  failure”.261	  As	  evidence	  of	  the	  extremes	  to	  which	  this	  had	  gone	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  noted	  that	  a	  single	  case	  had	  amassed	  costs	  of	  over	  12	  million	  pounds	  sterling.	  262	  Two	  other	  interesting	  points	  were	  raised	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  Canadian	  experience:	  A	  2007	  IPO	  report	  on	  the	  tribunal	  recommended	  that	  expert	  evidence	  “only	  be	  allowed	  if	  it	  was	  strictly	  necessary”	  while	  Libraries	  and	  Archives	  Copyright	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Supra note 120 at 2.89.  
260 Supra note 249 at 24. 
261 Ibid at 25. 
262 Ibid at 47. 
	   97	  
Alliance	  noted	  that	  “it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  find	  one	  expert	  who	  was	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  be	  expert	  for	  both	  sides”.263	  This	  is	  of	  course	  the	  same	  issue	  noted	  by	  Howard	  Knopf	  and	  discussed	  earlier.	  When	  addressing	  issues	  of	  access	  for	  small	  businesses	  and	  independent	  users,	  the	  committee	  opted	  not	  to	  offer	  any	  firm	  conclusions	  but	  did	  suggest	  expanding	  staff	  support	  for	  the	  tribunal.	  Pointing	  specifically	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  in	  Canada	  it	  noted	  that	  it	  had	  a	  staff	  of	  12	  (at	  that	  time)	  and	  suggested	  this	  would	  allow	  more	  cases	  to	  be	  heard	  in	  a	  reduced	  time	  which	  might	  allow	  for	  service	  dedicated	  to	  small	  scale	  users.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Canadian	  experience	  that	  would	  suggest	  such	  an	  outcome.	  If	  Howard	  Knopf’s	  comparison	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  board	  versus	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  is	  taken	  into	  consideration	  it	  seems	  even	  less	  likely.	  As	  is	  often	  the	  case	  in	  the	  copyright	  debates	  arguments	  are	  often	  proffered	  that	  have	  no	  reliable	  economic	  basis,	  as	  was	  ably	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  following	  review.	  
The	  Hargreaves	  Report	  The	  most	  recent	  report	  on	  copyright	  issued	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  is	  Digital	  
Opportunity	  A	  Review	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Growth264	  published	  in	  2011.	  While	  focusing	  on	  IP	  broadly	  the	  report	  did	  touch	  on	  several	  areas	  pertinent	  to	  this	  work.	  Specifically,	  the	  report	  lamented	  the	  lack	  of	  evidentiary	  basis	  underlying	  policy	  decisions.	  Echoing	  statements	  made	  in	  previous	  reviews	  the	  report	  noted	  	  The	  Banks	  review	  in	  the	  1970s	  deplored	  the	  lack	  of	  evidence	  to	  support	  policy	  judgments.	  Thirty	  years	  later,	  the	  Gowers	  Review	  in	  2006	  made	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Ibid at 49. 
264 UK, Independent Report, Digital Opportunity A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth by	  Ian 
Hargreaves (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 18 May 2011), online: Gov.UK < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-opportunity-review-of-intellectual-property-and-
growth> [Hargreaves report]. 
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same	  point.	  Our	  institutional	  framework	  appears	  to	  have	  failed	  to	  equip	  itself	  to	  conduct	  evidence-­‐‑based	  policy	  effectively.265	  	  In	  the	  same	  chapter	  Hargreaves	  would	  also	  draw	  specific	  attention	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  to	  withstand	  the	  power	  of	  lobbyists	  and	  the	  negative	  impact	  this	  had	  on	  government	  legislation.	  Referring	  to	  the	  periodic	  extension	  of	  copyright	  term	  the	  report	  states	  that	  terms	  have	  repeatedly	  been	  extended	  “[i]n	  spite	  of	  clear	  evidence	  that	  this	  can	  not	  be	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  core	  IP	  argument	  that	  copyright	  exists	  to	  provide	  economic	  incentives	  to	  creators	  to	  produce	  new	  works”.266	  Concurrent	  with	  this	  was	  the	  recognition	  that	  the	  data	  offered	  to	  evidence	  supposed	  losses	  to	  industry	  as	  a	  result	  of	  illegal	  practices	  (piracy,	  downloading)	  was	  largely	  useless	  given	  either	  the	  inability	  to	  examine	  the	  underlying	  methodology	  or	  where	  it	  was	  possible	  flaws	  in	  the	  methodology	  were	  discovered.267	  The	  need	  for	  a	  sound	  evidence	  based	  policy	  process	  was	  further	  elaborated	  in	  chapter	  two,	  “[m]uch	  of	  the	  data	  needed	  to	  develop	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  privately	  held.	  It	  enters	  the	  public	  domain	  chiefly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  “evidence”	  supporting	  the	  arguments	  of	  lobbyists	  (“lobbynomics”)	  rather	  than	  as	  independently	  verified	  research	  conclusions”.268	  The	  Hargreaves	  review	  also	  considered	  whether	  more	  extensive	  copyright	  exceptions	  should	  be	  pursued,	  in	  particular	  they	  looked	  at	  the	  U.S.	  model	  of	  Fair	  Use.	  Strangely	  however	  they	  seem	  to	  have	  considered	  only	  the	  U.S.	  Fair	  Use	  model,	  and	  much	  of	  the	  criticism	  levelled	  at	  the	  model	  was	  the	  uncertainty	  it	  would	  create	  given	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Ibid at 10.5. 
266 Ibid at 10.12. 
267 Ibid at 8.16. 
268 Ibid at 2.13. 
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its	  basis	  in	  American	  case	  law.	  While	  reference	  is	  made	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  Fair	  Use	  doctrines	  in	  Singapore,	  Israel	  and	  the	  Philippines,269	  Canada	  is	  conspicuous	  by	  its	  absence.	  It	  is	  surprising	  that	  the	  Canadian	  model	  was	  not	  considered,	  particularly	  given	  the	  shared	  root	  of	  copyright	  legislation	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CCH	  ruling	  was	  already	  seven	  years	  old	  at	  this	  point.	  In	  any	  event,	  after	  deliberation	  they	  felt	  that	  commitments	  to	  the	  European	  Unions	  would	  preclude	  them	  from	  moving	  in	  that	  direction,	  however	  they	  did	  feel	  that	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  could	  make	  better	  use	  of	  existing	  exceptions	  already	  allowed	  under	  European	  Union	  law.	  As	  such	  they	  recommended	  that	  the	  government	  allow	  exceptions	  for	  format	  shifting270,	  parody271,	  non-­‐‑commercial	  research,	  library	  archiving272	  and	  private	  copying273	  as	  well	  as	  an	  exception	  under	  non-­‐‑commercial	  research	  to	  allow	  for	  text	  mining	  and	  data	  analytics.274	  	  The	  report	  also	  recommended	  that	  the	  exceptions	  be	  made	  mandatory,	  pointing	  out	  that	  contract	  language	  was	  being	  utilised	  to	  rewrite	  the	  limits	  set	  by	  law.275	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  report,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  rights	  holders	  to	  insist,	  via	  their	  contracted	  licenses,	  that	  users	  consent	  to	  terms	  that	  effectively	  negate	  the	  exceptions.	  A	  submission	  to	  the	  inquiry	  from	  the	  Libraries	  and	  Archives	  Copyright	  Alliance	  pointed	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  100	  contracts	  offered	  to	  the	  British	  Library	  which	  demonstrated	  numerous	  examples	  of	  contracts	  overriding	  the	  exceptions	  allowed	  under	  copyright	  law.	  The	  Libraries	  and	  Archives	  Copyright	  Alliance	  commented,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Ibid at 5.18. 
270 Ibid at 5.31. 
271 Ibid at 5.35. 
272 Ibid at 5.34. 
273 Ibid at 5.27. 
274 Ibid at 5.26. 
275 Ibid at 5.40. 
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“licenses	  should	  never	  substitute	  for	  legislation	  on	  core	  matters	  such	  as	  exceptions	  and	  limitations”.276	  
6.2	  Collecting	  Societies	  Codes	  of	  Conduct	  In	  2012	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  received	  a	  report	  it	  had	  commissioned	  entitled	  “Collecting	  Societies	  Codes	  of	  Conduct”.	  While	  the	  report	  ultimately	  did	  not	  support	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  for	  various	  reasons,	  it	  is	  of	  interest	  here	  because	  of	  its	  inclusion	  of	  the	  Australian	  regime	  as	  a	  comparator,	  and	  specifically	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  Australian	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  collective	  management	  of	  copyright.	  “By,	  in	  effect,	  endorsing	  the	  purpose	  and	  practices	  of	  Australian	  collecting	  societies….,	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  has	  proved	  a	  boon	  to	  the	  societies”.277	  However	  the	  report	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  that	  since	  the	  1990s	  this	  has	  fuelled	  increasing	  hostility	  amongst	  licensees,	  noting	  that	  they	  have	  been	  “disturbed	  by	  the	  size	  of	  licensing	  fees	  and	  what	  they	  perceive	  as	  the	  Tribunal’s	  uncritical	  attitude	  to	  remuneration	  arguments	  advanced	  by	  collecting	  societies”.278	  
6.3	  Lobbynomics	  Another	  work	  published	  in	  the	  UK	  during	  this	  period	  worth	  noting	  is	  
Copyright,	  Evidence,	  and	  Lobbynomics:	  The	  World	  after	  the	  UK’s	  Hargreaves	  
Report.279	  Though	  not	  an	  official	  publication	  of	  the	  UK	  government,	  it	  was	  written	  by	  an	  economist	  in	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office,	  motivated	  in	  great	  part	  by	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Ibid at 5.39. 
277 UK, Intellectual Property Office, Collecting Societies Codes of Conduct (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 2012) at 17. 
278 Ibid at 18. 
279 Benjamin H Mitra-Kahn, “Copyright, Evidence, and Lobbynomics: The World after the UK’s 
Hargreaves Report” (2011) 8.2 Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 65. 
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publication	  of	  the	  Hargreaves	  report	  and	  his	  desire	  to	  “invite	  the	  reader	  inside	  the	  bubble	  that	  can	  be	  government	  policy	  making”.280	  Particularly	  interesting	  in	  the	  paper	  was	  the	  acknowledgement	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Hargreaves	  report	  the	  department	  had	  received	  “more	  than	  200	  written	  submissions,	  numbering	  in	  the	  thousands	  of	  pages,	  with	  exactly	  zero	  submissions	  of	  academic	  papers	  on	  copyright”.281	  In	  part	  the	  author	  attributes	  this	  to	  the	  overwhelming	  amounts	  of	  grey	  literature	  which	  he	  notes	  have	  dominated	  policy	  making	  	  “not	  because	  it	  is	  inherently	  better,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  presented	  in	  a	  definite	  voice,	  accompanied	  by	  press	  statements,	  glossy	  front	  pages	  and	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  send	  short	  executive	  summaries	  to	  politicians	  and	  policy	  makers”.282	  	  	  	   Coupled	  with	  this	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  of	  the	  grey	  literature	  focuses	  on	  the	  aggregate	  impact	  of	  copyright283,	  not	  recognizing	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  creator	  distributions	  it	  is	  primarily	  a	  winner	  take	  all	  game.284	  In	  fact	  when	  the	  extension	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  term	  was	  considered	  in	  the	  UK	  the	  IPO	  determined	  that	  it	  would	  result	  in	  a	  net	  cost	  to	  the	  UK	  economy	  and	  80%	  of	  affected	  performers	  would	  only	  see	  an	  increase	  of	  ten	  to	  thirty-­‐‑eight	  pounds	  sterling	  a	  year	  to	  their	  income.285	  Reviewing	  one	  of	  the	  most	  frequently	  cited	  economic	  reports	  in	  the	  copyright	  policy	  sector	  Mitra-­‐‑Kahn	  notes	  that	  “[d]espite	  the	  TERA	  report’s	  relative	  quality,	  there	  are	  methodological	  limitations	  and	  omissions	  at	  each	  stage	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Ibid at 65. 
281 Ibid at 67. 
282 Ibid at 77. 
283 Ibid at 82. 
284  See Parker & Towse p 26-27. 
285 Supra not 279 at 81. 
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calculations”.286	  Reviewing	  these	  associated	  methodologies,	  he	  comments	  that	  while	  the	  TERA	  report	  estimated	  UK	  copyright	  piracy	  losses	  had	  reached	  a	  staggering	  one	  point	  four	  billion	  pounds	  sterling	  in	  2008,	  after	  review	  by	  their	  office	  the	  IPO	  analysts	  could	  “only	  find	  evidence	  for	  less	  than	  half	  of	  this	  in	  the	  report	  itself”.287	  	  
6.4	  Simpson	  Report	  	  Delivered	  in	  1995	  A	  Review	  of	  Australian	  Copyright	  Collecting	  Societies	  A	  
Report	  to	  the	  Minister	  for	  Communications	  and	  the	  Arts	  and	  the	  Minister	  for	  Justice288	  was	  written	  by	  Shane	  Simpson289	  and	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Simpson	  Report.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  report	  was	  the	  review	  of	  collection	  societies	  in	  Australia	  as	  a	  whole.	  Within	  that	  context	  there	  was	  a	  short	  section	  devoted	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal.	  	  In	  general	  the	  report	  was	  supportive	  and	  illustrative	  of	  the	  role	  of	  collecting	  societies,	  but	  given	  that	  it	  was	  based	  almost	  entirely	  on	  submissions	  from	  those	  societies	  and	  was	  authored	  by	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  the	  process	  this	  is	  not	  surprising.290	  There	  were	  however	  definite	  commonalties	  between	  the	  Canadian	  and	  British	  views	  of	  the	  collectives,	  in	  particular	  complaints	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  length	  and	  costs	  involved	  in	  appearances	  before	  the	  tribunal.	  “It	  was	  the	  view	  of	  most	  of	  the	  societies	  and	  other	  parties	  who	  made	  submissions	  to	  the	  Inquiry,	  that	  proceedings	  before	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  are	  expensive,	  slow	  and	  unnecessarily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Ibid at 84. 
287 Ibid at 85. 
288 Australia, Commonwealth, A Review of Australian Copyright Collecting Societies A Report to the 
Minister for Communications and the Arts and the Minister for Justice by Shane Smith (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, July, 1995) [Simpson Report]. 
289 Shane Simpson was an attorney in private practice specializing in entertainment and IP law. His firm 
continues to be one of the most successful in Australia see online: <http://simpsons.com.au/our-firm/>. 
290 While a number of large licensees were invited to comment, hearings were not public, nor were public 
submissions sought as noted in Appendix two of the report at 288. 
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legalistic.”291	  The	  report	  suggested	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  ombudsman	  for	  copyright	  collectives	  that	  would	  operate	  independently	  of	  both	  the	  societies	  and	  the	  tribunal	  but	  the	  recommendation	  was	  not	  followed.292	  	  Interestingly,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  growth	  in	  private	  dispute	  resolution	  since	  the	  Simpson	  report	  suggested	  the	  role	  of	  ombudsman	  though	  it	  has	  yet	  to	  impact	  in	  Australia.	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  presently	  has	  a	  private,	  not	  for	  profit	  independent	  ombudsman,	  which	  deals	  with	  copyright	  licensing	  issues	  (as	  well	  as	  other	  areas).	  Participation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  collectives	  is	  voluntary	  but	  it	  has	  drawn	  significant	  support.	  Presently	  there	  are	  eleven	  collectives	  registered	  with	  the	  service.	  While	  the	  collectives	  pay	  for	  participation,	  licensees	  do	  not,	  which	  would	  seem	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  much	  greater	  participation	  of	  small	  and	  independent	  user	  in	  the	  dispute	  process	  given	  the	  alternative	  of	  expensive	  and	  lengthy	  appearances	  before	  a	  tribunal.293	  Sadly	  no	  such	  initiative	  is	  operating	  in	  the	  Canadian	  context.	  
6.5	  Recent	  Canadian	  Developments	  Other	  than	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  Royal	  Commissions,	  there	  has	  been	  painfully	  little	  critical	  discussion	  of	  collective	  management	  in	  Canadian	  policy	  circles.	  As	  commented	  on	  in	  the	  author’s	  other	  works	  and	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Canadian	  copyright	  scholar	  Daniel	  Gervais	  there	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  a	  wholesale	  acceptance	  of	  collective	  management	  as	  a	  policy	  tool	  in	  Canada	  without	  reservation.	  There	  has	  however	  been	  a	  recent	  internal	  policy	  process	  review	  prompted	  by	  the	  Copyright	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Supra note 288 at 32.4. 
292 Ibid at 32.1. 
293 See Ombudsman Services online: <http://www.ombudsman-services.org/companies-copyright.html>. 
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Board	  itself	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  its	  Working	  Committee	  on	  the	  Operations,	  Procedures	  and	  Processes	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board.	  The	  Working	  Committee	  on	  the	  Operations	  Procedures	  and	  Processes	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board,	  which	  convened	  in	  November	  of	  2012,	  was	  asked	  to	  consider	  means	  by	  which	  it	  might	  make	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  board	  more	  efficient	  and	  productive.	  Its	  first	  suggestions	  targeted	  three	  issues	  and	  released	  a	  discussion	  paper	  dealing	  with	  two	  of	  them	  on	  February	  5,	  2015.	  The	  areas	  targeted	  for	  discussion	  were:	  1:	  The	  identification	  and	  disclosure	  of	  issues	  to	  be	  addressed	  during	  a	  tariff	  proceeding.	  	   2:	  The	  interrogatory	  process.	  While	  some	  mention	  will	  be	  given	  to	  the	  second	  area	  targeted,	  the	  majority	  of	  this	  discussion	  will	  concern	  itself	  with	  ‘the	  identification	  and	  disclosure	  of	  issues	  to	  be	  addressed	  during	  a	  tariff	  proceeding’.	  As	  is	  usually	  the	  case	  when	  dealing	  with	  collective	  issues	  the	  stakeholders	  surveyed	  in	  the	  process	  were	  limited	  to	  the	  usual	  collectives	  and	  licensees,	  there	  was	  no	  attempt	  to	  include	  a	  broader	  frame	  of	  reference.	  The	  Board	  received	  fourteen	  submissions	  in	  response	  to	  the	  working	  paper,	  and	  a	  further	  six	  in	  reply	  to	  those	  comments.	  Of	  those	  fourteen,	  eight	  came	  from	  collectives	  or	  associated	  members	  of	  a	  collective.	  Four	  responses	  came	  from	  licensees,	  and	  two	  from	  individual	  lawyers	  who	  have	  a	  history	  of	  appearance	  before	  the	  board	  on	  behalf	  of	  users.	  It	  is	  also	  pertinent	  to	  note	  that	  the	  working	  group	  was	  made	  up	  of	  ‘representative	  counsel’	  from	  various	  firms,	  and	  facilitated	  by	  a	  former	  chairman	  of	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the	  Copyright	  Board,	  Mario	  Bouchard.	  There	  were	  no	  representatives	  of	  collectives,	  licensees	  or	  small	  scale/individual	  users.	  	  	   The	  working	  group	  delivered	  a	  list	  of	  forty-­‐‑three	  recommendations	  in	  their	  discussion	  paper.	  Noting	  that	  any	  tariff	  process	  must	  begin	  with	  users	  being	  made	  aware	  of	  a	  tariff	  request	  the	  first	  five	  recommendations	  dealt	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  proposed	  tariffs.	  While	  aware	  that	  publication	  in	  the	  Canada	  Gazette	  was	  the	  only	  legally	  required	  notice,	  the	  group	  recognized	  however	  that	  “publication	  in	  the	  
Gazette	  is	  no	  longer	  functional	  notice	  to	  anyone.”294	  They	  suggested	  that	  The	  Board	  in	  cooperation	  with	  collectives	  and	  users	  develop	  new	  methods	  of	  notifying	  users	  and	  that	  electronic	  means	  should	  be	  favoured.	  Additionally,	  they	  suggested	  that	  collectives	  bear	  more	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  contacting	  current	  and	  prospective	  users.	  	  	   The	  suggestion	  that	  collectives	  should	  bear	  more	  responsibility	  for	  notification	  was	  generally	  not	  well	  received	  by	  the	  collectives.	  While	  they	  were	  very	  supportive	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  making	  greater	  efforts	  to	  ensure	  that	  tariffs	  were	  circulated	  they	  did	  not	  feel	  that	  they	  should	  have	  to	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  cost	  for	  the	  process.	  The	  largest	  of	  all	  the	  collectives,	  SOCAN,	  noted	  in	  their	  response	  that	  they	  were	  “not	  convinced	  that	  the	  current	  notice	  requirements	  are	  insufficient”,	  and	  later	  “SOCAN	  is	  concerned	  about	  the	  amount	  of	  effort	  that	  would	  be	  required	  to	  attempt	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Canada, Working Committee on the Operations Procedures and Processes of the Copyright Board, 
Discussion Paper On Two Procedural Issues: Identification And Disclosure Of Issues To Be Addressed 
During A Tariff Proceeding And Interrogatory Process, (Ottawa: Copyright Board, 4 February 2015) at 2, 
online: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/pdf/discussion-paper.pdf>. 
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to	  communicate	  directly,	  even	  through	  email,	  with	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  existing	  licensees”.295	  	  	   SOCAN	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  this	  response.	  The	  collective	  Re:	  Sound	  stated	  they	  had	  “serious	  concerns	  with	  any	  suggestion	  that	  collectives	  be	  required	  to	  contact	  individual	  businesses	  and	  licensees	  to	  notify	  them	  of	  a	  proposed	  tariff”,	  and	  felt	  that	  such	  a	  requirement	  “creates	  an	  unnecessary	  and	  onerous	  burden	  on	  the	  collective”.296	  The	  Canadian	  Musical	  Reproduction	  Rights	  Agency	  (CMRRA)	  also	  took	  this	  position	  and	  while	  they	  agreed	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  proactive	  notification	  they	  would	  “caution	  that	  such	  new	  methods	  not	  place	  any	  undue	  burdens	  upon	  collectives”.297	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  the	  Access	  Copyright	  proposed	  tariff	  for	  colleges	  and	  universities,	  the	  lack	  of	  general	  awareness	  with	  respect	  to	  tariffs	  has	  always	  been	  a	  benefit	  to	  the	  collectives.	  	   Also	  of	  significant	  interest	  were	  recommendations	  six	  through	  eight,	  which	  concerned	  themselves	  with	  the	  early	  explanation	  of	  new	  tariffs	  by	  the	  collectives.	  In	  essence	  the	  working	  group	  had	  suggested	  that	  on	  the	  proposal	  of	  a	  new	  tariff,	  the	  collective	  tabling	  the	  tariff	  should	  give	  a	  “description	  of	  the	  persons	  or	  uses	  targeted	  in	  the	  tariff”	  and	  “a	  broad	  indication	  of	  how	  the	  proposed	  rate	  was	  selected”.298	  It	  was	  also	  recommending	  that	  where	  an	  existing	  tariff	  was	  subject	  to	  a	  significant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Letter from D Lynne Wyatt on behalf of SOCAN to Claude Majeau of the Copyright Board, Re: 
Discussion Paper on Procedural Issues (6 March 2015), online: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-
apropos/pdf/SOCAN.pdf>. 
296 Letter from Re:Sound to Gilles McDougall, Secretary General of the Copyright Board of Canada, Re: 
Re:Sound’s Comments on the Discussion Paper of the Working Committee on the Operations, Procedures, 
and Processes of the Copyright Board (9 March 2015), online: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-
apropos/pdf/RESOUND.pdf>. 
297 Letter from Veronica Syrtash, VP Legal & Business Affairs CMRRA to Gilles McDougall, Secretary 
General of the Copyright Board of Canada, Re: Discussion Paper of the Working Committee on the 
Operations, Procedures, and Processes of the Copyright Board (6 March 2015), online: <http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/pdf/CMRRA.pdf>. 
298 Supra note 294 at 4. 
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increase	  the	  collective	  responsible	  should	  also	  notify	  users	  affected	  by	  such	  an	  increase.299	  In	  response	  to	  this	  recommendation	  Re:Sound	  stated,	  	   Re:Sound	  strongly	  disagrees	  with	  the	  recommendation	  that	  a	  collective	  be	  required	  to	  advise	  existing	  users	  when	  it	  proposes	  significant	  changes	  to	  an	  existing	  tariff.	  Every	  proposed	  tariff	  filed	  by	  Re:Sound	  would	  constitute	  a	  significant	  change	  to	  the	  existing	  tariff.300	  	  Given	  that	  Re:	  Sound	  had	  filed	  a	  proposed	  tariff	  	  rate	  of	  45%	  of	  revenues	  for	  an	  initial	  webcasting	  tariff301	  their	  comment	  that	  all	  their	  proposed	  tariffs	  would	  ‘constitute	  a	  significant	  change’	  is	  likely	  understated.	  	  The	  Copyright	  Collective	  of	  Canada	  also	  opposed	  the	  recommendation,	  stating	  “[i]t	  is	  the	  Copyright	  Collective	  of	  Canada’s	  view	  that	  a	  collective	  should	  not	  be	  required	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  nature,	  purpose	  and	  ambit	  of	  any	  proposed	  change,	  material	  or	  otherwise,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  filing	  a	  proposed	  tariff”.302	  	   Surprisingly	  both	  SOCAN	  and	  the	  CMRRA	  agreed	  with	  the	  recommendation	  in	  principle.	  CMRRA	  stated	  that	  it	  “supports	  the	  proposal	  for	  collectives	  to	  provide	  early	  explanations	  of	  tariffs,	  but	  recommends	  that	  clear	  distinctions	  be	  drawn	  for	  the	  form	  and	  process	  as	  between	  tariffs	  of	  first	  impression	  and	  replacement	  tariffs”.303	  	  The	  CMMRA	  statement	  indicates	  general	  agreement	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  discussion	  paper	  and	  recommendations	  given,	  and	  CMRRA	  is,	  by	  any	  definition,	  responding	  quite	  reasonably	  in	  suggesting	  there	  be	  more	  clarity	  surrounding	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Ibid at 8. 
300 Supra note 296. 
301 Letter from J Aiden O’Neill to Gilles McDougall, Secretary General of the Copyright Board of Canada, 
Re: Discussion Paper on Two Procedural Issues (February 4, 2015) The Copyright Board’s Request for 
Comments – Reply Submissions, (17 April 2015), online: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-
apropos/pdf/AidanONeill.pdf>. 
302 Copyright Collective of Canada response to working paper online: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-
apropos/pdf/CCC.pdf>. 
303 Supra note 297. 
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process	  with	  regard	  to	  an	  initial	  ‘first’	  tariff	  and	  a	  new	  tariff	  rate	  for	  an	  existing	  tariff.	  Similarly,	  SOCAN	  also	  supported	  the	  recommendation	  in	  principle	  stating	  simply	  “SOCAN	  agrees	  with	  the	  Board’s	  recommendation	  that	  collectives	  be	  required	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  the	  tariffs	  they	  file”.304	  They	  did	  however	  also	  note	  that	  the	  board	  had	  accepted	  their	  reasoning	  limiting	  the	  detail	  of	  explanation	  offered	  and	  that	  such	  explanations	  not	  be	  binding.	  	  	   Considering	  their	  size	  and	  revenues,	  the	  absence	  of	  significant	  comment	  from	  Access	  Copyright	  was	  surprising.	  Their	  response	  to	  the	  recommendations	  was	  very	  brief	  (2	  pages),	  and	  concerned	  itself	  primarily	  with	  the	  interrogatory	  process,	  though	  they	  did	  comment	  on	  the	  makeup	  of	  the	  working	  committee	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  collective	  or	  user	  representation.305	  One	  can	  only	  speculate	  as	  to	  the	  reasons	  but	  possibly	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  both	  CCH	  and	  Alberta	  v	  AC	  had	  played	  a	  role.	  Certainly	  both	  those	  decisions	  had	  made	  that	  particular	  collective	  painfully	  aware	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  user	  must	  be	  given	  a	  balanced	  reading,	  and	  the	  SCC	  ruling	  in	  
Alberta	  v	  AC	  had	  pointedly	  chastised	  them	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  causal	  connection	  in	  their	  justification	  for	  tariff	  increases	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  market	  losses.306	  Conversely	  it	  may	  simply	  have	  been	  the	  fact	  that	  Access	  Copyright	  was	  dealing	  with	  the	  aftermath	  of	  successive	  blows	  to	  its	  business	  model	  and	  was	  focusing	  elsewhere,	  hoping	  the	  other	  collectives	  would	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  opposing	  the	  recommendations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Supra note 295. 
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The	  major	  broadcasters	  (referred	  to	  as	  BDU’s	  in	  the	  exchange:	  Broadcast	  Development	  Undertakings)	  commented	  that	  the	  interrogatory	  process	  in	  itself	  was	  too	  burdensome	  in	  general	  and	  this	  burden	  was	  not	  equally	  shared.	  They	  also	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  would	  be	  objectors	  were	  often	  subjected	  to	  not	  only	  requests	  for	  sheer	  volumes	  of	  information,	  but	  also	  information	  of	  a	  particularly	  private	  nature.	  Noting	  that	  much	  of	  that	  information	  was	  “commercially	  sensitive	  and	  highly	  confidential”307	  and	  as	  a	  result	  some	  users	  have	  chosen	  to	  withdraw,	  or	  even	  not	  begin	  submission	  before	  the	  board.	  They	  further	  stated	  that	  this	  was	  in	  part	  because	  the	  Board	  had	  accepted	  a	  very	  broad	  scope	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  relevance	  of	  information	  sought	  in	  these	  interrogatories,	  and	  that	  in	  practice	  this	  has	  allowed	  collectives	  to	  request	  a	  very	  ‘wide	  variety	  of	  confidential	  information”.308	  	   The	  response	  to	  the	  discussion	  paper	  from	  users	  was	  small,	  but	  as	  previously	  noted	  the	  invitation	  to	  comment	  was	  sent	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  group.	  The	  joint	  submission	  from	  Restaurants	  Canada	  and	  the	  Hotel	  Association	  of	  Canada	  responded	  specifically	  to	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  recommendation	  regarding	  the	  publication	  of	  tariffs	  in	  an	  unequivocal	  manner,	  “[n]otification	  of	  proposed	  tariffs	  should	  ultimately	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Collectives”.309	  Given	  that	  the	  hotels	  had	  been	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  a	  retroactive	  tariff	  from	  Re:Sound	  with	  respect	  to	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the	  use	  of	  music	  most	  believed	  was	  already	  covered	  in	  their	  SOCAN	  fees,	  it	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  they	  supported	  such	  an	  initiative.	  	  The	  Hotel	  and	  Restaurant	  Associations	  reacted	  in	  similar	  fashion	  to	  the	  proposal	  for	  early	  explanation,	  noting	  that	  “[c]ollectives	  should	  prominently	  highlight	  material	  changes	  in	  proposed	  tariffs	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  significant	  impact	  on	  royalty	  paying	  businesses”	  and	  that	  “[r]ationality	  for	  proposed	  tariff	  price	  increases	  should	  also	  be	  included”.310	  They	  also	  agreed	  with	  the	  recommendation	  that	  objectors	  to	  a	  tariff	  (users)	  should	  be	  required	  to	  state	  reasons	  for	  their	  objection	  in	  their	  submission.	  Similar	  to	  Access	  Copyright,	  they	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  representation	  on	  the	  working	  committee	  and	  suggested	  that	  in	  “the	  interest	  of	  promoting	  increased	  accessibility	  to	  the	  Board’s	  decision	  making	  process	  and	  more	  accessible	  language,	  we	  strongly	  advocate	  that	  an	  “end	  user”	  representative	  be	  appointed”.311	  	  The	  notion	  of	  accessibility	  in	  language	  was	  also	  noted	  in	  the	  second	  of	  the	  general	  comments	  submitted	  by	  the	  Restaurant	  &	  Hotel	  Associations	  when	  they	  stated,	  	  “in	  the	  interest	  of	  promoting	  transparency,	  justice	  and	  fairness	  we	  urge	  the	  Board	  to	  pursue	  the	  use	  of	  simple	  language	  (e.g.,	  “Plain	  English)	  as	  a	  key	  objective	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  its	  operations”.312	  This	  lack	  of	  accessibility	  been	  commented	  on	  in	  the	  IP	  discourse	  in	  the	  past.	  David	  Vaver’s	  Does	  the	  Public	  Understand	  
Intellectual	  Property	  Law?	  Do	  Lawyers?, was	  an	  attempt	  to	  discern	  if	  both	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practitioners	  and	  the	  general	  public	  in	  fact	  generally	  understand	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  system	  that	  currently	  exists.	  His	  conclusion	  was	  that	  they	  did	  not:	  At	  a	  minimum,	  the	  IP	  system	  should	  tell	  the	  public	  it	  serves,	  and	  the	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  who	  administer	  it,	  simply	  and	  clearly	  what	  qualifies	  for	  protection	  and	  how	  far	  protection	  reaches,	  i.e.,	  what	  people	  can	  or	  cannot	  do.	  The	  system	  should	  do	  that	  for	  both	  specialist	  and	  non-­‐‑specialist	  lawyers	  alike.	  It	  does	  not.	  313	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  Restaurant	  &	  Hotel	  Associations	  the	  BDU’s	  (supported	  by	  the	  Entertainment	  Software	  Association)	  offered	  full	  support	  for	  the	  recommendations	  discussed	  thus	  far.	  	  	   The	  Canadian	  Association	  of	  Broadcasters	  (CAB)	  also	  supported	  the	  recommendations	  noting	  however	  that	  there	  needed	  to	  be	  recognition	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  current	  participants	  are	  an	  elite	  group	  and	  as	  such	  “have	  a	  relatively	  sophisticated	  means	  of	  monitoring	  and	  assessing	  new	  and	  evolving	  tariff	  liability	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  industries	  and	  entities	  that	  do	  not	  have	  as	  significant	  exposure	  to	  copyright	  tariffs”.314	  The	  BDU’s	  also	  supported	  the	  need	  for	  early	  explanation	  but	  indicated	  that	  they	  felt	  the	  board	  suggestions	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  stating	  the	  “Board	  suggests	  a	  compromise	  which	  clearly	  favours	  the	  collectives	  and	  lacks	  teeth”.315	  Echoing	  the	  Hotel	  &	  Restaurant	  Associations,	  they	  also	  advocated	  for	  a	  simpler	  language	  noting	  “the	  need	  to	  better	  describe	  proposed	  tariffs	  and	  the	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process	  required	  to	  object	  to	  them,	  if	  applicable,	  in	  terms	  that	  can	  be	  understood	  by	  potential	  licensees”.316	  The	  other	  two	  responses	  to	  the	  working	  paper	  came	  from	  J.	  Aidan	  O’Neill	  and	  Howard	  Knopf	  respectively.	  Mr.	  O’Neill	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  unequal	  relationship	  of	  the	  two	  sides	  before	  the	  board,	  “[it]	  must	  be	  understood	  that,	  as	  between	  the	  collectives	  and	  the	  users	  in	  a	  particular	  tariff	  proceeding,	  their	  situations	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Board’s	  interrogatory	  process	  are	  not	  at	  all	  comparable.	  It	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  between	  “equals””.317	  While	  O’Neill	  is	  specifically	  referring	  to	  the	  interrogatory	  process,	  his	  comment	  reflects	  the	  general	  situation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  power	  imbalance	  that	  exists	  between	  collectives	  and	  licensees.	  	  As	  was	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  five,	  Knopf’s	  comments	  with	  regard	  to	  judicial	  review	  are	  particularly	  noteworthy.	  Decisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  review	  by	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  twenty-­‐‑one	  times	  between	  2004	  and	  2014.	  As	  Knopf	  noted	  in	  an	  address	  to	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Upper	  Canada	  in	  2008,	  “	  Although	  the	  FCA	  will	  doubtless	  continue	  to	  defer	  to	  the	  Board,	  to	  some	  extent	  at	  least,	  on	  ‘core’	  matters	  relating	  to	  fact	  finding	  and	  rate	  calculation,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  there	  will	  be	  no	  deference	  and	  increasing	  decisiveness	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  legal	  reasoning.”318	  Mr.	  Knopf’s	  also	  points	  out	  that	  “[t]he	  very	  high	  cost	  of	  Board	  proceedings	  has	  always	  been	  a	  problem	  for	  users,	  especially	  those	  who	  cannot	  pass	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on	  the	  costs	  on	  to	  their	  customers.	  However,	  these	  high	  costs	  and	  delays	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  cost/beneficial	  outcome	  are	  now	  a	  problem	  for	  collectives	  too”.319	  Noting	  the	  time	  between	  filings	  and	  hearings,	  the	  BDU’s	  pointed	  out	  that	  while	  the	  collaborative	  process	  used	  to	  implement	  proceedings	  was	  admirable,	  it	  wasn’t	  necessarily	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  those	  concerned.	  The	  time	  delay	  between	  filing,	  objections,	  hearing	  and	  ruling	  could	  often	  be	  multiple	  years.	  Given	  the	  retroactive	  rulings	  of	  such	  decisions	  the	  ability	  of	  licensees	  to	  adequately	  anticipate	  financial	  liabilities	  as	  a	  result	  was	  significant.	  This	  was	  particularly	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  inaugural	  tariff,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  Re:	  Sound.	  	   In	  2010	  the	  former	  Neighbouring	  Rights	  Collective	  of	  Canada	  reconstituted	  itself	  as	  the	  collective	  Re:	  Sound,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  collecting	  performance	  rights	  on	  behalf	  of	  performers	  and	  record	  companies	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  public	  performance	  or	  telecommunication	  of	  music.	  In	  2011	  Re:	  Sound	  filed	  a	  tariff	  6A	  for	  the	  use	  of	  recorded	  music	  to	  accompany	  dance.	  The	  tariff	  was	  to	  cover	  the	  years	  2008-­‐‑2012	  and	  targeted	  music	  played	  and	  provided	  by	  the	  lessees	  of	  rented	  banquet	  and	  conference	  spaces.	  Note	  that	  most	  of	  the	  facilities	  affected	  by	  this	  tariff	  already	  had	  licenses	  in	  place	  with	  SOCAN	  for	  their	  use	  of	  music,	  so	  they	  had	  a	  not	  unreasonable	  expectation	  that	  they	  were	  abiding	  by	  the	  rules	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  music.	  	  	   The	  Copyright	  Board	  subsequently	  approved	  tariff	  6A	  in	  2012.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  meetings	  spaces	  affected	  were	  then	  expected	  to	  deliver	  to	  Re:	  Sound	  fees	  for	  every	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event	  that	  had	  taken	  place	  back	  to	  the	  start	  date	  of	  the	  tariff.	  It	  would	  be	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  ascertain	  which	  lessees	  had	  provided	  their	  own	  music	  years	  after	  the	  fact.	  Even	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  identify	  those	  lessees	  who	  had	  brought	  their	  own	  music	  it	  would	  still	  be	  impossible	  to	  collect	  payment	  from	  them	  for	  a	  license	  not	  stipulated	  in	  their	  original	  contract	  years	  prior.	  	  	   On	  a	  simple	  basis	  of	  fairness,	  it	  seems	  highly	  questionable	  that	  a	  collective	  be	  allowed	  to	  create	  a	  new	  tariff	  retroactively,	  or	  that	  a	  board	  should	  approve	  a	  retroactive	  tariff.	  Interestingly	  in	  the	  Performing	  Rights	  report	  the	  commission	  recommended	  that	  the	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  be	  allowed	  not	  only	  to	  make	  the	  tariffs	  retroactive	  but	  also	  to	  charge	  interest	  on	  the	  sums	  owed	  the	  collectives.320	  That	  extreme	  suggestion	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  Monopolies	  and	  Mergers	  Commission	  being	  primarily	  an	  economic	  analysis	  forum,	  thus	  value	  for	  them	  is	  understandably	  rooted	  in	  simple	  economic	  frames.	  	  	   This	  issue	  also	  reflects	  the	  concern	  noted	  by	  the	  Board’s	  working	  group	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  publications	  of	  tariffs.	  The	  publication	  of	  proposed	  tariffs	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  complete	  once	  it	  has	  appeared	  in	  the	  Canada	  Gazette.321	  Few	  people	  in	  the	  general	  population	  are	  even	  aware	  of	  the	  Canada	  Gazette,	  much	  less	  its	  significance	  to	  the	  role	  of	  copyright	  collectives.	  Again	  this	  speaks	  to	  the	  comment	  of	  the	  Restaurant	  and	  Hotel	  Associations	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  anticipated	  increase	  in	  the	  numbers	  of	  groups	  affected	  by	  tariffs	  as	  new	  delivery	  platforms	  are	  created	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  plain	  language.	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   Another	  recent	  issue	  was	  the	  November	  2015	  SCC	  ruling	  of	  Canadian	  
Broadcasting	  Corporation	  v.	  SODRAC	  2003	  Inc.,322	  yet	  another	  decision	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  determinations	  of	  the	  board.	  In	  the	  decision	  the	  court	  dealt	  primarily	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  technological	  neutrality	  in	  respect	  of	  ephemeral	  recordings	  created	  in	  the	  process	  of	  a	  broadcast	  undertaking,	  however,	  and	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  intervention	  of	  Mr.	  Knopf	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  the	  court	  also	  determined	  in	  its	  decision	  that	  the	  copyright	  board	  does	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  compel	  a	  licensee	  to	  accept	  a	  license.	  This	  provision	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  a	  user	  whose	  copying	  activities	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  s.	  70.2	  proceeding	  may	  avail	  itself	  of	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  established	  by	  the	  Board	  as	  a	  way	  to	  gain	  authorization	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  activity	  contemplated	  in	  the	  Board	  proceeding.	  The	  language	  of	  s.	  70.4	  does	  not,	  of	  its	  own	  force,	  bind	  the	  user	  to	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  the	  license.323	  	  Though	  the	  court	  did	  not	  rule	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  board	  had	  authority	  to	  impose	  a	  license	  on	  a	  collective	  it	  did	  suggest	  that	  it	  might,	  noting	  that	  	  However,	  this	  case	  does	  not	  require	  this	  Court	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  collective	  organizations.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  statutory	  scheme’s	  focus	  on	  regulating	  the	  actions	  of	  collective	  organizations,	  and	  the	  case	  law’s	  focus	  on	  ensuring	  that	  such	  organizations	  do	  not	  devolve	  into	  “instruments	  of	  oppression	  and	  extortion”	  (Vigneux	  v.	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  Ltd.,	  [1943]	  S.C.R.	  348,	  at	  p.	  356,	  per	  Duff	  J.,	  quoting	  Hanfstaengl	  v.	  Empire	  Palace,	  [1894]	  3	  Ch.	  109,	  at	  p.	  128)	  would	  justify	  finding	  that	  the	  Board	  does	  have	  the	  power	  to	  bind	  collective	  organizations	  to	  a	  license	  based	  on	  the	  user’s	  preferred	  model	  —	  transactional	  or	  blanket	  —	  on	  terms	  that	  the	  Board	  finds	  fair	  in	  view	  of	  that	  model.	  However,	  this	  issue	  was	  not	  argued	  in	  this	  case.	  324	  What	  impact,	  if	  any,	  this	  decision	  will	  have	  on	  future	  dealings	  between	  collectives	  and	  users	  is	  uncertain,	  but	  at	  the	  minimum	  it	  represents	  yet	  another	  limitation	  on	  board	  powers	  and	  the	  presumptive	  operations	  of	  the	  collectives.	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One	  more	  case	  appealed	  to	  the	  Federal	  Court	  must	  be	  considered.	  In	  Dec	  of	  2015	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  handed	  down	  a	  decision	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  appellant	  in	  the	  case	  of Netflix, Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of 
Canada.325	  The	  case	  involved	  a	  tariff	  filed	  by	  SOCAN	  with	  the	  Board	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  fees	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  on	  the	  internet	  by	  various	  agencies,	  but	  primarily	  those	  concerned	  with	  the	  streaming	  or	  downloading	  of	  music,	  such	  as	  iTunes,	  Bell,	  Shaw,	  radio	  podcasters	  and	  Netflix.	  Netflix	  was	  not	  among	  the	  original	  objectors	  to	  the	  tariff	  when	  filed,	  and	  as	  such	  was	  not	  included	  in	  SOCAN’s	  subsequent	  efforts	  to	  reach	  agreement	  with	  the	  objectors	  prior	  to	  the	  Board	  making	  a	  decision.326	  In	  the	  subsequent	  agreement	  SOCAN	  was	  able	  to	  extend	  the	  original	  tariff	  period	  from	  2007-­‐‑2011	  to	  include	  the	  period	  of	  2012	  &	  2103.	  More	  importantly	  however	  SOCAN	  was	  able	  to	  gain	  agreement	  to	  new	  royalty	  provisions	  substantially	  different	  from	  those	  filed	  and	  published	  in	  the	  original	  tariff.327	  Specifically	  the	  terms	  included	  the	  provision	  for	  royalties	  to	  be	  charged	  with	  respect	  to	  subscriptions	  and	  the	  free	  trial	  of	  services.328	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  objectors	  to	  the	  original	  tariff329	  offered	  subscriptions	  and	  therefore	  would	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  these	  fees.330	  	   Though	  Netflix	  had	  not	  filed	  objections	  to	  the	  original	  tariff,	  and	  therefore	  had	  not	  been	  party	  the	  to	  negotiated	  agreement	  with	  SOCAN,	  they	  did	  make	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Netflix, Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2015 FCA 289. 
326 Ibid at para 8. 
327 Ibid at para 9. 
328 Ibid at para 10. 
329 The original objectors were Apple Canada, Apple Inc., BCE Inc., Canadian Association of Broadcasters, 
Cineplex Entertainment LP, Facebook Inc., Rogers Communications Partnership, Shaw Communications 
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submission	  to	  the	  Board	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  negotiated	  agreement	  providing	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  certification	  of	  the	  tariff.	  Netflix	  limited	  its	  submission	  to	  concerns	  relating	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  royalties	  for	  free	  trials,	  which	  it	  claimed	  violated	  the	  Supreme	  Courts	  jurisprudence	  on	  technological	  neutrality.331	  Subsequently	  the	  Board	  issued	  an	  order	  noting	  that	  Netflix’s	  submission	  would	  not	  be	  part	  of	  the	  record	  of	  proceedings,	  and	  also	  instigating	  a	  new	  process,	  with	  Netflix	  involved	  given	  its	  dominant	  role	  in	  the	  marketplace.	  However,	  the	  Board	  stipulated	  parties	  were	  only	  to	  address	  issues	  already	  raised	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  evidence	  was	  to	  be	  avoided.332	  	  	   In	  the	  ensuing	  process	  Netflix	  did	  make	  a	  submission	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  free	  trial	  tariff,	  despite	  it	  not	  being	  a	  previously	  raised	  issue.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  proceedings	  SOCAN	  made	  a	  submission	  to	  the	  Board	  stating	  their	  position	  that	  since	  Netflix	  had	  chosen	  not	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  original	  tariff	  submission	  they	  should	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  make	  submissions	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  ensuing	  settlement	  agreement.333	  On	  July	  2,	  2013	  the	  Board	  dismissed	  Netflix’s	  application	  for	  leave	  to	  introduce	  new	  materials.334	  Netflix	  appealed	  to	  the	  Federal	  Court.	  	   Ultimately	  the	  Federal	  Court	  would	  rule	  in	  favor	  of	  Netflix,	  again	  overturning	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Board.	  Pointing	  specifically	  to	  the	  Boards	  decision	  in	  Re:	  Sound	  Tariff	  5,	  the	  court	  noted	  that	  the	  Board	  had	  stated,	  “[b]efore	  certifying	  a	  tariff	  based	  on	  agreements,	  it	  is	  generally	  advisable	  to	  consider	  (a)	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  agreements	  can	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  prospective	  users	  and	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(b)	  whether	  relevant	  comments	  or	  arguments	  made	  by	  former	  parties	  and	  non-­‐‑parties	  have	  been	  addressed”.335	  Given	  that	  none	  of	  the	  objectors	  involved	  in	  the	  agreement	  with	  SOCAN	  were	  offering	  subscription	  services	  or	  free	  trial	  services	  they	  could	  not	  possibly	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  prospective	  users.	  Though	  the	  Board	  had	  stated	  in	  its	  decision	  with	  regard	  to	  Netflix	  that	  no	  Re:Sound	  5	  reasons	  (as	  noted	  above)	  could	  justify	  a	  refusal	  to	  certify,	  Justice	  Nadon	  writing	  for	  the	  Federal	  Court	  stated	  “[i]n	  my	  respectful	  view,	  the	  Board	  was	  wrong	  to	  come	  to	  this	  conclusion”.336	  The	  Board’s	  decision	  in	  the	  Netflix	  case	  was	  again	  disturbingly	  owner-­‐‑centric	  and	  reflective	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  collectives	  on	  the	  Board	  process.	  The	  final	  issue	  to	  be	  discussed	  involves	  the	  recent	  decision	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Access	  Copyright	  Provincial	  and	  Territorial	  Governments	  Tariff.	  The	  decision	  of	  the	  Board	  was	  given	  in	  May	  2015,	  though	  the	  start	  of	  the	  process	  is	  quite	  dated;	  it	  began	  in	  2004.337	  The	  eleven-­‐‑year	  span	  between	  filing	  and	  ruling	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  underscores	  the	  oft	  stated	  concern	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  length	  of	  proceedings	  before	  the	  board.	  Access	  Copyright	  filed	  the	  inaugural	  tariff	  in	  2004	  for	  the	  period	  2005-­‐‑2009,	  and	  then	  again	  in	  2009	  for	  the	  period	  2010-­‐‑2015.	  Access	  Copyright	  sought	  to	  impose	  a	  tariff	  on	  the	  provincial	  and	  territorial	  governments	  for	  the	  reproductive	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  materials	  in	  books,	  magazines,	  journals	  and	  newspapers	  for	  all	  of	  Canada	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Quebec.338	  Access	  Copyright	  had	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originally	  sought	  tariff	  rates	  of	  $10.50	  per	  full	  time	  employee	  (FTE)	  in	  the	  2004-­‐‑2009	  tariff,	  and	  $11.70	  for	  the	  2010-­‐‑104	  tariff.339	  In	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Board	  the	  rates	  were	  set	  at	  11.56	  cents	  per	  FTE	  for	  the	  period	  2004-­‐‑2009,	  and	  49.71	  cents	  for	  the	  period	  2010-­‐‑2014.340	  The	  Board	  reduced	  Access	  Copyright’s	  tariff	  to	  approximately	  1%	  of	  its	  original	  request	  for	  2005-­‐‑2009,	  and	  about	  4.5%	  of	  the	  2010-­‐‑2014	  tariff	  request.	  Far	  more	  important	  then	  the	  reduction	  in	  tariff	  was	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  it.	  	   Almost	  a	  third341	  of	  the	  decision	  was	  devoted	  to	  the	  Fair	  Dealing	  Analysis.	  Of	  the	  two	  hundred	  and	  ninety-­‐‑one	  events	  in	  the	  volume	  study	  the	  Board	  determined	  that	  only	  thirty-­‐‑nine	  were	  compensable	  events.342	  	  Access	  Copyright	  attempted	  to	  diminish	  the	  impact	  of	  Fair	  Dealing	  by	  questioning	  most	  aspects	  of	  the	  analysis.	  In	  its	  claim	  Access	  Copyright	  argued	  that	  Fair	  Dealing	  was	  a	  defense	  that	  must	  be	  proven	  by	  the	  objectors.	  The	  board	  however	  pointed	  out	  that	  while	  this	  is	  correct	  in	  litigation,	  the	  proceedings	  before	  the	  board	  are	  not	  a	  suit	  of	  copyright	  infringement.343	  Access	  Copyright	  further	  claimed,	  “where	  insufficient	  evidence	  has	  been	  adduced	  to	  evaluate	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  CCH	  factors,	  the	  Objectors	  did	  not	  meet	  their	  burden	  to	  establish	  fairness”.344	  However	  the	  Board	  found	  that	  “it	  is	  possible	  to	  evaluate	  the	  fairness	  of	  a	  dealing	  without	  evidence	  on	  every	  factor”,345	  thus	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reiterating	  that	  only	  a	  sufficient	  boundary	  need	  be	  reached	  for	  the	  dealing	  to	  be	  fair,	  not	  necessarily	  all	  6	  factors.	  Access	  Copyright	  also	  attempted	  to	  suggest	  the	  governments	  were	  hiding	  behind	  their	  employees	  since	  the	  work	  being	  done	  was	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  employers.346	  However	  the	  Board	  disagreed,	  referring	  to	  CCH	  and	  noting	  “[a]s	  the	  lawyer’s	  clients	  were	  in	  CCH,	  so	  the	  provincial	  and	  territorial	  governments,	  and	  in	  certain	  situations,	  their	  citizens,	  are	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  activities	  that	  were	  accomplished	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  dealings	  in	  question”.347	  	   Despite	  the	  clear	  statement	  in	  SOCAN	  v	  Bell	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  perspective	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  a	  Fair	  Dealing	  analysis348,	  Access	  Copyright	  claimed	  that	  copies	  of	  works	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  aggregate	  and	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  individual	  users.	  The	  Board	  disagreed,	  referring	  back	  to	  both	  the	  CCH	  and	  SOCAN	  v	  Bell	  decisions	  and	  noting,	  “[t]his	  approach	  ascribes	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  whole	  to	  its	  constituent	  elements	  without	  justification”.349	  The	  Board	  also	  recognized	  (in	  an	  echo	  going	  back	  to	  the	  original	  Royal	  Commissions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  Boards	  creation)	  that	  despite	  their	  claims	  Access	  Copyright	  does	  not	  in	  fact	  have	  the	  assignations	  for	  all	  the	  works	  it	  claims	  in	  its	  repertoire.350	  Access	  Copyright	  has	  claimed	  a	  relationship	  with	  copyright	  owners	  who	  are	  not	  registered	  members	  of	  their	  organization	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  in	  those	  instances	  they	  have	  transmitted	  to	  the	  copyright	  owner	  of	  the	  work	  a	  cheque,	  which	  in	  turn	  has	  been	  cashed	  thus	  establishing	  an	  agency	  relationship.	  The	  decision	  noted	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Ibid at para 228. 
347 Ibid at para 232. 
348 Supra note 220 at para 41. 
349 Supra note 338 at 289. 
350 Ibid at 119. 
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In	  the	  matter	  before	  us,	  payments	  have	  not	  been	  made	  by	  Access	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  copying	  events	  captured	  in	  the	  Volume	  Study,	  including	  to	  those	  with	  whom	  Access	  does	  not	  have	  an	  affiliate	  agreement.	  Since	  no	  payments	  have	  been	  made,	  no	  agency	  relationship	  could	  have	  arisen	  between	  the	  relevant	  owner	  of	  copyright	  and	  Access.351 	  In	  the	  explanation	  offered	  by	  the	  Board	  they	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  volume	  study	  done	  in	  support	  of	  the	  tariff	  request	  had	  found	  that	  forty-­‐‑one	  of	  the	  two	  hundred	  and	  ninety-­‐‑one	  copying	  events	  involved	  works	  not	  licensed	  by	  Access	  Copyright.352	  The	  Board	  also	  commented	  on	  other	  possible	  ‘irregularities’	  (despite	  the	  absence	  of	  comment	  from	  objectors	  to	  the	  tariff)	  with	  Access	  Copyright’s	  claimed	  repertoire.	  The	  specific	  example	  was	  the	  appearance	  of	  several	  works	  in	  the	  volume	  study	  (which	  Access	  Copyright	  claimed	  as	  part	  of	  their	  repertoire)	  of	  U.S.	  origin	  and	  as	  such	  part	  of	  the	  repertoire	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Clearance	  Centre.	  The	  Board	  noted	  that	  on	  the	  Copyright	  Clearance	  Centre	  website	  they	  stated	  they	  “cannot	  provide	  a	  business	  license”.353	  	  The	  decision	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  is	  extraordinarily	  significant,	  not	  only	  for	  its	  outcome,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  decision	  itself.	  As	  Howard	  Knopf	  has	  commented,	  “[t]he	  Board	  has	  gone	  from	  almost	  a	  dearth	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  and	  explicit	  factual	  underpinning	  and	  analysis	  to	  possibly	  the	  other	  extreme-­‐‑	  which	  is	  clearly	  a	  preferable	  excess	  if	  one	  has	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  extremes”.354	  More	  importantly	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  thesis	  it	  indicates	  a	  changing	  dynamic	  in	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Board	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  SCC.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Ibid at 127. 
352 Ibid at 141. 
353 Ibid at 146. 
354 Howard Knopf, “Possible Fallout From the Copyright Board’s Access Copyright Provincial And 
Territorial Government Decision” (25 May 2015), online: Excess Copyright 
<http://excesscopyright.blogspot.ca/2015/05/possible-fallout-from-copyright-boards.html>. 
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decision	  of	  the	  Board	  is	  absolutely	  grounded	  in	  the	  CCH	  and	  Pentalogy	  rulings	  indicating	  a	  wholesale	  acceptance	  of	  the	  enhanced	  status	  of	  the	  user	  and	  the	  redefined	  understanding	  of	  balance	  within	  the	  Act.	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Chapter	  7	  Reassessing	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  in	  a	  Gramscian	  Frame	  
	   The	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  (as	  it	  was	  originally	  known)	  was	  created	  to	  ensure	  oversight	  on	  the	  monopoly	  powers	  of	  the	  performance	  right	  collective	  (CPRS).	  To	  this	  point	  this	  thesis	  has	  concerned	  itself	  primarily	  with	  the	  history	  and	  development	  of	  that	  tribunal,	  and	  parallel	  tribunals	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Australia.	  Viewing	  these	  agencies	  through	  their	  parallel	  evolutions	  and	  divergences	  the	  thesis	  has	  attempted	  to	  discern	  patterns	  in	  policies	  and	  behaviours	  that	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  through	  an	  analysis	  in	  isolation.	  The	  observations	  thus	  far	  have	  been	  primarily	  rooted	  in	  empirical	  frames:	  case	  decisions,	  tribunal	  constitutions,	  and	  economic	  analyses.	  This	  chapter	  will	  connect	  those	  empirical	  points	  through	  a	  hegemonic	  frame.	  	  	   To	  begin	  we	  should	  return	  to	  the	  initial	  starting	  point,	  the	  myths	  of	  copyright.	  Specifically,	  the	  myth	  that	  it	  benefits	  the	  creator,	  and	  that	  intellectual	  property	  is	  property	  in	  the	  traditional	  understood	  sense.	  Both	  are	  untrue.	  Property	  is	  rivalrous,	  my	  possession	  of	  it	  denies	  its	  use	  to	  anyone	  else	  and	  my	  ownership	  of	  it	  may	  result	  in	  its	  destruction	  or	  damage.	  Conversely	  I	  can	  possess	  the	  intellectual	  content	  of	  a	  book	  (having	  read	  it)	  or	  a	  piece	  of	  music	  (having	  heard	  it)	  and	  this	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  ability	  of	  another	  person	  to	  possess	  it.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  more	  people	  that	  possess	  it	  the	  more	  valuable	  it	  will	  become	  as	  it	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  cultural	  fabric	  and	  language	  of	  the	  society.	  	  However,	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘property’	  rights	  is	  very	  attractive	  to	  those	  seeking	  to	  expand	  the	  circuits	  of	  capital.	  The	  consistent	  lengthening	  of	  copyright	  terms	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  Hargreaves	  report	  is	  a	  result	  of	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questionable	  economic	  data	  used	  to	  buttress	  the	  rationales	  of	  copyright	  term	  increases,	  serves	  to	  strengthen	  and	  inculcate	  the	  dominant	  economic	  goals	  of	  the	  ruling	  hegemony.	  	  As	  Hugenholtz	  and	  Senftleben	  stated	  “[a]ccording	  to	  these	  theories,	  just	  as	  property	  rights	  in	  tangible	  goods	  warrant	  complete	  and	  perpetual	  control,	  making	  unauthorized	  uses	  unlawful	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  copyright	  should	  ideally	  become	  a	  perpetual	  and	  absolute	  right	  that	  tolerates	  few	  or	  no	  ‘free’	  uses”.355	  This	  notion	  of	  an	  imprescriptible	  right	  attached	  to	  ever	  lengthening	  terms	  ensures	  a	  constant	  flow	  of	  capital	  to	  those	  controlling	  the	  process.	  With	  regard	  to	  benefit,	  though	  the	  discussion	  is	  always	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  creator,	  the	  Act	  is	  very	  clear;	  copyright	  benefits	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  work.	  Interestingly	  this	  was	  a	  point	  also	  raised	  by	  the	  Board	  in	  regard	  to	  their	  inaugural	  provinces	  and	  territories	  tariff	  decision,	  noting	  that	  while	  Access	  Copyright	  (Access)	  had	  provided	  a	  list	  of	  creators	  and	  publishers,	  “Access	  receives	  its	  authority	  to	  license	  the	  copying	  of	  a	  work	  from	  a	  person	  when	  they	  are	  the	  owner	  of	  copyright;	  merely	  being	  a	  publisher	  or	  an	  author	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  validly	  grant	  Access	  such	  an	  authorization”.356	  This	  point	  speaks	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  entire	  system	  of	  copyright	  relies	  on	  the	  very	  successful	  myth	  of	  the	  creator	  to	  justify	  what	  is	  really	  an	  owner’s	  benefit,	  and	  as	  noted	  previously	  the	  owners	  are	  usually	  not	  the	  creators	  but	  rather	  their	  publishers.	  This	  owner-­‐‑centric	  mentality	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  proliferation	  of	  the	  creator	  myth	  adopted	  and	  inculcated	  to	  serve	  the	  goals	  of	  industrial	  interests.	  The	  constant	  inculcation	  of	  the	  process	  as	  justified	  by	  the	  creator	  myth	  has	  led	  to	  an	  unquestioned	  acceptance,	  and	  while	  this	  might	  have	  been	  expected	  in	  right	  based	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 Supra	  note	  178	  at	  7. 
356 Supra note 338 at 148. 
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copyright	  jurisdictions	  (e.g.	  France,	  Germany),	  it	  has	  also	  been	  extraordinarily	  successful	  in	  utility-­‐‑based	  regimes.	  From	  its	  initial	  development	  the	  copyright	  tribunal	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  maintain	  some	  balance	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  extreme	  power	  inequity.	  Despite	  the	  regulatory	  nature	  of	  the	  tribunal	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  over	  time	  the	  position	  of	  the	  collectives	  became	  the	  dominant	  one.	  While	  they	  were	  the	  object	  of	  investigation	  in	  the	  1920s	  30s	  and	  50s	  they	  became	  a	  model	  for	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  1980s	  with	  the	  wholesale	  expansion	  of	  the	  collective	  model.	  As	  noted	  in	  chapter	  three	  the	  initial	  formation	  of	  the	  performance	  right	  collectives	  can	  be	  viewed	  within	  the	  hegemonic	  frame	  as	  an	  initial	  cross-­‐‑class	  alliance	  between	  traditional	  opponents	  (publishers	  and	  composers)	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  creating	  new	  circuits	  of	  capital.	  It	  was	  an	  extraordinarily	  successful	  one,	  a	  hegemonic	  process	  that	  has	  grown	  exponentially,	  and	  has	  dominated	  the	  artistic	  economy.	  	   While	  the	  initial	  alliance	  was	  between	  the	  publishers	  and	  composers,	  the	  subsequent	  growth	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  process	  would	  see	  the	  inclusion	  of	  many	  of	  the	  user	  stakeholders	  into	  it.	  Broadcasters	  who	  originally	  entered	  as	  users	  and	  licensees	  became	  collectives	  themselves	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  basis	  for	  collectives	  in	  the	  1988	  copyright	  reform	  (e.g.	  retransmission	  rights	  collective,	  baseball	  broadcaster’s	  collective)	  however	  the	  encroachment	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  process	  went	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  oppositional	  agencies	  of	  owners	  and	  users.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  analysis	  that	  the	  hegemonic	  process	  also	  captured	  the	  tribunals	  charged	  with	  oversight.	  The	  comment	  from	  the	  UK	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  report	  regarding	  the	  lack	  of	  the	  right	  for	  collectives	  to	  make	  references	  to	  the	  board	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as	  being	  the	  ‘nub’	  of	  the	  basis	  for	  allegations	  of	  unfairness	  is	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  this.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  tribunal	  in	  any	  jurisdiction	  is	  to	  ensure	  oversight	  of	  monopolies	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  treatment	  of	  users.	  As	  the	  court	  noted	  in	  Canadian	  
Broadcasting	  Corporation	  v.	  SODRAC	  2003	  Inc.,	  	  “the	  statutory	  scheme’s	  focus	  on	  regulating	  the	  actions	  of	  collective	  organizations,	  and	  the	  case	  law’s	  focus	  on	  ensuring	  that	  such	  organizations	  do	  not	  devolve	  into	  ‘instruments	  of	  oppression	  and	  extortion’	  (Vigneux	  v.	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society	  Ltd.,	  [1943]	  S.C.R.	  348,	  at	  p.o	  356,	  per	  Duff	  J.,	  quoting	  Hanfstaengl	  v.	  Empire	  Palace,	  [1894]	  3	  Ch.	  109,	  at	  p.	  128).”357	  The	  tribunal	  should	  exist	  to	  protect	  the	  users	  from	  the	  collective,	  not	  the	  collective	  from	  the	  user.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  UK	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  report	  completely	  failed	  to	  recognize	  or	  acknowledge	  the	  publishers	  as	  recipients	  in	  the	  collection	  and	  distribution	  of	  tariffs,	  thus	  again	  conflating	  the	  true	  function	  of	  copyright	  with	  the	  romantic	  myth	  of	  protecting	  the	  creator.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  North	  American	  regimes	  the	  publishers	  generally	  receive	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  revenues	  in	  music358,	  and	  often	  significantly	  more	  than	  that	  in	  reprography,	  this	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  creators	  outnumbered	  publishers	  by	  a	  ratio	  of	  almost	  8	  to	  1	  in	  2010.359	  While	  direct	  evidence	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  less	  obvious	  in	  the	  Australian	  regimes,	  the	  report	  on	  the	  Collecting	  Societies	  Code	  of	  Conduct360	  noted	  both	  an	  overwhelming	  feeling	  amongst	  users	  that	  the	  tribunal	  is	  ‘unquestioning’	  in	  regard	  to	  tariff	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 Supra note 322 at para 112.  
358 In the 2014 SOCAN financial report publishers received just under 83 million versus the just over 77 
million received by creators (writers): SOCAN Annual Report 2014, online: 
<http://www.socanannualreport.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/SOCAN_Annual_Report_2014_Financials.pdf>. 
359 2010 was the last year that SOCAN listed membership numbers as part of its financial report with 
respect to disbursement. 
360 Supra note 277. 
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increases	  and	  that	  there	  was	  a	  general	  endorsement	  of	  the	  collectives	  by	  the	  tribunal.	  Both	  comments	  indicate	  a	  tribunal	  that	  is	  heavily	  skewed	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  dominant	  voice	  of	  the	  collectives,	  the	  dominant	  voice	  in	  the	  hegemonic	  process.	  Within	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  decisions	  overturned	  by	  the	  Federal	  Appeals	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  indicate	  a	  tribunal	  process	  also	  strongly	  dominated	  by	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  collectives.361	  The	  fact	  that	  23%	  of	  all	  the	  Boards	  decisions	  between	  2004	  and	  2014	  were	  subject	  to	  judicial	  review	  speaks	  to	  systemic	  issues,	  particularly	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  none	  of	  the	  comparative	  tribunals	  had	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  their	  decisions	  reviewed,	  and	  all	  of	  the	  comparators	  had	  delivered	  at	  least	  double	  the	  number	  of	  decisions	  the	  Board	  had.	  Concurrent	  with	  this	  is	  the	  ongoing	  internal	  review	  process	  in	  which	  licensees,	  as	  well	  as	  Howard	  Knopf	  and	  J.	  Aidan	  O’Neill,	  have	  pointed	  out	  the	  board’s	  deference	  to	  the	  collectives	  with	  respect	  to	  compliance	  measures,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  respect	  to	  suggested	  initiatives	  regarding	  publication	  and	  accessibility.	  The	  processes	  of	  the	  Board	  itself	  have	  undoubtedly	  favoured	  the	  collective’s	  operation.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  only	  notice	  required	  for	  a	  new	  tariff	  (even	  one	  directed	  to	  a	  newly	  defined	  user	  group	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  hotels	  and	  Re:	  Sound)	  was	  publication	  in	  the	  Gazette	  gave	  an	  extraordinary	  amount	  of	  power	  to	  the	  collective	  over	  the	  user,	  and	  only	  serves	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  imbalance.	  	   During	  the	  period	  under	  discussion	  there	  was	  also	  a	  growing	  awareness	  of	  copyright	  and	  its	  associated	  regimes	  within	  the	  larger	  social	  context.	  The	  backlash	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 As an example of the 21 cases heard by the FAC 18 could be viewed as oppositional issues between 
collectives and users (some were simply procedural) and of these 10 would be found in favour of the 
licensee by the FAC and SCC. 
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surrounding	  the	  Access	  Copyright	  proposed	  colleges	  and	  universities	  tariff	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two	  and	  the	  redefinition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  copyright	  in	  contemporary	  society	  with	  respect	  to	  notions	  of	  owning	  and	  using	  has	  contributed	  to	  this	  shift.	  While	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  collectives	  and	  tribunals	  has	  occurred	  at	  corporate	  levels,	  be	  that	  the	  collectives	  or	  the	  industries	  or	  the	  large	  scale	  users	  they	  are	  focusing	  upon,	  the	  Access	  Copyright	  proposed	  tariff	  issue	  raised	  awareness	  in	  a	  critical	  and	  seminal	  way	  amongst	  individual	  end	  users,	  most	  of	  which	  had	  been	  completely	  unaware	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  collective	  licensing.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  contributed	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  moment	  of	  organic	  crisis	  for	  the	  hegemonic	  process	  when	  they	  recognized	  the	  existence	  of	  User’s	  rights	  within	  the	  Act	  and	  posited	  a	  redefined	  Fair	  Dealing	  as	  not	  merely	  a	  defense,	  but	  a	  right.	  Despite	  this	  direction	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  did	  not	  immediately	  recognize	  the	  shift	  to	  a	  more	  balanced	  reading	  and	  continued	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  owner-­‐‑centric	  fashion.	  Given	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  ruling	  hegemony	  and	  its	  massive	  expansion	  in	  the	  twenty	  years	  preceding	  CCH	  this	  was	  not	  surprising.	  The	  CCH	  ruling	  would	  establish	  new	  parameters	  and	  would	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  subsequent	  rulings	  of	  the	  court	  in	  the	  2012	  Pentalogy,	  and	  the	  eventual	  impact	  on	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  would	  be	  particularly	  significant.	  	   Graham	  Reynolds	  has	  given	  careful	  consideration	  to	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  SCC	  in	  Alberta	  v	  AC,	  in	  particular,	  he	  has	  been	  drawn	  to	  the	  dissenting	  comments	  of	  Rothstein.	  Reynolds	  posits	  that	  Rothstein	  is	  saying	  the	  court	  inadvertently	  applied	  a	  correctness	  standard	  instead	  of	  a	  reasonableness	  standard.362	  Reynolds	  notes	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Graham Reynolds “Of Reasonableness, Fairness and the Public Interest: Judicial Review of Copyright 
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in	  Alberta	  v	  AC	  the	  majority	  rejected	  the	  boards’	  decision	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  given	  their	  analysis	  it	  was	  an	  unreasonable	  outcome.	  However,	  Reynolds	  sides	  with	  Rothstein’s	  dissenting	  view	  that	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  board	  was	  not	  unreasonable.	  Why	  then	  is	  the	  ruling	  in	  Alberta	  v	  AC	  not	  in	  error?	  Referring	  to	  the	  case	  of	  SOCAN	  v	  
Bell,	  363	  Reynolds	  notes	  that	  Justice	  Abella	  “described	  the	  author-­‐‑centric	  approach	  to	  copyright	  as	  the	  ‘former	  framework’	  and	  the	  ‘earlier’	  view	  of	  copyright”.364	  	  Given	  the	  decision	  handed	  down	  in	  CCH,	  the	  owner	  centric	  approach	  to	  copyright	  that	  had	  been	  standard	  in	  Canada	  and	  throughout	  the	  commonwealth,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  cases	  Access	  Copyright	  used	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  support	  its	  position	  in	  Alberta	  v	  AC,	  was	  no	  longer	  good	  law	  in	  Canada.	  CCH	  had	  changed	  that	  dynamic	  and	  the	  Board	  had	  failed	  to	  recognize	  and	  appreciate	  the	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  copyright	  law	  in	  Canada.365	  	  	   The	  author	  posits	  that	  this	  issue	  goes	  deeper	  than	  Reynolds	  has	  stated.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  legal	  process	  and	  the	  makeup	  of	  the	  board	  itself	  had	  guaranteed	  a	  self-­‐‑perpetuating	  approach	  that	  was	  fundamentally	  owner	  centric.	  	  Consider	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  of	  Canada	  during	  the	  period	  under	  review.	  The	  chairman,	  Mr.	  William	  J.	  Vancise,	  was	  a	  justice	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  for	  Saskatchewan	  and	  was	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  board	  from	  2004-­‐‑2014.	  Since	  members	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  Act	  to	  two	  terms	  maximum	  he	  stepped	  down	  from	  the	  board	  in	  June	  of	  2014.	  Mr.	  Justice	  Vancise	  graduated	  from	  law	  school	  in	  1960	  and	  was	  called	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Board Decisions in Canada’s Copyright Pentalogy” in Michael Geist, ed, The Copyright Pentalogy How 
the Supreme Court Shook the Foundations of Copyright Law (University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, 2013).  
363 Supra note 220.  
364 Supra note 362 at 17.  
365 Ibid at 21. 
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to	  the	  bar	  in	  1961.366	  J.	  Nelson	  Landry	  joined	  the	  board	  in	  2010;	  he	  graduated	  from	  law	  school	  in	  1968	  and	  was	  called	  to	  the	  bar	  in	  1969.	  He	  was	  a	  member	  of	  Ogilvy	  Renault	  from	  1969	  to	  2002,	  leaving	  as	  a	  senior	  partner.367	  	  Claude	  Majeau	  was	  appointed	  vice	  chairman	  and	  CEO	  in	  August	  of	  2009,	  he	  had	  been	  secretary	  general	  of	  the	  board	  since	  1993.	  Graduating	  from	  law	  school	  in	  1977	  and	  called	  to	  the	  Quebec	  bar	  in	  1979	  Mr.	  Majeau	  had	  spent	  most	  of	  career	  in	  various	  positions	  within	  the	  civil	  service.	  368	  	   Thus	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  had	  a	  combined	  137	  years	  of	  practice	  in	  intellectual	  policy	  issues.	  If,	  as	  has	  been	  made	  clear	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  court	  and	  subsequent	  analyses,	  the	  owner	  centric	  paradigm	  is	  the	  dominant	  one	  in	  commonwealth	  legal	  tradition	  than	  unquestionably	  the	  dominant	  paradigm	  taught,	  learned,	  ingested	  and	  practiced	  not	  just	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  board,	  but	  by	  the	  legal	  profession	  as	  a	  whole,	  has	  been	  the	  owner	  centric	  one.	  The	  CCH	  ruling	  was	  handed	  down	  in	  2004;	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  think	  that	  a	  fundamentally	  new	  approach	  would	  have	  been	  absorbed	  quickly	  enough	  to	  counterbalance	  the	  prevailing	  attitudes.	  Consider	  the	  ongoing	  efforts	  of	  Access	  Copyright	  to	  impose	  unreasonable	  licenses	  in	  their	  inaugural	  provinces	  and	  territories	  tariff	  (despite	  the	  Alberta	  v	  AC	  rulings,	  and	  CCH).	  Such	  behaviours	  only	  emphasize	  that	  established	  practices	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 Canada, “Archived - William J. Vancise Reappointed to the Copyright Board of Canada” (15 May 
2009), online: < http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?m=/index&nid=450919>. Press release from Minister 
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difficult	  to	  change	  despite	  new	  realities.	  	   Beyond	  simply	  the	  Board,	  the	  lawyers	  who	  inform	  and	  manage	  the	  process	  are	  also	  products	  of	  the	  same	  system.	  And,	  importantly,	  many	  of	  them	  move	  back	  and	  forth	  within	  the	  policy	  network,	  creating	  and	  supporting	  justifications	  for	  the	  system	  itself.	  For	  example,	  the	  2006	  Industry	  Canada	  Report	  on	  Collectives	  was	  written	  by	  C.	  Craig	  Parks,	  who	  is	  also	  legal	  counsel	  for	  the	  collective	  Music	  Rights	  Organization	  of	  Canada.	  Shane	  Simpson	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  entertainment	  and	  media	  attorneys	  in	  Australia	  wrote	  the	  Simpson	  Report	  on	  Collectives	  in	  Australia.	  Perhaps	  the	  reason	  the	  Hargreaves	  report	  came	  down	  so	  strongly	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  methodologically	  sound	  economic	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  IP	  policy	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  Ian	  Hargreaves	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  historic	  practice	  surrounding	  IP	  issues,	  and	  thus	  had	  no	  preconceived	  or	  inculcated	  expectations.	  	  	   If	  user’s	  rights	  are	  truly	  to	  become	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  not	  simply	  as	  public	  relations	  exercises	  in	  appeasing	  growing	  user	  discontent	  with	  current	  copyright	  practice,	  then	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  genuine	  representation	  of	  the	  users	  within	  the	  makeup	  of	  the	  Board	  itself.	  Arguably	  the	  owner-­‐‑centric	  industry	  interests	  are	  already	  represented	  given	  that	  so	  many	  members	  of	  the	  board	  were	  in	  fact	  practicing	  attorneys	  prior	  to	  their	  appointment.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  any	  consciously	  improper	  behaviour	  on	  their	  part	  but	  referring	  back	  to	  the	  earlier	  point	  if	  one	  is	  trained	  with	  a	  certain	  paradigm	  in	  mind	  and	  practices	  that	  paradigm	  in	  their	  professional	  career	  they	  will	  carry	  that	  paradigm	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously.	  These	  lawyers	  are	  the	  ‘intellectuals’	  within	  Gramsci’s	  framing	  of	  hegemony,	  responsible	  for	  inculcating	  and	  implementing	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  dominant	  order.	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   Doris	  Nadine	  McDonnell	  has	  noted	  in	  her	  work	  that	  the	  insular	  nature	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  its	  inability	  to	  accept	  those	  not	  within	  the	  “priesthood”	  of	  law	  interferes	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  public	  to	  actually	  participate	  in	  the	  process.369	  Thus	  the	  policy	  process	  is	  not	  particularly	  conducive	  to	  entertaining	  end	  user	  concerns	  or	  suggestions,	  and	  as	  Samuelson	  notes,	  in	  a	  rather	  blunt	  assessment,	  “Collective	  action	  problems	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  parties	  that	  will	  be	  negatively	  affected	  by	  higher	  protection	  rules	  to	  organize	  effective	  resistance	  to	  copyright	  industry	  lobbying.	  This	  mix	  of	  concentrated	  benefits	  and	  distributed	  costs	  is	  likely	  to	  yield	  the	  best	  laws	  money	  can	  buy”.370	  	   It	  is	  worth	  reiterating	  that	  despite	  admonitions	  to	  the	  contrary	  the	  initial	  purpose	  of	  the	  board	  was	  to	  protect	  users	  from	  exploitation	  by	  the	  collectives	  and	  even	  in	  the	  current	  neo-­‐‑liberal	  dynamic	  there	  is	  at	  least	  a	  grudging	  recognition	  of	  the	  disparity	  in	  power	  between	  the	  negotiating	  parties	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  CAB,	  SOCAN	  and	  CMRRA	  submissions	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  consultation.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  users’	  right	  advocate	  on	  the	  board	  would	  go	  a	  long	  way	  to	  creating	  the	  balance	  the	  Court	  has	  looked	  for	  since	  Theberge.	  Ultimately	  it	  has	  been	  the	  recent	  rulings	  of	  the	  SCC	  with	  their	  inherently	  new	  direction	  for	  copyright	  in	  Canada	  that	  may	  define	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  board	  such	  that	  our	  path	  will	  diverge	  even	  further	  from	  that	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Australian	  tribunals.	  In	  practice	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  much	  of	  the	  SCC’s	  rulings	  the	  board	  will	  take	  to	  heart	  but	  it	  has	  been	  the	  SCC	  and	  its	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  copyright	  that	  has	  created	  the	  seed	  for	  this	  organic	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crisis.	  	   The	  following	  section	  will	  review	  the	  research	  questions	  stated	  at	  the	  outset	  in	  light	  of	  the	  analysis	  offered	  in	  this	  study.	  
7.1	  Research	  Questions	  
1.   In	  what	  ways	  has	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  changed	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  scope	  
and	  oversight	  role	  since	  its	  creation	  as	  the	  Copyright	  Appeal	  Board	  in	  
1936?	  While	  the	  board	  began	  its	  role	  as	  one	  of	  oversight	  on	  behalf	  of	  users	  against	  the	  monopoly	  power	  of	  performance	  right	  collectives,	  over	  time	  that	  role	  became	  increasingly	  one	  of	  economic	  advancement.	  As	  commented	  on	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  this	  was	  something	  seen	  in	  all	  jurisdictions	  discussed,	  though	  even	  more	  so	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  However,	  with	  the	  2004	  and	  2012	  rulings	  of	  the	  SCC	  recent	  decisions	  of	  the	  board	  seem	  to	  be	  taking	  greater	  consideration	  of	  the	  user	  into	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  This	  has	  been	  particularly	  evident	  in	  its	  most	  recent	  decision	  with	  regard	  to	  Access	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Provinces	  and	  Territories	  tariff.	  2.   How	  well	  are	  user	  interests	  represented	  in	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  Board?	  	  	  In	  practice	  the	  Board	  has	  not	  been	  overly	  concerned	  with	  user	  interests,	  as	  comments	  from	  the	  various	  reports	  have	  noted.	  Again	  however,	  recent	  developments	  at	  the	  SCC	  are	  encouraging	  a	  changing	  dynamic	  in	  Board	  decisions.	  For	  example,	  while	  the	  Board	  still	  presented	  a	  very	  owner,	  or	  collective-­‐‑centric	  approach	  in	  the	  FCA	  appeal	  cases,	  at	  the	  SCC	  level	  the	  SOCAN	  v	  Bell	  decision	  (at	  least)	  had	  absorbed	  the	  high	  courts	  direction	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  ‘broad’	  understanding	  of	  research.	  Also,	  the	  recent	  decision	  of	  the	  Board	  with	  respect	  to	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provinces	  and	  territories	  tariff	  shows	  a	  far	  greater	  inclusion	  of	  the	  principles	  set	  forth	  in	  CCH	  and	  the	  Pentalogy	  rulings.	  Similarly,	  recommendation	  of	  the	  Working	  Committee	  on	  the	  Operations	  Procedures	  and	  Processes	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  to	  enhance	  the	  accessibility	  of	  tariff	  creations	  and	  justifications	  are	  indicative	  of	  a	  more	  balanced	  approach	  with	  respect	  to	  user	  interests.	  While	  outcomes	  of	  this	  process	  are	  still	  unknown	  this	  is	  at	  least	  a	  hopeful	  step.	  
3.   Has	  lobbying	  by	  the	  various	  industries	  represented	  by	  collective	  
management	  shaped/impacted	  board	  practice?	  The	  economic	  evidence	  presented	  in	  chapter	  two	  as	  well	  as	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  Hargreaves	  report	  and	  the	  Mitra-­‐‑Kahn	  offer	  a	  preponderance	  of	  evidence	  that	  the	  policy	  process	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  industry	  interests.	  Mr.	  Knopf’s	  comments	  with	  respect	  to	  ‘expert’	  evidence	  as	  well	  as	  those	  noted	  by	  SCONUL	  in	  the	  UK	  Copyright	  Tribunal	  Report,	  and	  SOCAN’s	  response	  to	  the	  working	  group	  regarding	  the	  Boards	  acquiescence	  to	  its	  suggestion,	  all	  indicate	  an	  owner	  centric	  dynamic.	  This	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  the	  UK	  report	  on	  a	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Collecting	  Societies,	  which	  noted	  the	  owner	  centric	  nature	  of	  the	  Australian	  tribunal	  and	  the	  increasing	  hostility	  emanating	  from	  licensees	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  critical	  response	  to	  tariff	  justifications.	  These	  indicate	  a	  significant	  disparity	  in	  the	  power	  relations	  before	  the	  tribunals,	  which	  has	  impacted	  board	  practice.	  
4.  	  Is	  there	  evidence	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  policy	  or	  findings	  of	  the	  board	  as	  a	  
function	  over	  time?	  Bearing	  in	  mind	  its	  initial	  role	  of	  oversight,	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  role	  and	  function	  of	  the	  board	  as	  well	  the	  staggering	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  collectives	  operating	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following	  the	  1988	  revisions	  to	  the	  Act,	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  of	  impacts	  upon	  the	  board.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  responses	  to	  questions	  1-­‐‑3	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  owner	  centric	  patterns	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Board	  following	  this	  period.	  However,	  in	  fairness	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  as	  Reynolds	  pointed	  out,	  the	  tradition	  of	  Copyright	  prior	  to	  CCH	  was	  an	  owner	  centric	  practice.	  
5.   Has	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  original	  public	  performance	  right	  collectives	  
continued	  to	  significantly	  impact	  the	  board	  since	  the	  1988	  copyright	  
revisions,	  or	  has	  the	  network	  seen	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  key	  
players?	  The	  original	  performing	  rights	  organization	  in	  Canada	  was	  the	  Canadian	  Performing	  Right	  Society,	  it	  successor	  today	  is	  SOCAN.	  As	  has	  been	  noted	  by	  Gervais	  and	  in	  the	  initial	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis,	  SOCAN,	  like	  all	  the	  collectives	  for	  music	  worldwide,	  is	  by	  far	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  greatest	  proportion	  of	  tariff	  revenues.	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  sole	  recipient	  as	  it	  once	  was,	  but	  as	  Gervais	  noted	  music	  collectives	  collect	  more	  revenue	  than	  all	  other	  collectives	  in	  Canada	  combined.	  Regardless	  there	  are	  new	  and	  key	  players	  in	  the	  system.	  Until	  recently	  Access	  Copyright	  would	  likely	  have	  been	  one	  of	  the	  strongest,	  but	  its	  successive	  losses	  in	  the	  courts	  coupled	  with	  its	  most	  recent	  losses	  at	  the	  Board371	  have	  significantly	  weakened	  its	  power.	  Nonetheless,	  judging	  from	  the	  submissions	  in	  response	  to	  the	  working	  paper	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  strong	  players	  in	  the	  system,	  the	  BDU’s	  and	  CAB	  amongst	  them,	  however	  SOCAN	  is	  still	  dominant.	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Concluding	  Thoughts	  	   	   Within	  the	  context	  of	  IP	  discussion	  generally	  and	  copyright	  tribunals	  specifically	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  overarching	  need	  to	  ‘fit’	  the	  process	  to	  the	  evolving	  social	  practice.	  For	  Collectives	  this	  has	  meant	  enlarging	  the	  frames	  and	  terms	  of	  their	  collection	  and	  the	  sites	  of	  acquisition.	  For	  licensees	  and	  the	  small-­‐‑scale	  user,	  it	  has	  meant	  fighting	  a	  losing	  battle	  (generally)	  against	  increasing	  tariffs	  and	  attempting	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  pass	  on	  costs	  to	  the	  end	  user.	  For	  the	  Board	  it	  has	  for	  the	  most	  part	  been	  business	  as	  usual.	  The	  change	  that	  has	  occurred	  (is	  occurring)	  is	  primarily	  the	  result	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada.	  However,	  the	  one	  truly	  absent	  point	  has	  been	  the	  real	  consideration	  of	  any	  alternatives.	  Simply	  because	  we	  can	  charge	  a	  toll	  on	  our	  information	  thoroughfares	  doesn’t	  mean	  we	  should.	  Is	  there	  another	  way?	  	   If	  the	  true	  purpose	  of	  copyright	  is	  to	  incent	  creation,	  and	  if	  the	  desire	  is	  that	  it	  genuinely	  benefit	  the	  creator,	  why	  do	  we	  continue	  with	  a	  system	  that,	  as	  the	  economic	  studies	  have	  indicated,	  is	  clearly	  not	  very	  effective	  at	  either?	  At	  a	  time	  when	  our	  global	  society	  has	  begun	  to	  rethink	  the	  meaning	  of	  ownership	  and	  creation,	  who	  is	  a	  creator	  and	  with	  what,	  should	  we	  not	  also	  reconsider	  how	  we	  want	  to	  incent	  creativity?	  Clearly	  our	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  noted	  the	  change	  in	  our	  world	  given	  their	  uniquely	  expanded	  understanding	  of	  Fair	  Dealing	  and	  User’s	  Rights.	  The	  Hargreaves	  report	  was	  also	  crystal	  clear	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  changing	  nature	  and	  evolution	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  in	  our	  contemporary	  period	  commenting	  “[t]he	  copyright	  regime	  cannot	  be	  considered	  fit	  for	  the	  digital	  age	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when	  millions	  of	  citizens	  are	  in	  daily	  breach	  of	  copyright”.372	  	   The	  standard	  rationales	  for	  copyright	  are	  simply	  not	  a	  good	  ‘fit’	  for	  modern	  society.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  make	  copyright	  fit,	  we	  should	  be	  seeking	  alternatives	  that	  do	  fit.	  What	  that	  alternative	  might	  be	  is	  unclear,	  but	  first	  and	  foremost	  clarity	  as	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  copyright	  as	  a	  policy	  instrument	  must	  be	  forthcoming.	  If	  there	  is	  to	  be	  any	  hope	  of	  reform,	  the	  fundamental	  purpose	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  must	  be	  settled.	  Presently	  the	  purpose	  is	  either	  viewed	  pragmatically,	  as	  one	  of	  incenting	  creation,	  or	  romantically	  as	  one	  of	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  creators.	  Copyright	  as	  it	  presently	  exists	  does	  not	  serve	  either	  of	  those	  objectives	  well.	  	   If	  the	  intended	  purpose	  is	  to	  actually	  reward	  creators	  then	  we	  need	  policies	  that	  provide	  real	  impact	  for	  creators	  across	  a	  broad	  spectrum,	  not	  simply	  the	  very	  few	  ‘winners’	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  pyramid.	  As	  the	  economists	  Boldrin	  and	  Levine	  have	  noted,	  “[g]ood	  economic	  laws	  and	  institutions	  are	  designed	  not	  to	  make	  a	  few	  lucky	  people	  super	  wealthy,	  but	  to	  make	  the	  average	  consumer	  better	  off.”(Emphasis	  added)373	  The	  most	  lucrative	  copyright	  collectives,	  those	  associated	  with	  music,	  disperse	  somewhat	  more	  than	  half	  of	  all	  revenues	  to	  the	  publishers	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  creators.	  Recall	  that	  the	  Hargreaves’s	  Report	  condemned	  the	  lack	  of	  evidence	  based	  policy	  creation	  and	  particularly	  cited	  copyright	  term	  extension	  as	  a	  poignant	  example	  of	  policy	  decisions	  made	  in	  spite	  of	  economic	  evidence.	  Recall	  also	  the	  comments	  of	  Towse,	  Kretschmer	  and	  Mitra-­‐‑Khan,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  ‘winner	  take	  all’	  nature	  of	  those	  royalties	  that	  are	  dispersed	  to	  creators.	  If	  our	  policy	  goal	  with	  the	  copyright	  system	  is	  to	  incent	  creation	  and	  promulgate	  cultural	  growth	  in	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 Supra note 264 at 6. 373	  Supra	  note	  24	  at	  125.	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community,	  our	  current	  approach	  vis	  a	  vis	  copyright	  is	  akin	  to	  trying	  to	  address	  poverty	  in	  our	  society	  by	  means	  of	  distributing	  lottery	  tickets.	  A	  few	  may	  get	  lucky,	  but	  the	  majority	  will	  continue	  to	  suffer.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  creators	  are	  not	  the	  big	  winners	  in	  copyright	  despite	  all	  the	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  them,	  but	  there	  are	  alternatives.	  	  	   Consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  tax-­‐‑free	  status	  for	  artists	  or	  a	  guaranteed	  minimum	  wage	  in	  return	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  copyright.	  How	  might	  that	  impact	  the	  creative	  process	  and	  the	  artistic	  community?	  For	  the	  average	  composer/musician/writer	  having	  tax-­‐‑free	  status,	  or	  a	  guaranteed	  minimum	  income	  would	  be	  vastly	  more	  beneficial	  than	  the	  current	  lottery	  approach.	  Nor	  is	  this	  as	  outlandish	  an	  approach	  as	  it	  might	  at	  first	  glance	  appear.	  Ireland	  has	  had	  a	  tax-­‐‑free	  status	  system	  in	  place	  for	  artists	  since	  1969374,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  credited	  in	  part	  with	  feeding	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  technology	  sector	  by	  virtue	  of	  creating	  a	  large	  supply	  of	  graphic	  artists	  and	  musical	  designers.375	  Couple	  this	  with	  Finland’s	  recently	  announced	  intention	  to	  provide	  all	  citizens	  with	  a	  guaranteed	  minimum	  income.376	  	   Finland	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  experimenting	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  guaranteed	  income,	  Canada	  did	  the	  same	  in	  the	  community	  of	  Dauphin	  Manitoba	  back	  in	  the	  1970s,377	  	  and	  a	  pilot	  project	  is	  planned	  for	  Utrecht	  in	  2016,	  with	  Switzerland	  voting	  on	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 For further information on this program see the following online: 
<http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/reliefs/artists-exemption.html>. 
375 Thomas	  C.	  O’Connor	  &	  Terence	  M.	  O’Connor,	  “Tax	  exemption	  as	  a	  marketing	  tool:	  The	  Irish	  Republic	  and	  profits	  derived	  from	  artistic	  creativity”	  (2009)	  62.10	  Journal	  of	  Business	  Research	  1002	  at	  1005. 
376 Daniel Tencer, “Finland’s Basic Income Plan Would See All Citizens Receive 800 Euro A Month” 
Huffington Post, December 7, 2015, online: http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/12/07/basic-income-
finland_n_8739898.html. 
377 Evelyn Forget, The	  Town	  With	  No	  Poverty:	  Using	  Health	  Administration	  Data	  to	  Revisit	  Outcomes	  of	  a	  Canadian	  Guaranteed	  Annual	  Income	  Field	  Experiment.	  University	  of	  Manitoba.	  2011	  online:	  <http://nccdh.ca/resources/entry/the-­‐‑town-­‐‑with-­‐‑no-­‐‑poverty#sthash.5c3ntlmq.dpuf>.>. 
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project	  as	  well.378	  Funding	  for	  such	  an	  endeavour	  directed	  towards	  the	  arts	  could	  in	  part	  be	  provided	  from	  the	  savings	  that	  would	  be	  realized	  by	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  surrounding	  the	  management	  of	  the	  current	  systems,	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  being	  one.	  In	  the	  2011	  National	  Household	  Survey	  3,400	  Canadians	  identified	  themselves	  as	  composers,	  conductors	  and	  arrangers.379	  	  Simply	  dividing	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  budget	  for	  2014380	  among	  them	  would	  mean	  each	  would	  receive	  an	  additional	  $1033.58,	  which	  doesn’t	  sound	  like	  a	  great	  deal,	  but	  is	  significantly	  more	  than	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office	  determined	  the	  average	  British	  artist	  would	  receive	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  copyright	  term	  extension	  in	  sound	  recordings.	  This	  example	  only	  references	  the	  yearly	  budget	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Board.	  If	  a	  minimal	  rate	  were	  attached	  to	  all	  commercial	  tax	  filings	  of	  those	  industries	  presently	  targeted	  by	  collectives	  the	  amount	  available	  for	  distribution	  could	  be	  quite	  significant.	  In	  addition	  tax-­‐‑free	  status	  would	  ensure	  an	  additional	  15%381	  in	  disposable	  income.	  Given	  the	  generally	  low	  income	  of	  most	  artists	  this	  would	  also	  not	  place	  a	  significant	  burden	  on	  the	  Canadian	  tax	  base	  particularly	  if	  there	  were	  a	  maximum	  income	  cap.	  	  	   Regardless	  of	  the	  method,	  an	  equitable	  solution	  is	  needed.	  The	  current	  regime	  simply	  does	  not	  serve	  artists	  well	  and	  given	  the	  influence	  of	  lobbyists	  it	  is	  not	  ever	  likely	  to.	  As	  Ruth	  Towse	  so	  eloquently	  noted,	  “the	  tentative	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  economic	  power	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  cultural	  industries,	  which	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  vertically	  integrated	  oligopolies,	  strengthened	  as	  they	  are	  by	  copyright	  law,	  is	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Supra note 376. 
379 Hill Strategies Research Inc., A	  Statistical	  Profile	  of	  Artists	  and	  Cultural	  Workers	  in	  Canada,	  (2014),	  online:	  <http://www.hillstrategies.com/content/statistical-­‐‑profile-­‐‑artists-­‐‑and-­‐‑cultural-­‐‑workers-­‐‑canada>.	  
380 See onine: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/annual-annuel/2013-2014-financial-statements-
etats-financiers-e.html>. 
381 Or more depending on earnings, but the majority of artists are generally in the lowest income brackets. 
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that	  conceivable	  changes	  to	  that	  law	  could	  not	  vastly	  improve	  the	  earnings	  of	  artists”.382	  That	  outcome	  is	  certainly	  not	  one	  we	  should	  be	  seeking	  for	  our	  culture	  and	  artists.
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  Act,	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  Act	  for	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  Encouragement	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  by	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  Copies	  of	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  Books	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  Authors	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